Governing the Health Commons: 

An Institutional Analysis and Development (Iad) Framework on Health Devolution in Greater Manchester by Lazo, Kimberly
Lazo, Kimberly (2019) Governing the Health Commons: An Institutional
Analysis and Development (Iad) Framework on Health Devolution in Greater
Manchester. Doctoral thesis (PhD), Manchester Metropolitan University.
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/626071/
Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Deriva-
tive Works 4.0





GOVERNING THE HEALTH COMMONS: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
DEVELOPMENT (IAD) FRAMEWORK ON HEALTH 









K C LAZO 
 
PhD     2019
 
GOVERNING THE HEALTH COMMONS:  
AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
DEVELOPMENT (IAD) FRAMEWORK ON HEALTH 




KIMBERLY CAMILLE LAZO 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
of Manchester Metropolitan University  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Department of Economics, Policy,  












“The NHS will last as long as there are folk with the faith to fight for it.” 






In 2015, Greater Manchester (GM) has landed a landmark devolution deal in health 
with the government. National Health Services (NHS) England agreed to delegate some 
functions to the city-region, including strategic planning and administrative 
responsibilities. The GM Health and Social Care (GMHSC) Partnership was established 
in order to bring together local authorities, NHS organisations, and community-based 
institutions and to provide strategic direction and make collective decisions on behalf of 
the overall GM health and care economy. Using collective action, common property 
regimes, and collaborative governance as theoretical lens, this research argues that 
health systems leaders of a regional can come together as a collective unit and act as 
stewards of their health commons. They can devise institutional arrangements and use 
collaborative mechanisms in order to address collective action dilemmas and address 
the sustainability issue of the health commons. 
This research proposes an alternative solution in managing and sustaining the NHS. 
It aims to explore how formal and informal institutions emerged as a response to 
collective action dilemmas in the context of the Health Devolution policy and GMHSC 
Partnership. Using a qualitative approach, we used the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework to explore the role of rules and how they emerge as a 
response to collective action dilemmas, and how the (in)formal institutional 
arrangements facilitate and influence the interaction of the actors. Our findings suggest 
that the Partnership demonstrated that with the right combination of leadership, trust, 
and collective intention to resolve joint problems, then it is possible to overcome the 
political barriers of Devolution. They were able to successfully craft, enforce, and monitor 
their own institutional arrangements to overcome the limitations of the formal rules and 
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This chapter outlines the background of the study and why it is important in the policy 
context, followed by the supporting theoretical assumptions that will guide the thesis. We 
then highlight the rationale of the study and enumerate the research objectives needed 
to be addressed. The chapter concludes with a section on the summary of each chapter 
in the thesis. 
1.2 Background of the study 
This thesis investigates how formal and informal institutions emerged as a response 
to collective action dilemmas in the health policy context. We apply this in the Health 
Devolution (Devo Health) context in Greater Manchester (GM), where we posit that 
health system actors, such as local authority (LA) leaders, local National Health Service 
(NHS) providers, voluntary and community groups, etc., can come together and act as 
stewards of their own local health and social care (HSC) economy as a response to the 
need for sustaining their resources.  
Analogous to the conceptualisation of the commons, we recognise that health 
resources can be devised as a shared property between those who benefit from it, where 
those said individuals (or organisations) can function as semi-autonomous communities 
and craft their own rules to monitor who, what, and how to appropriate from it. This 
research suggests that we can compare these conditions similar to that of governing 
common pool resources (CPR), where self-organising communities formulated 
institutional arrangements in order to limit free-riding behaviour and to shape the 
incentives of those who benefit from the shared resource. McGinnis and Brink (2012) 
demonstrated in a pioneering study in the health commons that a health care community 
in Grand Junction, Colorado was able to generate positive health outcomes by managing 
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their own resources, exerting influence over collective decisions on how to allocate their 
shared resources, and creating parameters and governing structures to moderate 
multisectoral relationships. These group of leaders formed a collaborative governance, 
where they have a collective responsibility of overseeing the health commons and make 
decisions on behalf of its population to ensure that the resource will be sustained for later 
use.  
Following the success of this study, we aim to replicate the findings of McGinnis and 
Brink's (2012) study and apply it in the United Kingdom (UK) health context, which has 
never been explored before. Whilst there has been a wide amount of research 
addressing how and why we should sustain the health resources in the UK through a 
plethora of state-led policies, place-based approaches, and/or partnership working 
(Alderwick, 2015; Ham and Alderwick, 2015; Ham, 2018a), empirical evidence using a 
collective action and institutional approach to regional stewardship of managing a 
particular segment of the NHS remains unexplored.  
There are several reasons why we should examine these conditions and why we are 
interested in exploring this phenomenon. This is outlined as follows. 
1.2.1 Sustainability of the NHS: not enough fish in the sea 
When the NHS was established in 1948, it advocated for free (at the point of use) 
comprehensive health care services to all UK citizens funded primarily by general 
taxation (Gorsky, 2008). For as long as we know, it has been a universally admired 
institution that offers “one of the best and most cost-effective health services in the world” 
(British Medical Association, 2018b:2). However, this has not been the case over the last 
two decades. It has been well-documented that the top-down centralised and hospital-
based model of care established in 1948 is no longer adequate to fit the fast-growing 
population and ever-changing needs of the UK population (Department of Health, 2016; 
NHS England, 2017; The King’s Fund, 2017; British Medical Association, 2018b).  
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The NHS has been under enormous financial pressure to sustain quality care and 
keep up with the rising demands. Recent figures indicate that it is predicted from 2019-
2020 to 2023-204 that health spending will increase by 3.4% a year on average as a 
result of the growing ageing population, increasing prevalence of chronic conditions, and 
the rising costs of delivery of care (National Audit Office and Department of Health & 
Social Care, 2019). However, over the last decade, there has been an overall slowdown 
in the growth of NHS funding as a proportion of the UK's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
dropping from 7.6% in 2009-2010 to 7.2% in 2018-2019  (The Health Foundation, 2019). 
As the NHS budget continues to tighten due to austerity measures, this resulted in a 
negative impact on access to services and quality care. NHS trusts and CCGs are 
spending more than their income, whilst Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments 
continue to miss their targets (National Audit Office and Department of Health & Social 
Care, 2019). These narratives posed unprecedented risks to the sustainability of the 
NHS and whether the government is doing enough to make sure that the NHS will still 
be alive and standing for the future generations. 
Whilst the NHS is incomparable to any natural or man-made CPR, the logic of 
sustaining the commons is still applicable. Alderwick (2015) explained that the public 
draws from a pool of resources, such as health services, human capital, and estates, 
being provided by the NHS. The providers of NHS services, on the other hand, are only 
provided a limited set of these resources that is being paid for from an allocated national 
budget. Over time, these resources will run out and we should be thinking about other 
ways of managing the NHS in order to sustain it. In 2014, NHS England released a 
strategic document called Five Year Forward View (FYFW) to address the sustainability 
issues by promoting new models of care, such as the integrated care systems (ICS), in 
order  to reduce costs and encourage collaboration across different parts of the HSC 
system through shared pooled budgets between local councils and CCGs, joint 
governance structures, and joint planning responsibilities (NHS England, 2014; 
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Checkland et al., 2015). However, our research believes that we could offer an 
alternative perspective to addressing the problems on sustaining our NHS. 
1.2.2 Is governance the answer to fragmented health systems? 
Governance has played an increasingly important role in health care systems. 
Amongst many issues, debates have centred around health governance as a 
prescription for institutional reform (Ramesh et al., 2013; Vian and Bicknell, 2013), 
transformation of organisational performance (Lockett et al., 2012; Shen and Snowden, 
2014), collaboration between providers and decision-makers (Abimbola et al., 2014; 
Marais and Petersen, 2015) and corruption within global health programmes (Brinkerhoff 
and Bossert, 2008; Avelino et al., 2013). The concept of governing health care resources 
is not new. It is arguably the most complex but critical building block of any health system 
(World Health Organization, 2007). Studies have acknowledged the role of governance 
as a key contributor to the improvement on performance and health outcomes 
(Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2013), and the various mechanisms that facilitate the 
implementation and delivery of an effective health system (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011; 
Cleary et al., 2013; Pyone et al., 2017).  
Ultimately, NHS England1 is the governance in charge of looking after the health 
systems in England. It was established as part of the Health and Social Care Act (HSCA) 
2012 where it functioned as an arm’s length and executive non-departmental public body 
of the Department of HSC (NHS England, 2013). This centralist model of hierarchy, 
where there is a central decision-maker on behalf of the population, has been promoted 
since the NHS was initially established in 1948. Competition and market principles were 
then introduced in the 1990s, which led to the purchaser-provider split and fragmented 
                                                          
1 NHS England must not be confused with the overall NHS system. NHS England refers to the governance 
body overseeing the health system in England; whilst the NHS is the publicly funded national health care 
system of the UK. 
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delivery of care. This continued until the early 2000s before partnership working and 
collaborative models were promoted in 2010s to adopt to the changing needs on 
managing the HSC system. Literature suggests that the multiple dramatic restructuring 
of the NHS governance over the last two decades were catastrophic and resulted into a 
more complex system (Timmins, 2008; Ham et al., 2015). Ostrom et al. (1961:831) 
described this setting as polycentric, which connotes “many centres of decision-making 
that are formally independent of each other where there are overlapping domains of 
responsibilities”. The impacts of these reforms bring us to the question whether there is 
an alternative solution to effectively managing and governing the health systems. 
1.2.3 The role of institutions in health governance 
Studies have suggested that the perspective on stewardship governance can be 
better analysed through the institutionalist approach, where governance focuses on the 
role of institutions and how they shape interactions within diverse players and 
organisations (Chhotray and Stoker, 2008a; Pyone et al., 2017). Health governance 
frameworks highlight the importance of governance in explaining how health systems 
function and achieve desired health outcomes; however, there is a limited capacity to 
conceptualise the patterns of interaction of the complex system of actors involved in it.  
Governance is influenced by the rules that distribute roles and responsibilities among 
societal actors and shape the interaction among them (Rhodes, 1996). These rules are 
referred to as institutions and they shape the way actors in a governance interact. By 
applying an institutional approach to health governance, it takes into account the formal 
and informal institutions in determining the arrangements and rules set by governmental 
and non-governmental health organisations and how these impacts the delivery of health 
services and outcomes (Abimbola et al., 2017). 
Efforts to understand the role of governance in health care system in an institutional 
approach, however, have been limited. An institutional approach to governance not only 
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examines the role of the actors in the system, but rather embraces the range of formal 
and informal institutions that can determine how to govern the health care system 
(Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011; Abimbola et al., 2017). For example, Abimbola et al. 
(2014) examined the role of institutions in primary health care systems in Nigeria using 
a multi-level governance framework. Using the theory of common pool resources to 
understand how primary health care services in Nigeria can be preserved and sustained, 
the framework emphasised the institutional approach to not only focus on structures, but 
also on the rules on demand and supply of collective actions of government and non-
government actors. Similarly, Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. (2011) prescribed a governance 
framework for a health system steward, where consensus was sought by both state and 
non-state actors through co-producing decisions and participation in policy design.  
An institutional approach to assessing governance focuses on a rules-based 
approach, where it maps out how key decision-makers affecting behaviour and decision-
making in the health systems, and also to understand the formal and informal 
arrangements that shape the interactions in the context (Lockett et al., 2012; Abimbola 
et al., 2017). For example, Fattore and Tediosi (2013) investigated the role of culture in 
promoting universal health coverage. It suggested that cultural and societal values 
cultivate the idea of 'group identity', which is helpful in the possibility of the success of 
the willingness to adopt universal health coverage. Gilson (2003), Bloom (2011), and 
Baez Camargo and Jacobs (2013) highlighted the significance of informal institutions 
(i.e. trust, respect, social capital, etc.) in various settings (i.e. rural areas, low-income 
communities, etc.) where formal rules were not effectively applied. Both Gilson (2003) 
and Bloom (2011) posited that in low-income rural communities, establishing trust 
between patient and provider is highly crucial. This relationship mattered more to 
vulnerable patients or those who are less educated because of their associated level of 
needs and risks. On the other hand, Starke (2010) did not dismiss the role formal 
institutions in health governance, where highly centralised policy communities, like the 
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New Zealand health care systems, were prone to structural reforms. Partisan ideologies 
existed predominantly, and this potentially influenced the legislations and decisions of 
the governments who were in charge of stewardship of the health system.  
1.2.4 Devolution: a panacea? 
The UK government has had a contentious history of devolution, characterised by a 
variety of experimental policies as an attempt to rescale territorial governance and 
redistribute powers across different levels of regional and local governments presented 
(Pearce et al., 2005; Pike et al., 2017; Shaw and Tewdwr-jones, 2017). The implications 
of the devolution to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales were vital to the future of the 
English local governance. First, it triggered a search for an alternative to recalibrating 
the relationship between centre and subnational governments. Second, the 
modernisation and regional policies of the New Labour government ignited a focus on 
urban regeneration through community-level decision-making in England. Lastly, it 
created pressure to address spatial disparities and increase accountability to 
Westminster by decluttering the current regional structures (Sullivan et al., 2004; Pearce 
and Ayres, 2012; Fenwick, 2015).  
In a ground-breaking move, GM has landed a landmark devolution deal with the 
government. In addition to a directly elected mayor and delegation of powers on 
planning, land, transport, and fire services, the government and NHS England agreed to 
devolve over £6 billion in health and care spending to ensure joint planning 
responsibilities of these services can deliver better care for the population of the 
conurbation. This introduced new arrangements in the health governance structure 
through the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care (GMHSC) Partnership, which 
aimed to provide strategic direction to the overall development of the GM health and care 
economy and to cement the responsibilities, accountabilities and decision-making roles 
of the key and stakeholders. With the Partnership making up of relevant public, private, 
and community-based organisations, this has raised fundamental questions on who will 
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take charge, how far could health devolution go, what are the risks and how will it be 
managed, and what are the national implications of this initiative (The King’s Fund, 2011; 
Quilter-Pinner, 2016). 
1.2.4.1 The Devolution deals 
As part of the Spending Review in 2015, George Osborne, former chancellor of the 
exchequer at that time, invited cities and non-metropolitan areas across England wanting 
to agree a devolution deal to submit proposals (Local Government Association, 2012). 
With the Northern Powerhouse movement fuelling the momentum for English devolution 
post-Scottish referendum in 2014, the Cities and Local Government Devolution bill was 
announced on 2015 to legitimise these efforts. It provided a legislative framework for the 
creation of a directly-elected mayor of a combined authority to exercise additional 
functions including transportation and police, with the aim of working across a wider 
geographical reach and create economic growth. It also detailed how local government 
structures are to be altered in order to grant some public authority functions to a 
combined or local authority (For in-depth details, see Communities and Local 
Government (2015, 2017) and Sandford (2017)). With over 30 submissions put forward, 
10 areas (i.e. Cambridgeshire; Cornwall; Greater Manchester; Liverpool city region; 
London; North of Tyne; Sheffield city region; Tees Valley; West of England; West 
Midlands Combined Authority) have been successful. Following the ratification of the 
Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, several other city-regions received a 
devolution deal (see Table 1 for an updated list). 
Table 1: Devolution deals to date 
 
DEVOLUTION DEAL AGREED 
GREATER MANCHESTER 2014 November Health July 2015 
SHEFFIELD CITY REGION 2014 December  
WEST YORKSHIRE 2015 March  
CORNWALL 2015 July  
NORTH EAST 2015 October Rejected 
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TEES VALLEY 2015 October  
WEST MIDLANDS 2015 November  
LIVERPOOL CITY REGION 2015 November  
LONDON 2015 December Health 
WEST OF ENGLAND 2016 March  
GREATER LINCOLNSHIRE 2016 March Rejected 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE AND 
PETERBOROUGH 
2016 June  
NORFOLK AND SUFFOLK 2016 June Rejected 
NORTH OF TYNE 2017 November  
SURREY 2017 June Health 
 
1.2.4.2 Greater Manchester health devolution 
The GM Devolution Agreement (or ‘Devo Manc’) set out further devolution of powers 
on planning, land, transport, and fire services, and the changing governance of the 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) to introduce new arrangements for a 
directly-elected mayor in 2017 (Communities and Local Government, 2017), making it 
the first of its kind outside London. This was monumental for GM, especially after 
decades of close political cooperation and joint working between the 10 LAs through 
various governance arrangements (Walshe et al., 2018). Whilst the negotiation stages 
were conflicted with the absence of public consultation (Jenkins, 2015; Prosser et al., 
2017; Ayres and Bird, 2018) and the lack of enthusiasm for a directly-elected mayor 
(Deas, 2014; Gains, 2015), GM swiftly secured the Devo Manc agreement. 
This became a catalyst for a supplemental devolution deal, focusing on developing 
a business plan for the integration of health and social care provision across GM (GMCA, 
2016b). In February 2015, the government and NHS England also agreed to devolve 
over £6 billion in health and care spending to ensure that joint planning responsibilities 
of these services can deliver better care for the population of the conurbation (GMCA, 
2016a). A Memorandum of Agreement (MoU) was signed between representatives from 
the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), NHS England, and the GM 
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Clinical Commissioning Groups (GM CCGs) to secure the devolution of all health and 
social care funding to Greater Manchester. Under this initial agreement, primary care 
providers (such as general practitioners or GPs) were not formally included, although 
letters of support were present from the GM NHS Trusts, Foundation Trusts (FTs), and 
North West Ambulance Service.  
To provide strategic direction and govern to the overall development of the health 
and care economy of the city-region, the GMHSC Partnership was established to cement 
the responsibilities, accountabilities and decision-making roles of all key stakeholders 
(i.e. 10 local authorities, 12 CCGs, 15 NHS trusts and foundation trusts, and NHS 
England). This ground-breaking move was done at speed and without much public 
debate between the Treasury, NHS England, and key local government and NHS 
leaders (Jenkins, 2015; Walshe et al., 2016). It was considered as “a late and dramatic 
extension of the already ambitious devolution deal” by some (Walshe et al., 2016:2), 
given that GM is one of the only two city-regions in the country to bid for significant 
powers to control its own health and social care system at that time; Surrey and London 
being the other.  
Although such arrangements usually require statutory or legislative changes to 
define the extent and scope of devolved powers, nothing changed in terms of existing 
accountabilities and structures within the NHS system. Some described the devolution 
as an illusion, due to the absence of legislative force to enact the full transfer of 
responsibilities to GM (Quilter-Pinner, 2016; Walshe et al., 2016). In fact, it was more of 
a delegation of NHS England responsibilities that fell in the hands of the Partnership, 
which controversially mirrored NHS England’s Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships (STP) (University of Manchester, 2016). 
With the goal of improving the overall health outcomes of the 2.8 million population 
and to reduce health inequalities within GM and between GM and the rest of the country, 
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GMHSC is now in charge of steering the GM health economy towards this path. It is 
currently in its final phase of implementation and delivery of ‘Taking Charge’, which is 
the strategic plan dictating the reform themes that key GM partners will collectively focus 
on. With 4 years now since Devolution has started, the governance surrounding the 
GMHSC continued to evolve over time, where a lot of institutional architecture is involved 
to reconfigure the system to engage various stakeholders in working collectively.  
1.3 Rationale of the study 
Given the context of the need to address the sustainability of the NHS, 
complemented by the ongoing political discourse to promote regionalist Devolution 
policies in English local governance, this research wants to propose an alternative 
perspective in managing and sustaining the health commons. Our policy review showed 
that the UK has used a plethora of centralist, market, and collaborative as an attempt to 
modernise regional policies, apply territorial fixes, and restructure the fragmented 
relationships between the centre and subnational governments. With the latest 
Devolution policy fuelling the full-scale localism agenda of the Coalition government, we 
want to examine whether the unique case of Greater Manchester can be used as a 
pioneer model to future decentralisation policies of NHS functions across England. 
Greater Manchester already possesses the key ingredients to constituting a strong 
policy; however, we wanted to examine their success (or lack thereof) and look at it from 
a different perspective. By applying the study on the health commons, we want to explore 
whether Greater Manchester is able to resemble the conditions analogous to Ostrom's 
design principles and create institutional arrangements to govern their health commons. 
Moreover, one of the key objectives of this thesis is to extend the theoretical 
framework on the commons, theory of collective action, and collaborative governance, 
and apply it in the health policy context. The concept of the health commons has 
remained unexplored and has only been limited to the US health care context. Although 
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the UK and US health care systems differ in many aspects, they both share the 
problematic narrative on addressing their dwindling finite resources and financial 
sustainability. By applying an institutional approach to examining the health commons in 
the UK setting, we make a theoretical contribution to this research gap (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Addressing the research gap 
 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
This research argues that health care professionals, community service 
organisations, private organisations, and public officials can effectively act as stewards 
of their local health care resources and manage them by devising, enforcing, and 
monitoring their own institutional arrangements to address collective action dilemmas, 
i.e. sustainability issues. In order to address this, we use the theory of common pool 
resources, theory of collective action, and collaborative governance to guide the 
framework of the thesis. Our key assumptions are the following: first, organisations 
benefiting from a shared resource can form a collaboration to collectively govern their 
commons; second, a group of leaders can act as stewards of their own commons and 
make collective decisions on behalf of their population; and finally, stewardship of the 


























arrangements to facilitate the decision-making process, shape the behaviour and 
incentives of the participants, and to constrain the access to the resource. 
1.5 Research questions 
The aim of this research is to offer an alternative perspective in managing the health 
commons by crafting and monitoring institutional arrangements to address collective 
action problems. This research explores the role of the institutions and how it emerged 
as a response to collective action dilemmas, how the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements influence the interaction of the actors within this collaboration, and how 
the actors make, change, monitor, or enforce these rules.  
1.5.1 Research objectives 
 To extend the theory of collective action and common property regimes and apply 
them in the health policy context 
 To examine the contextual factors that enhance and/or hinder decision-making, 
and motivate collaboration and interaction between multiple actors across a 
fragmented, polycentric system 
 To evaluate the collaborative and institutional mechanisms in place to resolve 
collective action dilemma 
1.5.2 Research questions 
1. Under what circumstances can collaborative governance mechanisms create a 
system of stewardship in governing the health commons? 
a. What are the external factors that influence decision-making bodies to 
collaborate and act as a collective unit? 
2. What are the formal and informal institutions that emerged as a response to 
collective action dilemmas? 
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a. What are the rules-in-form (formal) and rules-in-use (informal) that were 
formulated?  
b. How are they crafted, monitored, and enforced? 
3. How are institutional arrangements influencing the different levels of collaborative 
processes in the governance of the health commons? 
a. How is the interaction of formal and informal institutions affecting the 
different levels of relationships between the participants?  
b. How are the rules-in-use (informal) utilised to facilitate the relationships 
within the collaborative governance? 
c. What are the collaborative mechanisms used by the decision-makers to 
enforce collective action? 
1.6 Research design and methodology 
In order to address the objectives of this research, we employ a qualitative approach. 
We particularly use case study methods to focus on the context of Greater Manchester’s 
Health Devolution policy and unpack the collaborative governance mechanisms that 
emerged in order for them to govern their own local health economy. A combination of 
interviews and documents were examined to evaluate the collaborative and institutional 
mechanisms in place to resolve their collective action dilemma. The data was 
triangulated and analysed using the framework approach. 
We identified the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework as the 
analytical tool to assist us in organising the complex situations that occurred to establish 
the institutional arrangements that emerged before, during, and as a result of the 
collective action in governing the health commons. We particularly take advantage of the 
explanatory power of this framework to investigate the institutional arrangements 
associated with collective action efforts. Moreover, we use the IAD’s multiple levels of 
analysis to be able to compare how the rules obtained from one level affect the rules 
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configuration of the proceeding level. This advantage enabled us to extend the 
application of the IAD framework in the health commons setting. 
1.7 Summary of the chapters 
This thesis aims to theoretically and methodologically contribute not only on the study 
of the commons, but also to the conceptualisation health commons and the application 
of rules configuration as a response to collective action dilemmas. The thesis is 
organised as follows. 
In Chapter 1, we examine the background of the study and establish the grounds as 
to why this research is important. We identify the research objectives and research 
questions, along with the theoretical framework that will guide us throughout this thesis. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we conduct a twofold review of the theoretical literature and the 
policy background of the health commons. Chapter 2 aims to examine the theoretical 
foundations pertinent to understanding what the common is and the role of institutions in 
governing the commons. We explore the literature to identify the theoretical assumptions 
that will guide the framework of the thesis. It covers the theory of collective action, the 
conceptualisation of the commons and the common pool resources, the responses to 
collective action, the role of institutions, the different mechanisms from an empirical 
review of the literature, and the working elements of the IAD framework. We continue to 
Chapter 3 with our conceptualisation of the health commons and its applicability to the 
context of the NHS and English local governance. We unpack the contextual background 
and the institutional evolution that led to the current polycentric state of the NHS and the 
oscillating reforms of centralist, regionalist, and localist approaches in the local English 
governance setting. Both chapters set up the necessary concepts and theories needed 
to guide our understanding on the institutional arrangements that led to the emergence 
of Devo Health and GMHSC Partnership. 
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In Chapter 4, we address the chosen research design and methodology of this study. 
Using a critical realist approach in qualitative research, we identify the rationale as to 
why case study methods is appropriate in examining GMHSC Partnership. We looked at 
the methodological approaches in the study of the commons and institutions and used 
these to justify our chosen resign design. Our tools for data collection and data analysis 
are detailed in this chapter, including the recruitment process and ethical procedures. 
In Chapter 5, we analyse the external variables or existing pre-conditions that led to 
the Devo Health in GM. We focus in identifying the factors that were critical during the 
initial stages (negotiation and formalisation) of the Partnership. First, we identify the 
physical attributes of the health commons in question. Second, we examine the 
community attributes that reflect the shared norms between the participants. Lastly, we 
explore the initial set of rules that were established to prepare the operation of the 
Partnership. These three factors altogether constitute the antecedents that shape the 
impetus to collaborate and the starting conditions that are necessary to establish a 
collaborative governance. This chapter directly addresses the first research question. 
In Chapter 6, we examine the action situation, which is the centrepiece of the IAD 
framework. It draws together the exogenous variables identified in the previous section 
and how the actors of the Partnership used these to organise their behaviour in making 
decisions and strategies, creating patterns of interaction, navigating through the system, 
and generating outcomes. In this chapter, we identify the various rules configuration that 
the Partnership created in order to facilitate their interaction within the decision-making 
arena. This chapter directly addresses the second research question. 
In Chapter 7, we examine the outcomes and implications of the GMHSC Partnership 
as stewards of the commons as a result of the external factors, formal and informal 
institutional arrangements, interactions, incentives, and sharing of information that 
shaped their behaviour within the collective action arena. This also rounds up the 
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empirical findings from Chapters 6 and 7 using the multiple levels of analysis. This 
chapter directly addresses the third research question. 
We end this thesis in Chapter 8 where we summarise the overall findings of the 
research and identify its contribution to addressing the research gap. We highlight the 





2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned about how organisations benefiting from a shared resource 
decide to collaborate by crafting formal and informal institutional arrangements to 
facilitate their decision-making process. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
theoretical foundations pertinent to understanding what the common is and the role of 
institutions in governing the commons, and to explore the literature and the theoretical 
assumptions that will guide the framework of the thesis. In order for us to situate the 
justification behind the health commons and how users can come together to protect it 
given some costs and benefits, we look at how these theories were applied in the study 
of the commons and how it was tested, evaluated, and replicated across a variety of 
contexts and fields of studies.  
According to Ostrom (2011), development and use of theories make the necessary 
working assumptions relevant to answering particular questions, to diagnosing a specific 
phenomenon, to explaining processes, and to predicting outcomes. We particularly 
explore three key areas of literature in order to understand how institutions emerged as 
a response or mechanism to the collective action dilemmas. First, we examine theories 
that will help in building and supporting the mechanisms of our theoretical framework, 
particularly theories influencing individual behaviour: the theories of rational choice, 
bounded rationality, and collective action (Figure 2). Second, we look at the responses 
to resolving collective action dilemmas. We then map out the evidence from empirical 
literature regarding the different mechanisms used to address collective action dilemmas 
that are also found in collaborative governance settings. Lastly, we introduce the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework as the analytical tool that links 
all the conceptual variables identified from our literature search. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical framework 
 
 
2.2 Underlying theories in understanding collective action 
dilemmas 
This section examines the underlying theories on the study of the commons, 
particularly the foundations that will direct the assumptions of this study. Moreover, it 
aims to understand how and why individuals or organisations behave the way they do 
when faced with a collective action dilemma. Earlier scholarly views in economics used 
the expanded typology on the types of goods and their characteristics (e.g. theory in 
public goods economics) to determine the different types of individual incentives that 
motivate potential users from consuming them. Through organisational models of firms 
and human behaviours (e.g. rational choice models), various conditions were examined 
to identify how individuals react to accessing different types of goods and how it leads to 















eventually became the basis of many debates and interpretations on how to efficiently 
manage and consume the commons. 
2.2.1 The narrative of the commons 
We begin our argument by identifying a shared sustainable resource system – let’s 
say a water source, e.g. river. We shall refer to this as ‘commons’, to which members of 
a group share access to this resource (McGinnis, 2018:281). Let’s say this water source 
is located geographically between the border of two small communities – town A and 
town B. In this context, shared access does not necessarily mean that each individual in 
the town claims to own any portion of the resource; but rather, a shared access for their 
own personal benefits or private use (Hardin, 1968). Both towns use the water source to 
supply their daily needs, such as watering the plants or cooking food, but neither of them 
monitors how much one takes nor who gets how much. Neither of them also takes into 
account what happens if the water source depletes or if they should look for an 
alternative source. Over a period of time, as more people appropriate from the resource, 
there is a higher risk of the water source becoming unavailable for future use as it 
continues to deplete.  
There are a number of ways on how individuals may behave or react to this problem. 
Those benefiting from the resource now face a dilemma. People collect and use the 
water without thinking if there is enough left for their neighbour to use, or if there will be 
enough left for the two towns in a decade’s time. Rational theorists would argue that 
individuals behave out of their self-interest and do not realise the collective implications 
of their actions in the future. This economic approach to understanding human behaviour 
posits that individuals act to maximise their long-term best interest and utility based on 
the best available information (see Becker, 1976). Their initial reaction is to get the 
maximum amount of gains without having to cooperate in overcoming the impeding 
dilemma. This behaviour eventually leads to the overuse and the degradation of the 
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resource, resulting into what policy scholars refer to as the “tragedy of the commons” 
(Hardin, 1968). Based on this scenario, there are a couple of theoretical arguments we 
need to examine. We explore scholarly explanations on how and why individuals behave 
this way, and what they should to resolve this type of dilemma.  
2.2.2 Public goods economics 
We look at earlier views on the nature of goods and consider the consequences that 
may arise on its overuse. Borrowing from neoclassical economic theories, Samuelson 
(1954) introduced two categories of goods. Private goods are excludable (i.e. individual 
can be prevented from consumption unless it's been paid for) and rivalrous (i.e. individual 
consuming this good keeps another individual's from consuming it), such as bread and 
shoes. Public goods, on the other hand, are non-excludable (i.e. excluding other people 
from consuming the good is difficult to attain) and non-rivalrous (i.e. a person using this 
good does not prevent others from using it), such as national defence. In his essay The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Samuelson (1954) argued that given optimal 
conditions of production, there is a Pareto efficient bundle2 of private and public goods 
to which not one person can be made better off without making someone else worse off. 
The characteristics of these goods (i.e. excludability and rivalry) enabled the creation 
of market arrangements to meet the demands of production. Delivery of private goods 
was organised through market transactions, whilst public goods were delivered through 
government intervention via imposed rules (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). Moreover, 
coordination was required to govern economic relationships and impose a command 
structure, through competition within the markets and accountability within the public 
sector.  
                                                          
2 See Stiglitz, 1987 
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Adam Smith and his early works (1759, 1776) argued that one of the functions of the 
government is to be in charge of the provision and maintenance of public goods, such 
as public roads, health care, and education. He discouraged the profit-maximising firms 
in the market and wanted to promote a free market system where all classes of society 
benefit from their own self-interests. He also believed in the “invisible hand”  where 
markets are free to buy and sell amongst themselves without the government having to 
intervene on the market prices (see Smith, 1776). The problem with public goods, 
however, is its excludability criteria, which makes it more difficult to exclude others from 
enjoying it. Individuals are then tempted to “free ride” on the efforts of those who 
contribute to the provision of the good, causing market provision and welfare gains to 
decline (Anomaly, 2015).  
Policy scholars have attempted to empirically demystify the free-rider problem and 
how governments addressed them in various scenarios. Studies in public transportation, 
for example, found that deliberate fare evaders are rampant especially in transports 
systems where ticket controls are eliminated for cost efficiency (Barabino et al., 2015; 
Delbosc and Currie, 2016). The system created incentives for individuals to escape 
paying for fares because there was no monitoring system in place. This resulted in 
strategic motivations (Anomaly, 2015; Grandjean et al., 2018), where individuals engage 
in different behaviours based on finitely repeated interaction. Grandjean et al. (2018) 
showed in a cooperative game that individuals reduce their contributions to the provision 
of a good when they interact with free riders; whilst strategic players contribute larger 
amounts during the initial periods to sustain mutually beneficial future for the 
cooperation, but gradually reduces it as the cooperative game ends.  
Whilst some advocate for the free-rider problem to be addressed with government 
intervention (see Welfare Economics, Keynes, 1936) such as taxation of goods (Groves 
and Ledyard, 1977), some believe that not all free-rider problems warrant government 
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action (Coase, 1960; Pasour Jr., 1981). Alternative solutions included private ownership 
of the economy (Arrow and Debreu, 1954), altruism and institutions (Ostrom et al., 1994), 
and even an introduction to membership and property rights arrangements (Coase, 
1960; Buchanan, 1965). For instance, Coase (1960) advocated that property rights 
arrangements can be introduced to address externalities and free-rider problems without 
having the state to intervene in the market transactions. Under certain conditions, 
beneficiaries can pool their resources together given that they bargain with zero 
transaction costs. Similarly, Buchanan (1965) also introduced “club goods” as a third 
type of good, where cooperative membership arrangements are set-up to enjoy goods 
that are non-rivalrous and exclude non-members those who do not contribute towards 
the maintenance of that good. By introducing an exclusion mechanism, this addressed 
the free-rider problem by turning public goods into club goods through membership 
arrangements. A common example is subscription to cable TV. The market can charge 
a price to deliver cable TV for access and use in order allow those who paid for it enjoy 
it as a collective. These theoretical accounts in public goods economics provide a 
normative justification on how to mitigate externalities resulting from free-rider problems. 
2.2.3 Collective action dilemma 
As individuals learned how to cope with the problems associated with managing 
goods, theorists challenged Samuelson’s two-fold classification of goods and proposed 
an expanded typology. As a contribution to the discourse, Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) 
proposed a fourth type of good, which is one of the tenets of this research. Common pool 
resource (CPR) is a sufficiently large natural or man-made resource (i.e. fisheries, 
forests, underwater basins, and irrigation systems) from which it is difficult to exclude or 
limit potential users from appropriation and its joint benefits. There is only a finite quantity 
of resources available for its users, which means that consuming a portion of these 
resources makes it less available for others – a subtractability property it shares with 
private goods; and alternatively, it is difficult and costly to exclude or limit the use of the 
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CPR to its users, making it non-excludable like a public good. These characteristics were 
used to classify a new way of managing resources, particularly drawing from the 
assumptions on public goods economics in addressing free-rider problems (Table 2) 
(Ostrom, 1999).  
Table 2: Four basic types of goods 
   Subtractability of use 





Low Club goods Private goods 
High Public goods 
Common pool 
resources 
Source: (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977) 
 
Hardin (1968) argued that if all users of the CPR restrain themselves from using the 
resource, then the resource can be sustained. However, there is a level of difficulty in 
excluding users from accessing and usage of the commons – a characteristic that is 
shared with public goods – which eventually poses a potential free-rider problem. As 
examined by Grandjean et al. (2018), the efforts of those who contribute to improve the 
long-term sustainability of the resource is reduced as soon as the risk of a free-rider is 
identified. When the commons has no restrictions to appropriation (i.e. open access), 
individuals face incentives to appropriate more without wishing to contribute towards 
collective outcomes (Ostrom, 2005), which eventually result into congestion, overuse, or 
destruction of the resource itself. This was illustrated by Hardin's (1968) influential article 
on the “tragedy of the commons”, which was deeply rooted in the assumption that 
unrestrained norm-free individuals have no intentions of cooperating to overcome the 
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dilemma that they face and still exploit the commons for their self-interests and own 
benefits in the knowledge that everyone else would do the same. This situation is 
described as a collective action dilemma (or social dilemma, in some literature), where 
in the absence of effective management or mitigating institutions, interdependent 
individuals are faced with incentives to choose actions that will yield maximum individual 
benefits but generate inefficient aggregate outcomes collectively (Ostrom, 1990; Swann 
and Kim, 2018). 
Let’s go back to the initial narrative presented at the beginning of this chapter. The 
water source is being accessed and shared by two small communities, and if it is not 
effectively sustained and/or managed, there is a risk of depletion or overuse. If we are 
to follow Hardin's (1968) assumptions, the two communities will act out of their short-
term self-interests and keep appropriating from the resource for their own benefits, 
eventually leading to the degradation of the commons. This kind of behaviour generates 
inefficient collective outcomes in the future because rational individuals refuse to act to 
achieve common group interests.  
2.2.4 Collective action theory 
Collective action theory is one of the theoretical foundations in explaining why 
humans behave the way they do when they are faced with a dilemma to cooperate as a 
collective unit. Olson's (1965) classic The Logic of Collective Action was one of the most 
celebrated and criticised scholarly explanation in the field of social sciences in 
understanding how people produce and consume goods as a collective. He explained 
that rational individuals will always act on their self-interests and will be incentivised to 
free ride on the efforts of others without contributing to the costs3.  
                                                          
3 see Chapter 1, Olson 1965 
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2.2.4.1 Rational, self-interested individuals 
Theoretical research on the commons draws from the assumptions that individuals 
are short-term maximisers motivated by their self-interests rather than their concern for 
others or for society as a whole (Dietz et al., 2002; Lam, 2014). Social scientists have 
used the foundations of rational choice theory to predict how individuals who are facing 
collective action dilemmas avoid the worst outcomes and approximate optimality for their 
own interests. This is derived from the concept of an ‘economic man’, where a self-
interested individual makes choices based on the available information (Birkland, 2011; 
Cairney, 2012). A rational individual engages in a process of optimising his or her goals 
by choosing amongst all available alternatives to exhaustively solve a problem, and 
eventually yields to the best outcome or to the solution with the highest payoff (Leoveanu, 
2013). However, these assumptions are unrealistic.  
Critics were not convinced that the assumption of self-interest posited by a majority 
of rational choice theorists is inadequate in explaining collective action behaviour. The 
rational actor theory was viewed as a “theory of advice” (Ostrom, 1991:238) where it 
does not explicitly identify how an individual processes information or achieves 
objectives especially under circumstances of uncertainty and ambiguity. It is therefore 
inadequate in predicting unique prescriptions or behaviour in different situations (Ostrom, 
1998).  
Theorists like Lindblom (1959) and Simon (1972) presented a broader view on 
human behaviour through the theory of bounded rationality, which assumes that 
individuals are adaptive creatures who do not aim to maximise their short-term utility, but 
rather, satisfice to seek a course of action that is satisfactory or good enough under 
constrained circumstances. Individuals pursue goals but do so under constraints of 
limited cognitive and information-processing capability, and incomplete information. 
 
27 
Humans learned norms, heuristics, and full analytical strategies from one another to 
achieve satisficing outcomes (see 'muddling through', Lindblom, 1959).  
Organisational studies also presented that in certain circumstances, individuals can 
take into account the interests of the group (see Sober and Wilson, 1998). When faced 
with collective action dilemmas, altruistic mechanisms and social norms can be used to 
avert the tragedy of the commons motivated by the warm glow of knowing they did the 
right thing (Elster, 1989:46). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the 
vast amount of collective action literature, scholars have performed an extensive review 
on the evolution of the theory of collective action, particularly examining how Olson's 
view have moved beyond its initial assumptions on rational, self-seeking individuals and 
free-riding problem (see Oliver, 1993; Udehn, 1993; Reuben, 2003; Medina, 2013). 
2.3 Responses to collective action dilemmas 
In this section, we look at how research has evolved to offer innovative solutions in 
addressing collective action dilemmas and avoiding the pitfalls of the tragedy of the 
commons. Prior to Hardin’s article, studies about the commons or CPR were rare (see 
van Laerhoven and Ostrom, 2007). Early formal analyses of Gordon (1954) and 
Schaefer (1957) on the economic factors in the CPR management of fisheries, for 
instance, became one of the key influential work in how to manage the commons. Their 
model applied microeconomics in policy design and posited that those appropriating fish 
from the resource only takes into account their own costs and not the increasing costs 
that individual efforts impose on others. Both scholars also assumed that at low levels of 
harvest, the yield of return increases rapidly as effort increases but once the maximum 
economic yield is reached, there is diminishing marginal returns (Dietz et al., 2002). 
Gordon (1954) and Schaefer's (1957) work became one of the important set pieces in 




If no rules exist to limit access to an open access commons, resource scholars 
suggested two potential solutions to address the management of the CPR – sole 
ownership via government or state control (Scott, 1955; Ophuls, 1977), or private 
management (Demsetz, 1967; Simmons et al., 1996). Scott (1955) suggested that in an 
environment where individuals compete to access a resource that is available to anyone, 
it is more efficient in the long run if a sole owner (ideally a government) manages the 
resource on behalf of everyone; however Simmons et al. (1996) believed that the political 
environment does not necessarily suffer the consequences of the decisions that they 
make on behalf of those who benefit from it. Instead, Demsetz (1967) and Simmons et 
al. (1996) advised that dividing the commons into private plots and enforcing rules and 
regulations is more effective because the private owners can bear the full costs of their 
actions and internalises the externalities. These were further reinforced by Hardin (1968) 
where he recommended “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” as an alternative 
mechanism to regulation. This was problematic because not only does it suggested that 
agreement can only be reached through the state, but also it implied that communities 
cannot develop informal and non-governmental institutions as coping mechanism (Dietz 
et al., 2002). 
The study on the commons has garnered interest amongst distinguished scholars in 
many disciplines, especially in economics, social ecology, political science and policy 
analysis, and environmental studies (Dietz et al., 2002:6; van Laerhoven and Ostrom, 
2007:5). A substantial amount of literature between the late 70s and mid 80s focused on 
challenging Hardin's (1968) article, creating a multidisciplinary approach on how to 
manage the common pool resources (Berkes et al., 1989) and why collective action 
issues occur (Olson, 1965; Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977).  
Because of the emerging diversity in the study of the commons, critiques appraised 
Hardin's (1968) interpretation of the commons and its conceptual limitations and 
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questioned the generalisability and empirical validity of his model. In an examination the 
limitations of Hardin’s model, Dietz et al. (2002) illustrated that Hardin’s mistakenly 
referred to the commons as an open access resource with no rules existing to limit the 
users. Scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; McKean and Ostrom, 1995; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; McGinnis, 2013) clarified that common property rights existed, where communities 
benefiting from the common pool resources can agree to transform the resource systems 
into a ‘common property regime’ and create shared rights and responsibilities towards 
consuming and/or managing it.  
Whilst CPR refers to the physical quality of the resource rather than the social 
institutions that individuals attached to them, common property regimes refer to the 
property rights arrangement in which users share duties towards a resource (McKean 
and Ostrom, 1995). McKean and Ostrom (1995) suggested that converting CPR to 
common property regimes offer a way of privatising the rights of individuals who benefit 
from a resource without having to divide it into parcels as suggested previously by 
Demsetz (1967) and Simmons et al. (1996). This, in effect, instituted collective rules to 
enforce property rights and functions as “…imaginary fences and informal courts” 
(McKean and Ostrom, 1995:9) contributing to administrative efficiency and improved 
productivity. 
Over the most recent decades, the study and analysis of CPR have evolved from the 
theoretical understanding of institutions and collective action (Tang, 1992), historical 
studies of empirical analysis (McCloskey, 1972), to the institutional arrangements found 
in sustainable resource management (Ostrom, 1990). Different empirical accounts also 
explored a deeper understanding on what motivates individuals to behave the way they 
do when faced with social dilemmas, which were tested in a variety of settings (Ostrom, 
1999; Ostrom et al., 2002). Such studies have contributed to the ongoing discourse of 
illustrating that in self-organising common pool resource settings, institutional 
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arrangements can result in efficient use, equitable allocation, and sustainable 
conservation (McKean and Ostrom, 1995; Agrawal, 2001). 
2.3.1 A revised theory in collective action 
In this research, we particularly draw interest from Ostrom's (1998) alternative 
individualistic conception to collective action. She posited that a behavioural theory of 
bounded rational behaviour is needed to address the shortcomings of Olson's (1965) 
theory. Individuals are capable of designing new tools – including institutions – to change 
the structure of their environment, and adopt short-term or long-term strategies based 
on the opportunities they face (Ostrom, 1998; McCay, 2002).  
Whilst the conventional response suggested state ownership or privatisation to 
resolve collective action dilemmas, Ostrom and her colleagues have dedicated 
tremendous amount of work (see Governing the Commons, Ostrom, 1990) to illustrate a 
third alternative. In some self-governing resource-dependent communities, 
interdependent individuals have worked together to create properly designed institutional 
arrangements that limit their behaviour in order to govern the CPR. This have led to a 
reasonable degree of success over long periods of time as small-scale communities can 
create self-organised networks made up of actors, who are interested to craft institutions. 
They crafted, monitored, enforced, and revised these to order their relationships and 
regulate their decision-making. Such institutions include shared understandings 
amongst those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions about which actions are 
required, prohibited, or permitted, which information must or must not be provided, and 
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Imperial, 1999; 
Ostrom, 2011).  
Although CPR theory assumes that self-organised systems are more effective than 
government regulation and intervention, it is not necessarily a panacea to resource 
management. The role of the state, in fact, can sometimes be a key set piece to the 
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success of the CPR management. Mansbridge (2014) argued that governing CPRs are 
dependent on overarching structures of administration that can provide coercion and 
settle negotiations, especially in polycentric situations. Similarly, Agrawal (2002) 
explained that in some cases,  even if communities have the inherent right to craft their 
own rules, the  government is still the ultimate guarantor of property rights arrangements. 
Drawing from a critical examination of property and control of state forestry in the Indian 
Himalaya, Rangan (1997) also claimed that state involvement is needed to guarantee 
and enforce the rights of the communities, mediate disputes, and intervene at times of 
market failure.  
In some instances, the resulting governance (i.e. decentralised, centralised, 
polycentric) is not a priori policy choice, but rather a response to institutional failure. For 
example, state intervention occurred to manage non-timber forest products in Canada 
(Tedder, 2008), where users of CPRs are disorganised and the provincial government 
struggles to identify appropriate policy responses. The role of the state ranges from a 
facilitative to cooperative to prescriptive approach to coordination, where a government 
identifies the source of institutional failure. On the other hand, privatisation of land use 
has been prescribed as a tool to increase protection and sustainable use in a dry region 
in Argentina where low-income peasants depend on multiple CPRs to survive (Altrichter 
and Basurto, 2008). The changing property rights from open access to private access 
demonstrates a more controlled use of stationary and low mobility resources, such as 
trees; but highly mobile wildlife continues to be under an open access regime due to lack 
of mechanisms to control the access of the resource beyond the private property. 
2.3.1.1 Design principles to managing the commons 
Using extensive fieldwork and comparative case studies generated by other 
scholars,  Ostrom (1990) was able to collect from a sample of 14 cases where she drew 
the design principles for enduring CPR that are common to all successful cases and 
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absent in those that failed. Drawing from experimental-based models like prisoner’s 
dilemma and game theory, she was able to successfully draw successful cases that 
uniquely exhibited collective action behaviour and crafted properly designed institutional 
arrangements to govern their commons, which led to a reasonable degree of success 
over long periods of time. These cases (i.e. mountain grazing and forest resources in 
Switzerland and Japan; irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippine islands) illustrated 
that in some small-scale communities, they can create self-organised networks made up 
of actors who are interested to craft institutions that they use to order their relationships 
and use in decision-making.  
Fundamentally, the design principles are a configuration of the rules constituting how 
to sustain the commons through the formation of incentives that influence the behaviour 
of those benefiting from the resource. These included institutional arrangements related 
to who gets to withdraw which resources from the system, who is authorised to 
participate in decision-making, who is everyone accountable to, what are the sanctions 
and who monitors compliance to the rules, who monitors resource use, how are 
outcomes and costs distributed, and how conflict is resolved (Ostrom, 1990:90–102). 
More importantly, these design principles are useful in understanding how participants 
structure the appropriation of the resource, including the benefits and costs associated 
with it. 
Table 3: Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions 
 
Adapted from: (Ostrom, 1990; Cox et al., 2010) 
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Following this interest, scholars have evaluated and tested Ostrom’s design 
principles in various contexts in order to provide empirical evidence and critique. The 
design principles reinforced each other and limited the damage on those who would be 
tempted to exploit the common resource for their own personal benefit. Ostrom does not 
claim, however, that all conditions needed to be satisfied in order to attain success in 
sustainability. In fact, she campaigned for the need for further theoretical and empirical 
work to apply the design principles in order to assert that the conditions are necessary 
for achieving institutional robustness (Gari et al., 2017). Cox, Arnold and Tomás (2010) 
re-examined Ostrom’s design principles to characterise whether any theoretical issues 
have arisen since these principles were introduced and applied in managing CPRs. Their 
study included 91 empirical studies on the application of the principles and found that 
whilst the principles are well supported, it does not mean that they are complete. The 
authors, instead, proposed and redesigned some of the principles (1, 2 and 4) to account 
for user and resource boundaries.  
Other scholars tested the principles in contexts such as polycentric systems (Carlisle 
and Gruby, 2017), community settings (Imperial and Yandle, 2005), and collaborative 
governance (Yang, 2017) to name a few. McGinnis and Ostrom (1992) justified that the 
principles were merely focused on the conditions to account for the success of these 
institutions, rather than the underlying mechanisms that direct the relationships between 
them. The main argument is that the participants created rule-setting conditions on 
appropriate and acceptable appropriation of the shared resources whilst taking an active 
role to craft, enforce, monitor, and revise such rules.  
2.3.2 The role of institutions 
Institutions as a solution to collective action problem is one of the key arguments of 
this research. Kosfeld et al. (2009) identified that the design of appropriate institutions is 
vital to preventing the market from failing as a result of the pursuit of individual interests 
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and conflict with the maximisation of the social welfare, particularly in the economics of 
public goods and common pool resources. Scholars like Baland and Platteau (1996) and 
Ostrom (1999) proved that creating an effective institutions in sanctioning led to a 
successful management of the common pool regimes. 
In this study, we refer to these institutions as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990) 
that facilitate, guide, and constrain the behaviour of individuals and organisations. They 
are human-constructed constraints or opportunities within which individual choices take 
place and which shape the behaviour of the individuals and the consequences of their 
choices (McGinnis and Walker, 2010; McGinnis, 2011a; Storz and Schafer, 2011; 
Heikkila and Andersson, 2018). They promote socially beneficial outcomes by helping 
actors resolve the collective action dilemma and common pool resource problems and 
encourage individual behavioural and policy changes through the structure imposed to 
organise their behaviour and patterns of interaction. 
Institutions vary in formality and authority depending on the appropriate 
circumstances (Moore and Koontz, 2003; Imperial and Koontz, 2007). Formal 
institutions or “rules-in-form” are binding rules, which encompasses laws and 
regulations of government, or binding legal documents and statutes; whilst informal 
institutions or “rules-in-use” are soft rules, which could be any unwritten shared 
understandings or social agreements like values, tradition, customs, norms, and working 
habits (Ostrom, 1990; Imperial, 1999; Rodríguez-pose, 2013; Cole, 2014). These 
informal institutions are the working rules used to structure and justify the patterns of 
interaction within and across organisations (Ostrom, 2005). These are also the rules that 
are followed and respected by the people or what is practiced by a collective group, 
which usually differs from the written statutes (Heikkila and Andersson, 2018).  
Collective action theory posits that when actors come together to collaborate, they 
develop a set of working rules in order to determine who will be eligible to make 
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decisions, which actions will be allowed, and how costs will be distributed (Ostrom, 2005; 
Ansell and Gash, 2008). Institutions are particularly useful in addressing collective action 
dilemmas. In such cases (Ostrom, 1990), actors from self-organising communities 
establish amongst themselves some sort of regime, where resources and skills are 
pooled together. Access to the collaborative process itself is fundamental and 
stakeholders must be able to design protocols or ground rules to assist this interaction. 
Upon examination of multiple settings of common pool regimes and how self-organising 
communities developed their own set of rules to organise their relationships and 
determine the appropriation of the commons, Ostrom (2005) summarised this through 
the design principles. These served as a guide to policy scholars on the various types of 
institutional arrangements that emerge from a collective action towards managing a 
common pool resource.  
2.3.2.1 Impact of institutions in sustaining the commons 
As illustrated earlier, critiques suggested that CPR scholars (Ostrom, 1990; McGinnis 
and Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994; McKean and Ostrom, 1995) have focused in 
identifying which institutional arrangements are found in communities that are able to 
sustain over periods of time. Perhaps the greatest contribution of Ostrom’s work is the 
conceptualisation of institutions in common property regime settings, which has not only 
extended the theoretical body of research interested on the impact of institutions to 
individuals, organisations, and society (such as Hardin, 1968; Parks et al., 1981; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996 to name a few), but 
also sparked an interest to investigate the role of institutions in regulating behaviour of 
individuals who are engaged in collective action  and are sharing rights to a CPR.  
CPR literature has been refined by scholars over the years and has evolved into 
efforts to finding causal relationships between formal and informal institutions in relation 
to the success or failure of robust common property regimes based on the previously 
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identified design principles of Ostrom. It has been applied into various situations where 
effective management of resources and efficient institutions have led to different socially 
optimal outcomes. For instance, scholars have explored how institutions influence the 
emergence of collaborative governance on a variety of common pool regime settings, 
such as large-scale ecosystems (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005, 2018; Gerlak and Heikkila, 
2006), watershed management (Moore and Koontz, 2003; Imperial and Koontz, 2007; 
Hardy and Koontz, 2009) and regional/local/metropolitan governance (Feiock, 2008; 
Ayres, 2017; Roberts and Abbott, 2017; Swann and Kim, 2018).  
For managing natural resources that involves a large-scale regional collaboration 
characterised by heterogenous stakeholders and fragmented management 
responsibilities, Heikkila and Gerlak (2005) and Gerlak and Heikkila (2006) highlighted 
that establishing institutions played a vital role in organising decision-making structures 
in the constitutional, collective choice, and operational levels. This involved the 
establishment of a convening body that governs all participants, whilst day-to-day 
implementation or operational decisions were made in the lower levels. On a more recent 
study, Heikkila and Gerlak (2018) recognised the need for diversity of institutions in 
addressing collective membership, particularly in identifying which individuals are eligible 
to join the collaboration.  
Consequently, smaller-scale collaborative management on natural resources focus 
on the types of institutional arrangements (i.e. group memberships) and the institutions 
necessary to create a sustainable collaborative governance. Moore and Koontz (2003) 
and Hardy and Koontz (2009) emphasised membership composition (i.e. agency-based, 
citizen-based, and mixed) in determining what kind of collaborating strategies will 
facilitate the participating groups. For instance, citizen-based groups are more likely to 
rely on adversarial means of negotiation, such as lobbying and petition, whilst agency-
based and mixed groups rely more on technical advice. Hardy and Koontz (2009) also 
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argued that agency-based groups are more likely to abide by more formal rules 
established through statutory laws. These findings are all useful in identifying the types 
of formal and informal institutions that collaborating stakeholders use in sustaining the 
longevity of the collaborative governance (Imperial and Koontz, 2007). 
Informal institutions play an equal role in regional, local, or metropolitan collaborative 
arrangements on delivering public services or implementing public policies. This is often 
characterised by fragmented lines of authority and misaligned collective interests, where 
institutions are crafted to impose coordination and shape incentives faced by the 
stakeholders (Feiock, 2008). In some cases, evidence postulated that where formal 
institutions are lacking, informal institutions fill those gaps. Informal institutions can "help 
explain conditions under which formal institutions can be difficult to be enforced" (Storz 
and Schafer, 2011:45) especially in circumstances where formal institutions are 
oftentimes absent. Whilst binding rules play an important role in legitimising the 
collaboration, more recent studies focus on the emerging role of informal rules, in 
particular, in sustaining interdependent relationships amongst stakeholders.  
These involve uncodified interactions within and across actors that is not structured 
by pre-given sets of formal rules (Tatenhove et al., 2006). For instance, Yi et al. (2018) 
demonstrated that informal agreements provided the greatest autonomy as actors 
engage in frequent interactions through informal forums and venues. Such activities are 
as important as formal institutions in order to gain control in local government networks. 
Agranoff and McGuire (2003a) explained that this is a common approach to information 
seeking in order to reach agreement and to search for joint solutions. As a result, informal 
institutions reduce the transaction costs to collect information (tenet of New Institutional 
Economics, see Chhotray and Stoker, 2008a). Since a lot of the work occur “behind the 
scenes” or “back stage” (Peters, 2006:27), such as meetings, networking, or through 
informal contacts, the time and effort spent on negotiating and monitoring to ensure all 
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parties keep the agreement are reduced. This has valuable implications when 
implementing policies because of the high transaction costs associated with collective 
initiatives (Vanni, 2014; Pyone et al., 2017).  
This, however, does not discredit the role of formal institutions in the emergence of 
self-governing communities and how it interacts with informal institutions when the 
desired outcome is not achieved (Storz and Schafer, 2011; Cole, 2017). Formal 
institutions are very useful in imposing autonomy and structure to the collective group. 
For example, in a study on collaborative watershed partnerships with differing 
membership profiles, Hardy and Koontz (2009) found that codified rules imposed by 
government-led collaboration (i.e. agency-based) make enforcement and sanctioning 
easier because they are backed by formal regulations.  
2.3.3 Factors to effective management of the commons 
Whilst institutions are important and are the focal point of Ostrom’s contribution to 
the management of the commons, we also need to acknowledge other influencing 
factors that contribute to the effective management of CPRs. Formal game theoretical 
models, experiments, and theoretical speculations contributed to the evolutionary 
process of examining the structural variables that predict the likelihood of collective 
action (Ostrom et al., 1994; Agrawal, 2001, 2002; Kopelman et al., 2002; McCay, 2002; 
Agrawal, 2003; Ostrom, 2009). Research suggested that studies on commons are 
focused primarily on institutions and forgot other factors (Agrawal, 2001; Imperial and 
Koontz, 2007; Vanni, 2014; Yi et al., 2018), such as group size or external environment, 
as aspects of the commons that could affect durability of the long-term management of 
the system. Agrawal (2002) pointed out that the reason why scholars have focused so 
little on external factors, such as markets, population pressure, and technology, is 




Agrawal (2001) examined statistical, comparative approaches to the commons and 
identified in detail the critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons, 
related to its resource system’s physical characteristics, group characteristics, 
institutional arrangements, and external environment. This additional list of operational 
factors, ranging between 30 and 40 variables (e.g. group size, resource size, or shared 
norms; interdependence among group members, and fairness in allocation rules; ease 
of enforcement and supportive external sanctioning institutions), are correlated and 
potentially affect outcomes depending on their interaction. In a later study, Agrawal 
(2002) explained that these factors could perhaps explain emergence of commons 
institutions but not sustainable management.  
Overall, behaviour in collective action dilemmas are affected by many structural 
variables, including size of the group, heterogeneity of the participants, dependence on 
the benefits received, the organisational levels, monitoring techniques, and the 
information available to participants (Ostrom et al., 1994; Baland and Platteau, 1996; 
Agrawal, 2001) to name a few. These act as causal links to the institutions created to 
constrain or regulate the use of common pool resources.  
2.4 Collaborative governance 
In this section, we want to address our research objective of extending the theory of 
common pool resources and collective action into a collaborative governance setting. In 
order to build our argument, we borrow our assumptions from Elinor Ostrom's (1990) 
theoretical conceptualisation of common property resources and Mancur Olson's (1971) 
theory of collective action, and apply them to the collaborative governance setting.  
2.4.1 Role of governance in managing the commons 
Governance is an act of governing using rules and forms to steer the economy and 
society, and reaching collective goals through an interaction of a multiplicity of actors 
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influencing each other (Stoker, 1998; Pierre and Peters, 2000). As the role of the state 
changed from the traditional steering role and top-down hierarchical approach 
(hierarchies) to a more displaced power and control to the private sector and civil groups 
(markets), fragmentation of public services delivery and complex interdependencies 
arose as a result. This created different levels of opportunities for collaborative 
governance to occur, in order to resolve conflicts and advance shared visions as a moral 
imperative in addressing “wicked problems” (Gray, 1989; Huxham et al., 2000; Swann 
and Kim, 2018). A new governance emerged (Rhodes, 1996), where formal and informal 
institutions of self-organising networks and actors were involved engaging in game-like 
interactions rooted in trust and regulated by the rules of the game agreed upon by the 
participants. 
An emerging theme from CPR studies is the increasing role of governance where the 
capacity to get things done does not rest on the authoritative command of the 
government nor privatisation of property rights. Under a common property regime, 
participants can form an informal basis of coordination without an encompassing 
structure of command (Stoker, 1998). Governance in the commons is therefore 
described as autonomous self-governing networks, where actors and institutions 
interact, and pool their skills and resources to form a long-term coalition (Rhodes, 1996; 
Stoker, 1998). For example, Rudd (2004) highlighted that in small-scale communities 
managing ecosystem-based fisheries, the development of formal governance regimes 
and its interaction with informal institutions is vital in constraining short-term opportunism 
and maintaining sustainability of the resources.  
In polycentric settings where multiple actors have overlapping roles and have 
competing statutory responsibilities to protect different constituencies, collaborative 
mechanisms have been developed by state and non-state actors to work together and 
overcome conflict (Ostrom et al., 1961). Imperial (2005) demonstrated that in six 
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watershed common property regimes, a series of separate collaborative activities are 
adopted to narrow the range of potential policy solutions. It led to better public 
participation and policy dialogue, resulting into a better informed, more creative, and 
enduring solutions. However collaboration amongst diverse institutional designs can also 
be a challenge, in terms of financial expense, complexity of problems, and uncertainty 
(Gerlak and Heikkila, 2006).  
2.4.2 Conceptualisation of collaborative governance 
Collaborative governance is an important tenet in this research. It has emerged as a 
new form of governance in the public administration and management literature, 
encompassing the engagement and networking arrangements between public, private, 
and third-sector agencies. Studies illustrated that collaborative governance is a useful 
approach in a range of sectoral problem and policy areas, such as the development of 
metropolitan regions (Feiock, 2009; Roberts and Abbott, 2017), management of urban 
infrastructure projects (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003c; Page and Melroy, 2008), resource 
management (Koontz, 2006; Imperial and Koontz, 2007), and public services 
management (Carnwell and Buchanan, 2008; Jung et al., 2009) just to name a few. It 
focused particularly on the impact of partnership working and building consensus 
between multi-sectoral actors in terms of reaching agreements, addressing collective 
problems, and planning and implementing of policies. 
Definitions are crucial to theory building and it is important that we provide a 
consolidated version from the literature in order to encompass the salient points of the 
concept. Collaborative governance encompasses an amalgamation of various scope 
and scale of perspectives on cross-boundary engagement between public, private, and 
third-sector organisations. It emerged as an alternative to hierarchical and managerial 
forms of governance as a response to the failures of top-down implementation of policies 
and the high costs associated with it (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Ansell et al., 2017). This 
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research uses the following criteria for collaborative governance based on the variations 
provided by the literature (Gray, 1989; Wood and Gray, 1991; Himmelman, 1996; 
Thomson and Perry, 2006; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). 
A collaborative governance has: 
 a governing arrangement, where formal and informal institutions serve as an 
overarching dimension that regulates the decision-making behaviours of the 
group and the individuals 
 stakeholders made up of public, private, and third-sector participants who are 
ultimately involved in all stages of the decision-making process 
 a formal forum where stakeholders gather and meet on a regular basis, 
maintaining interdependent relationships and engaging in dialogues to achieve 
direction and control 
 a collective, multilateral, and deliberate decision-making process 
 a consensus-oriented decision rule 
 a common purpose or shared intention to solve issues together 
 an autonomous and voluntary participation, guided by accountability and 
legitimacy principles in decision-making   
 
However, collaborative governance has been interpreted in multiple accounts across 
different studies, drawing further confusion to readers as different variations such as 
“partnership”, “joint working”, “cooperation”, and “cooperation” are used interchangeably 
in the literature (Himmelman, 1996; O’Flynn, 2009). This research recognises that 
concepts like networking, cooperation, and coordination are strategies to the 
collaborative governance process and are not to be used interchangeably when referring 
to collaboration (Figure 3). As scholars have suggested (Gray, 1989; Wood and Gray, 
1991; Himmelman, 1996), we view collaboration as an iterative, emergent and cyclical 
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process rather than linear stages, where a continuum of strategies (i.e. networking, 
cooperating, etc.) are used to enhance stakeholder capacity, make collective decisions, 
and achieve a common purpose for mutual benefit.   
Figure 3: Continuum of collaboration 
 
2.4.3 Elements of collaborative governance congruent to collective action 
theory 
2.4.3.1 Governance 
Perhaps one of the most defining characteristics of collaborative governance that 
sets it apart from “partnerships” or “networks” is the added value brought by the 
governing arrangement that enables the participants to function as a collaborative 
institution. Governance, in the institutional context, determines ‘who can do what to 
whom, and on whose authority’ (McGinnis, 2011a). It is concerned with constituting rule–
ruler–ruled relationships for collective action to cope with problems affecting the 




Donahue (2004) stated that a collaborative relationship can be institutionalised 
through formal contracts to some degree in order to coordinate and monitor activities, 
whilst also recognising the value of informal institutions in operating (i.e. informal 
agreements or tacit understandings). Ansell and Gash (2008) also reiterated that a 
formal and structured arrangement was necessary to distinguish collaborative 
governance from other forms of public-private partnerships. This encompassed the 
critical component of governance, which served as an overarching element describing 
the institutions or rules of the game that guide collective decision-making between a 
multiplicity of actors, rather than a single individual or organisation making a decision. 
2.4.3.2 Stakeholders 
In its simplest sense, collaboration involves any joint activity by two or more 
organisations who intend to create public value by working together rather than 
separately (Imperial and Koontz, 2007; Von Wald and Boyes, 2010). Donahue (2004) 
stated that a minimum level of diversity to participate in a collaborative are at least one 
public and one private player. Ansell and Gash (2008) used the term stakeholders to 
refer to the participation of public and non-public agencies as individuals or as organised 
groups, with public stakeholders taking the leadership role in the collaborative 
governance. For example, in resource management collaboration, public agencies (e.g. 
the state; bureaucracies; courts; governmental bodies) have the authority in terms of the 
institutional and political setting for other participants. In a framework for analysing 
government roles in collaborative environmental management, Koontz (2006) indicated 
that the state play a key role in setting the agenda and providing resources, whilst also 
shaping group structure and decision processes. In a monograph on collaborative 
governance of public services in Australia, Shergold (2008) specified that public 
agencies impose the  structure of collaborations particularly on deciding representation 
and its capacity to marshal resources and access to information, which mildly reflects 
the implicit hierarchical relationships between actors. Ansell and Gash (2008) did not 
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disregard, however, the role that non-public agencies play in terms of policy outcomes, 
more importantly in implementation.  
Ultimately, all stakeholders should be involved in all stages of the decision-making 
process. Donahue (2004) and O’Brien (2012) stated that if other parties are simply 
agents engaged to implement a dominant player’s agenda, this  relationship is not a valid 
form of collaborative governance. Emerson et al. (2012) offered a more flexible definition 
for stakeholders by emphasising cross-boundary, multi-partner agencies (i.e. the state, 
the private sector, and the civil society), where joined-up arrangements such as public-
private, private-social, or co-management regimes occur. This expanded a broader 
boundary in terms of who gets to participate in the collaborative, bringing the possibility 
of hybrid arrangements to fit the needs of the collaborating participants. For example, in 
metropolitan governance where cross-cutting issues like climate change and equity and 
accessibility to public services call for a more diverse collaborative arrangements that 
cut across traditional dichotomies of hierarchical governance (Roberts and Abbott, 
2017). Similarly in environmental management, advisory groups play an important role 
in creating shared leadership amongst all members of the collaborative group (Koontz, 
2003).  
2.4.3.3 Forum 
In collaborative organisations, formality may vary from relatively informal (i.e. 
informal agreements through corresponding trust and norms) or very formal structures 
institutionalised in binding legal documents (Imperial and Koontz, 2007). O’Brien (2012) 
stressed the importance of a formal forum where the stakeholders gather and meet on a 
regular basis. Ansell and Gash (2008) put great emphasis on the role of public agencies 
in initiating this forum, either to fulfil their own purposes or to comply with a mandate. 
The forum is particularly useful for knowledge sharing, sustained dialogue and mutual 
learning, which enables forging interdependent relationships between the stakeholders 
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involved in the collaboration. Subsequently, the forum is created to make collective 
decisions and is used to achieve direction, control, and coordination of the participating 
stakeholders (Imperial and Koontz, 2007; Ansell et al., 2017).  
2.4.3.4 Collective decision-making  
Collaboration involves collective decision-making, where public and non-state 
stakeholders communicate and influence each other through a multilateral and 
deliberative process (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Gray (1989) highlighted that there is also 
joint ownership of decisions and the participants are directly responsible for reaching 
agreement on a solution. This is also a key feature of governance (Wood and Gray, 
1991; Chhotray and Stoker, 2008b) where decisions are taken by a collection of 
autonomous individuals through mutual influence and control, and  shared rules, norms, 
or organisational structures.  
In some cases, collective decision-making can also be an outcome of collaborative 
governance. Using a collective action perspective, Ostrom (1990) suggested that when 
parties come together to collaborate, they create set of formal or informal rules in 
addressing collective action problems. Using a structured set of collective choices, the 
stakeholders are able to develop and germinate new policy possibilities by feeding into 
formulation, implementation and evaluation (Wanna, 2008). The participants should be 
willing to monitor themselves and impose sanctions for noncompliance in order to 
succeed in collective decision-making. On the other hand, Shergold (2008) emphasised 
the role of public agencies in enhancing collaboration by championing the collective 
decisions through disproportionate power, on behalf of the rest of the collaborative 
venture. 
2.4.3.5 Consensus oriented 
Whilst consensus is a common decision rule, it is not necessarily always achieved 
or required (Koontz, 2006; Emerson et al., 2012). In collaborative forums, the goal is 
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typically to achieve some degree of consensus amongst stakeholders. Ansell and Gash 
(2008) used the term consensus oriented to acknowledge that although consensus not 
result into a successful collaboration, stakeholders can build consensus to address 
collective problems through a deliberative, multilateral, and formal forum. We must be 
reminded that collaboration is an iterative process where the search for solutions does 
not only happen just by reaching mutual agreement on answers, but also by jointly 
framing the questions and identifying the problems (Shergold, 2008). Stakeholders can 
design different rules and adopt different types of group decisions, and rely on consensus 
to compensate for imperfections resulting from the differences in decision rules 
especially (Koontz, 2006; Imperial and Koontz, 2007). As the decisions become more 
complex, alternative binding procedures (e.g. voting) are employed as a back-up in case 
achieving consensus becomes more difficult (Imperial and Koontz, 2007; O’Brien, 2012). 
For example, consensus is built during the initial stages where common ground is being 
established in order to define or frame a single shared challenge or a broader range of 
concerns (Donahue, 2004; O’Brien, 2012).  
2.4.3.6 Common purpose 
A key defining element of collaborative governance is the working together of 
stakeholders as a collective for mutual benefit and a common purpose. Ansell and 
Gash's (2008) definition purposively defines the focus of collaboration on public policies 
or issues. It could either be a shared intention to solve issues for the wider community, 
to resolve a conflict, or to develop and advance a shared vision which otherwise cannot 
be carried out by merely acting alone (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003c; Koontz, 2006; 
Emerson et al., 2012; O’Brien, 2012). Huxham (1996) referred to this as the moral 
imperative, where collaboration is the only way to address complex social problems, 
such as poverty, crime, etc., that cannot be tackled by any single organisation alone. 
Stakeholders develop a shared understanding and motivation of what they can 
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collectively achieve and improve together, and the willingness to enhance each other’s 
capacity for joint action and mutual benefit (Himmelman, 1996).  
2.4.3.7 Participation 
Collaboration involves stakeholders who participate voluntarily and are autonomous 
(Wood and Gray, 1991; Huxham, 1996; Thomson and Perry, 2006). Although it may be 
mandated by court orders or legislatures, participation in collaborative governance is 
largely voluntary especially when they see the benefit in doing so (Huxham, 1996). 
Incentives are, therefore, vital when participating in a collaboration. When stakeholders 
believe that they can achieve their goals unilaterally or through alternative means, the 
incentives to participate in the collaboration is low (Ansell and Gash, 2008). In a collective 
action theory perspective, autonomous actors behave in accordance with their rational 
weighing of costs and benefits of strategies (Thomson and Perry, 2006; Swann and Kim, 
2018). When the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits, the participants will stop 
contributing to the collaboration before group optimum is met. 
On the other hand, Wood and Gray (1991) emphasised the importance for 
stakeholders to retain their independent decision-making powers whilst abiding by the 
rules in the collaborative governance. Because of the recognition of autonomy of the 
stakeholders, they often come to the table with competing interests. Thomson and Perry 
(2006) and Shergold (2008) described this as dual identity, where stakeholders have to 
maintain their own distinct organisational identity and authority separate from or 
simultaneously with their collaborative role. This tension was also portrayed by Huxham 
(1996) as an autonomy-accountability dilemma, where collaborating organisations have 





2.5 Linking the structural variables using the IAD Framework 
Guided by formal and informal institutions, the revised theory of collective action, and 
the concept of collaborative governance, this study employs an analytical framework to 
help link the various structural variables identified in the literature review.  
As we have continued to reiterate in this chapter, previous studies in managing the 
commons have emphasised the emerging role of institutions in common property 
regimes. Institutions provide a coordinating function where rules are established to 
regulate the entry and use of the resource systems, the incentives that shape the 
behaviour of those who benefit from it, the interactions resulting from this, and the types 
of outcomes obtained. Without these rules guiding the appropriation of resources, users 
compete with one another until their actions may destroy the CPR (McGinnis and 
Ostrom, 1992). Therefore, formal and informal arrangements may be devised to address 
collective action dilemmas. To examine the institutional arrangements that emerge in the 
introduction of stewards of the commons, this study selects the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework.  
In 2005, Ostrom published another critically acclaimed book Understanding 
Institutional Diversity on the management of the common pool, which included a 
comprehensive framework on theoretical issues and empirical studies on successfully 
resolving common pool tragedies through locally devised institutions. These institutions 
are shared understandings amongst those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions 
about which actions are required, prohibited, or permitted, what information must or must 
not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their 
actions (Imperial, 1999; Ostrom, 2005, 2011).  
Central to her new contribution to the study of the commons is the conceptualisation 
of the IAD framework and how it is a useful multi-tier conceptual map in analysing how 
multiple actors interact to solve collective action problems shaped by structures, rules, 
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positions and external attributes. The IAD framework is a systematic method that collects 
institutional contexts and policy analysis functions to understand how institutions shape 
outcomes, and how they operate and change over a period of time (McGinnis, 2011a). 
It claims an explanatory power to unpack the details of the institutional operations, which 
will be useful in understanding how a set of rules, norms, and beliefs are embedded 
within common property regimes and influence the way they address problems and 
enforce such existing institutions. 
Figure 4: The IAD framework 
 
Adapted from: (Ostrom, 2005) 
Figure 4 illustrates the elements of the IAD framework for multi-stakeholder 
sustainable stewardship for governing the health commons. The process-oriented 
framework has been designed to analyse the nature of institutional arrangements 
shaping the actors' behaviour, as well as the rules of the game. In Ostrom’s later work, 
she included not only physical properties of the resource were identified in her design 
principles, but also the rules created to regulate the entry and use of the resources, the 
types of interactions emerging, and the outcomes obtained (Forsyth and Johnson, 2014). 
 
51 
The unit of analysis in the IAD framework is the action situation where policy choices 
are made (McGinnis, 2011a). It involves multiple individuals who engage in a set of 
actions that together lead to outcomes, and observe information, select actions, engage 
in patterns of interaction, and realise outcomes from their interaction (McGinnis, 2011a; 
Heikkila and Andersson, 2018). It is enclosed in an action arena, which includes those 
individuals or organisations that make decisions based upon information about how 
actions are linked to possible outcomes and the different costs and benefits attached to 
actions and outcomes (Imperial, 1999). To analyse an action situation, the following are 
identified:  
“1. the set of participants 2. the positions to be filled by participants 3. potential 
outcomes 4. the set of allowable actions and the function that maps actions into 
realised outcomes 5. the control that an individual has in regard to this function 
6. the information available to participants about actions and outcomes and their 
linkages 7. costs and benefits – which serve as incentives and deterrents – 
assigned to actions and outcomes” (Ostrom, 2005:32) 
 
Central to the analysis of institutions in the IAD framework focuses particularly on the 
rules-in-use. It addresses questions like (Ostrom, 1990): How many participants were 
involved?  What was the group structure? Who initiated action? Who paid the costs of 
entrepreneurial activities? What kind of information did participants have about their 
situation? What were the risks and exposures of various participants? What broader 







Figure 5: Elements within action situation 
 
Adapted from: (Ostrom, 2005) 
To address these, Ostrom (2005) developed a typology for rules-in-use, which must 
be compatible with the underlying biophysical setting and community attributes. Each of 
these rules are interrelated with a specific function in the action situation (Figure 5). The 
rules typology included: position (determines types and roles of decision-makers), 
boundary (determines the entry, succession, and exit of actors), choice (defines the set 
of actions assigned to each actor), aggregation (determines collective agreement rules), 
information (determines information access), payoff (identifies the rewards and sanctions 
associated with outcomes of actions) and scope (determines the outcome variables) 
rules (Ostrom, 2005; Heikkila and Andersson, 2018). 
Once these are the initial action arena has been evaluated, the variables affecting 
this are examined. There are three exogenous variables that influence the pattern of 
interactions among individuals and organisations in an action arena, namely attributes 
of the community, nature of the biophysical conditions, and rules-in-use (Ostrom, 2005). 
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These inputs are the contextual factors that set out the context within which an action 
situation is situated (McGinnis, 2011a). Once contextual factors are linked to action 
arenas, then it generates interactions and produce outcomes.  
The IAD framework has been applied in numerous contexts in examining the 
commons including large-scale ecosystems (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005, 2018; Gerlak 
and Heikkila, 2006), watershed partnerships (Moore and Koontz, 2003; Imperial and 
Koontz, 2007; Hardy and Koontz, 2009), fisheries (Rudd, 2004; Imperial and Yandle, 
2005), forestry management (Koontz, 2003), and polycentric settings (Whaley and 
Weatherhead, 2014); however, it has yet been explored in the health commons context.  
Another analytical framework was also examined to potentially address the 
objectives of this research. The Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework by Feiock 
(2013) has emerged as useful analytical lens for explaining why different mechanisms 
are selected in collaborative metropolitan settings. Directly borrowing from IAD's rule 
types and configurations of rules, ICA framework focuses on principal-agent problems 
and free-riding behaviour found on collaborative governance arrangements, where “an 
authority’s incentives do not align with collectively desired outcomes” (Swann and Kim, 
2018:274). However, it steers away from institutions; instead, it focuses on a more 
general approach on examining integrative mechanisms based on varying levels of 
transaction costs, authority, complexity of issue, and uncertainty to information (Feiock, 
2013:404).  
ICA framework has emerged as a useful analytical framework in empirical studies on 
the collaborative governance literature. In a systematic literature review, Swann and Kim 
(2018) identified 68 empirical studies that utilised ICA as a means of understanding how 
fragmented authorities  strengthen collaboration through embeddedness and networks, 
contracts and agreements, and delegated and imposed authority. Similarly, Yi et al. 
(2018) similarly applied the ICA framework using quantitative analysis to examine why 
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local authorities choose various mechanisms of cooperation given the variation in 
autonomy and authority on each jurisdiction.  
Whilst ICA has its advantages in examining a wider range of collaborative 
mechanisms in fragmented settings, there are multiple reasons why it is not compatible 
for our research objectives and why IAD framework is more appropriate. First, ICA is 
focused on identifying the reasons to fragmentation and explaining the selection of the 
mechanisms to foster collaboration and its consequences. Swann and Kim (2018) 
identified that the ICA framework offers practical prescriptions on reducing risk and 
uncertainty in collaborative arrangements in regional and metropolitan settings, which is 
not really the focus of this research. Second, although the ICA framework can be useful 
in explaining the mechanisms used to resolve collective action dilemmas, IAD framework 
is focused on comparing the different types of rules of the game and their resulting 
outcomes, given the contextual setting, costs and benefits, and interaction within an 
action situation. Third, examining institutional arrangements require an organised 
conceptual framework where structural variables can be managed and easily 
understood, such as actors, characteristics of the resources, the amount of information 
available to actors, and the factors that constrain or facilitate their interactions (Imperial 
and Yandle, 2005:502). Although ICA framework borrowed from IAD’s configuration of 
rules, it does not have a conceptual structure like IAD as illustrated in Figure 4. Fourth, 
IAD framework has the built-in feature of identifying the different institutional designs, 
given its congruence to the exogenous factors (e.g. physical setting, community 
attributes). Researchers can use IAD’s rule typology to identify how institutional 
arrangements resulted in various policy outcomes (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2018). 
Lastly, IAD has the explanatory power to be examined using multiple levels of 
analysis. This is to illustrate how all rules are nested in another set of rules (Ostrom, 
2005:58), where one level of actions and outcomes obtained from the previous level 
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affect the proceeding level (Figure 6). For example, constitutional rules refer to who, 
when, and how can participants engage. These then affect the collective-choice 
activities, where choices about which institutions or strategies should be used in 
resolving collective decisions. These collective-choice rules then influence how day-to-
day transactions and decisions are made by the participants in operational situations. 
Figure 6: Multiple levels of analysis 
 
Source: (Cole, 2014) 
Overall, the IAD framework presents merits as an analytical tool for this study. 
Applications of the IAD framework in health governance has been limited (see Abimbola 
et al., 2014, 2017), particularly focusing on the multiple level analysis. This study takes 
advantage of the IAD framework by applying it in a unique context of the health system 
as a common property regime setting. It is a promising tool for investigating the 




2.6 Modified IAD model in collaborative governance  
Ostrom (2011) posited that the development and use of models are vital in making 
precise assumptions about variables, in order to make precise predictions on the results 
of combining these parameters. Now that we have a clear definition on what collaborative 
governance entails, we will now examine the elements and mechanisms of the 
collaborative process as illustrated by various models presented in the literature and 
present a modified model of collaborative governance and collective action. We embed 
the structural variables previously identified on our examination of the collective action 
literature, particularly focusing on the role of institutions as facilitating mechanisms to 
address social dilemmas.  
2.6.1 External conditions 
There are many possible reasons as to why organisations come together to 
collaborate within a multi-layered context of political, legal, socioeconomic, 
environmental, and other influences (Emerson et al., 2012). Scholars have identified 
elements that distinguish or influence the emergence of a collaborative governance, 
including responding to complex issues (Gray, 1989; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003a) and 
collective action dilemma (Imperial and Koontz, 2007; Page and Melroy, 2008), 
advancing self-interests (Wood and Gray, 1991; Huxham, 1996), promoting cost-
effectiveness, efficiency, or economic development (Himmelman, 1996; Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2003a), declining productivity growth (Gray, 1989), and overlapping and 
fragmented roles (Diaz-Kope et al., 2015; Roberts and Abbott, 2017). Such elements act 
not as starting conditions but as external factors that influence the key drivers to 
collaboration. 
Gray (1989) and Wood and Gray (1991) highlighted that collaboration is a logical and 
necessary response to turbulent conditions, such as rapid economic and technological 
change resulting to globalisation and increasing political pressures for organisations to 
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adopt competitive strategies. In a study on collaborating metropolises, Roberts and 
Abbott (2017) argued that globalisation impacted the increasing links between countries, 
requiring governments to engage and share economic activity. This resulted in high 
levels of interdependence amongst governments and organisations, who now share 
power and have overlapping roles and responsibilities.  
For government policy changes such as decentralisation, collaboration has become 
a mechanism to resolve the failures of downstream implementation and to the high cost 
and politicisation of regulation (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Wanna, 2008). For instance, the 
marketisation of public services resulted in fragmented institutional structures delivering 
those services. This resulted in “wicked problems”, as in those involving substantial goal 
conflicts, important technical disputes, and multiple actors from several levels of 
government (Sabatier, 2007; Bingham, 2011), which are exacerbated by systems of 
fragmented authority or overlapping jurisdictions. To address these, integrative 
organisational arrangements have emerged where such organisations cooperate to 
deliver services effectively, instead of competition (Rhodes, 2000; Saltman et al., 2007).  
In organisational studies, collaboration is recommended to address collective action 
dilemmas, particularly those that create diseconomies of scale, positive and negative 
externalities, and common property resource problems (Feiock, 2009). Ostrom (1998) 
posited that collective action problems occur when individuals in interdependent 
situations face choices in which all individuals will be better off cooperating but fail to do 
so because of conflicting self-interests leaving everyone worse off than feasible 
alternatives. For example, in environmental management where the appropriation of 
resources is shared amongst grassroot communities, they face collective action 
problems such as restoration activities, permitting processes, etc. (Heikkila and Gerlak, 
2005; Imperial and Koontz, 2007). Swann and Kim (2018) offered practical prescriptions 
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for governing fragmented governments, where the use of collaborative arrangements is 
vital to reducing risk and uncertainty when facing such dilemmas.  
Overall, the external environment factors influence the impetus for organisations to 
collaborate. Collaboration has proven to be a useful tool in addressing a multitude of 
interorganisational problems – whether they aim to resolve conflict or a complex issue, 
or to create joint action in order to reduce costs, risks, or fragmentation of services. 
2.6.1.1 Physical attributes 
Physical conditions influence the action situation and constrain the institutional 
arrangements being formed. They provide significant implications for policy design and 
collective action, which are all critical aspects of the policy-making process (Polski and 
Ostrom, 1999). 
Number of participants. Olson (1965) pointed out that unless the group has very 
specific characteristics to overcome the free rider problem, the provision of the collective 
good will fail. For instance, free riding is less likely to happen if groups are smaller 
because individuals are more incentivised to put in effort and contribute to the good being 
provided due to the potential gains. Larger groups, on the other hand, struggle to 
cooperate because individuals the individual benefit is too low and organisation costs 
are too high (Udehn, 1993; Reuben, 2003). This was, however, based in a public goods 
economics perspective where rational choice theory assumes that no one will cooperate 
in one-shot or finitely repeated interactions. Similarly, Agrawal's (2001) meta-analyses 
of structural variables in collective action discovered that small size and well-defined 
boundaries are likely to be better managed under common property arrangements. 
Although Ostrom (2010) pointed out that size being a factor on the likelihood of 
cooperation depends on other variables as well, such as group characteristics. 
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Heterogeneity of participants. Attributes of a community are likely to affect the 
behaviour of individuals interacting with one another. In self-organising resource 
regimes, homogenous and stable communities are likely to sustain the resource. 
Empirical studies in collective action illustrate that heterogeneity increases the 
transaction costs of reaching an agreement (Yi et al., 2018); whilst a diverse group 
makes it more challenging to develop norms of trust and reciprocity amongst the group 
(Heikkila and Andersson, 2018). 
Shared resources. When organisations initially come together to collaborate, one of 
the few things they have to decide on is agreeing which resources (e.g. power, time, 
human resources, knowledge, capital, etc.) are to be shared amongst the members. This 
provides the potential for organisations to secure collaborative advantage (see: Wood 
and Gray, 1991; Huxham, 1996). In a study on management of common pool resources, 
Koontz (2006) identifies three broad categories for resources – human, technical, and 
financial. Human resources involve the manpower (i.e. volunteers, staff, leaders, etc.), 
who each possess skills, knowledge, and experience, that may be needed to advance 
collaboration. Technical resources refer to the local context and knowledge about the 
external environment, which can inform collaborative efforts. Finally, financial resources 
are the funding, donations, or contributions that the group receives to allow the 
collaborative arrangement to conduct and perform business activities. In a collaborative 
metropolitan governance for example, integration of planning resources is one of the first 
few steps to creating a sustainable regional development model (Roberts and Abbott, 
2017).  Much of this occurs by agreeing access to information, sharing resources and 
expertise, and integrating policy, regulation and administration functions.  
Whilst sharing of resources is vital, not all organisations have the capacity to 
participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders; hence, it creates a power and 
resource imbalance amongst the participants. Himmelman (1996) noted that power in 
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relation to collaboration does not assert dominance, but rather as capacity to produce 
intended results. Ansell and Gash (2008) asserted that weaker organisations will be 
prone to manipulation by stronger actors, which may lead to distrust or less willingness 
to commit to collaboration. For example, small voluntary organisations may feel more 
vulnerable when collaborating with larger statutory agencies that bring major resources 
to the collaboration (Huxham et al., 2000). Diaz-Kope et al. (2015) suggested that citizen-
based collaboratives often lack the human, technical, and financial resources. Thus, they 
form partnerships with public agencies, where the latter provides technical assistance, 
funding and provision in exchange of the citizens’ direct knowledge about local context 
and issues (Koontz, 2006). 
The extent of involvement may depend on the amount of resources an organisation 
can contribute to the collaborative arrangement. In some cases (Wanna, 2008), some 
stakeholders do not have the time or energy to engage in the collaboration, nor do they 
have the skills and expertise to participate in discussions. In order to address such power 
relationships, countermeasures such as leadership and representation (Huxham, 1996; 
Huxham et al., 2000) must be in place to avoid an unsuccessful collaboration process. 
This is a common practice in citizen-based collaborations, particularly those involving 
grassroot communities and government agencies (Koontz, 2006). 
2.6.1.2 Community attributes 
The attributes of a community refer to the degree of common understanding between 
the potential participants who share values, beliefs, and preferences about policy 
strategies and outcomes (Polski and Ostrom, 1999). 
Incentives to participate. Collaboration is likely to emerge when actors have 
incentives to participate. This is often shaped by the scope and nature of the problem 
being resolved (Emerson et al., 2012), the power differences amongst the participants 
(Gray, 1989), or whether participation is mandated or voluntary (Diaz-Kope et al., 2015). 
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In studies on common pool resource, for example, Ostrom (1999) posited that incentives 
can be generated for self-organising communities facing dilemmas on resource 
appropriation. However, these incentives will only be effective if they have a reasonable 
expectation to continuously enjoy benefits from it. For instance, Ansell and Gash (2008) 
proposed that incentives increase if the stakeholders perceive that their participation can 
directly lead to concrete, tangible effective policy outcomes. 
Power imbalances are also determinants to the types of incentives to participate. 
Gray (1989) argued that power differences influence the willingness of some participants 
to the table. For mixed-agency structures, public agencies often exert dominance over 
citizen actors because of their advantage on resources (Diaz-Kope et al., 2015). 
However, as power asymmetry increases, participants will be more likely to shop around 
for alternative venues or to at least keep their options open. Stakeholders become 
discouraged with the collaborative process when they find other places to pursue their 
agendas (Ansell and Gash, 2008). 
Incentives to participate can also depend on the legitimacy of the collaboration. For 
agency-based collaborations, stakeholders participate because it is mandated by 
legislature, which in turn creates a sense of legitimacy. This compels stakeholders to 
collaborate and work towards collective interests, creating positive incentives for 
participation. Voluntary participation for citizen-based agencies, on the other hand, is 
motivated by pluralistic incentives to exert influence over policy outcomes (Gray, 1989; 
Logsdon, 1991; Diaz-Kope et al., 2015). 
Various incentives presented to participants are also subject to the autonomy-
accountability dilemma (Huxham, 1996), where stakeholders have competing interests 
between achieving individual organisational missions and maintaining accountability to 
collaborative partners. When participants are presented with multiple incentives to 
collaborate, they oftentimes find themselves in a situation where they struggle to 
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maintain their own self-interests (i.e. their accountability to their own organisations or 
constituents) versus compromising with their collaborative interests, thus making it 
harder to make concessions with other stakeholders. This was the one of the core 
arguments of the collective action theory, where Olson (1971) expounded that rational 
individuals will act on their own self-interests and will not act to achieve group interests 
when participating in collective group decision-making. Roberts and Abbott (2017) stated 
that when accountability lines are not clear, especially for the private sector and 
community groups, self-interests may be easily involved in the policy process. On the 
other hand, Swann and Kim (2018) argue that citizen participation create positive 
incentives to build legitimacy and accountability in a collaborative governance because 
delegated entities are indirectly accountable to citizens. 
History of cooperation. Literature suggests that history of antagonism or cooperation 
between stakeholders can either hinder or facilitate collaboration (Gray, 1989; Thomson 
and Perry, 2006; Ansell and Gash, 2008). This oftentimes dictates the direction of the 
collaboration in terms of the amount of resources (e.g. information) and/or common 
ground needed to be established. Much of the evidence on the literature suggest that 
having a previous history in cooperation generate strong trust and interdependence 
amongst stakeholders, thus resulting in collaboration (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005; 
Imperial, 2005; Roberts and Abbott, 2017). In metropolitan governance literature, cases 
with a long history of cooperation result in more successful collaborative efforts. Lee et 
al. (2012) proved that on an analysis in regional collaboration, communities' cooperative 
perception appears to be a strong reinforcing mechanism to forge network relationships 
amongst their potential partners, thus increasing the likelihood to collaborate. 
Consequently, in situations where there are little history of cooperation, this can be 
resolved by establishing interdependence or by taking positive steps to rebuild the low 
levels of trust amongst stakeholders. Swann and Kim (2018) noted that in collaborative 
environmental management, governments with little to no history of collaboration 
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oftentimes need more capacity to share information and coordinate; thus, focusing on 
smaller projects in the first instance before making larger commitments may be the best 
alternative. This type of incrementalism is oftentimes advantageous for collaborative 
governance with limited history in voluntary collaboration. 
On the other side of the coin, having a history of conflict is likely to have low levels 
of trust, which in turn produces unwillingness to commit, manipulative strategies, and 
dishonest communications (Ansell and Gash, 2008; O’Brien, 2012). This oftentimes 
become a barrier to collaboration, leading to unsuccessful attempts in overcoming 
collaborative process and to resolve collective issues. For example, in comparing large-
scale ecosystem collaboratives, Gerlak and Heikkila (2006) noted that a history of 
polarised relationships amongst stakeholders made it more difficult to implement 
projects.  
We do not discount, however, the possibility of high levels of conflict to lead to a 
successful collaboration. In fact, when stakeholders are highly interdependent, they are 
more likely to create a powerful incentive to collaborate when there is some level of 
conflict present (Gray, 1989; Ansell and Gash, 2008; O’Brien, 2012). When stakeholders 
deal with disparity of power and/or resources and it’s becoming more costly to organise, 
this type of conflict causes an impetus to encourage collaboration. Similarly, when there 
is history of competition amongst the stakeholders, which is particularly more evident on 
studies in polycentric metropolitan governance, Lee et al. (2012) suggest that there is a 
stronger motivation to collaborate to learn best practice, reduce costs, and gain valuable 
information. 
Interdependence. Perhaps one of the tenets of collaboration is the interdependence 
of stakeholders, which encompasses the coming together in order to accomplish 
something which they are unable to do so on their own. Collective action begins with the 
recognition of the actors’ interdependency with each other to resolve an issue that affects 
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the actions of others. Thus, when stakeholders have a give-and-take relationship and 
depend on each other, it generates stronger collaborative solutions (Gray, 1989; 
Emerson et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012). 
Literature suggests that interdependence is the root of several collaborative 
strategies (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Logsdon (1991) asserted that willingness to 
collaborate depends on an organisation's perceived interdependence with other groups 
in addressing a social problem effectively. The author designed a logical path for 
evolution of organisational commitment to collaboration using a conceptual matrix based 
on level of risk and interdependence. When an organisation accepts solving a social 
issue to achieve its interests (high stakes) and also realises that joint efforts are vital to 
resolving such issue (high interdependence), it is more likely that the organisation will 
engage in collaborative efforts. When an organisation reaches this point, it is highly likely 
that they have already identified the resources to be shared, recognised legitimacy, and 
established shared motivation and mutual commitment to collaborate (Emerson et al., 
2012). Thomson and Perry (2006) particularly identified forging mutual beneficial 
relationships is deeply rooted in interdependence, where organisations either have the 
shared motivation (homogeneity) or differing interests (complementarities) to forego their 
own interests at the expense of others. As long as participants can satisfy each other's 
differing interests without losing incentives to themselves, then collaboration can 
continue.  
Emerson et al. (2012) provided a more elaborate explanation on how shared 
motivation encompasses all the interpersonal elements (social capital), such as trust, 
mutual understanding, and commitment, and how these are conditional to creating 
higher levels of interdependence. As participants engage in multiple interactions, they 
establish trust and respect with each other’s interests, thus creating bonds of 
commitment that eventually contributes to sustaining shared motivation to pursue 
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collaboration. Principled engagement is also another element rooted in interdependence 
(Thomson and Perry, 2006; Emerson et al., 2012). This involves getting the right people 
at the table during the negotiation stages to either forge out their differences or to identify 
commonalities based on each other's needs. 
Overall, higher levels of interdependence provide a fertile ground for the key drivers 
of collaboration to foster. It is an intermediate outcome to a shared vision in achieving 
collective goals together, coupled with principled engagement, mutual trust and 
understanding, and deeper levels of commitment.  
2.6.2 Action situation 
The action situation is the centrepiece of the IAD framework where it highlights how 
institutions and structural attributes of the contexts affect the behaviour of the actors 
participating in it (Ostrom, 2005). In collaborative governance theory, the mechanisms of 
the “black box” or the collaborative process is analogous to the IAD’s action situation. 
Wood and Gray (1991) described this as the linkage from inputs to outputs, and 
Thomson and Perry (2006) and Emerson et al. (2012) referred to it as the dynamics 
necessary to ensure a successful process. Whilst the patterns of the “black box” differ 
per context, the general sequence is usually dependent on the key drivers. It is important 
that we identify these elements to determine the various actions that participants take 
when engaged in a collaborative relationship with each other. We want to evaluate the 
different strategies they adopt resulting from the collaborative process, particularly 
focusing on their change-oriented, emerging relationships.  
Common definition of problem. During the problem-setting stage of the collaborative 
process, stakeholders identify the problem or issue that they are more or less likely to 
resolve. Gray (1989) believed that it is important for all parties to narrowly define the 
problem to the satisfaction of everyone, otherwise, there will be little incentive to 
collaborate. They have to find a common ground and weave out their differences in order 
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to construct the problems they need to deal with. This is usually resolved through 
incremental negotiation and deliberation (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). 
During this discovery stage, participants reveal their individual and group interests and 
concerns until they develop a shared understanding of what they can achieve 
collectively. In some cases (Imperial, 2005; Imperial and Koontz, 2007), stakeholders act 
as “entrepreneurs” where they sell their ideas and display high creativity in order to form 
a niche that distinguishes the collaborative arrangement from its member organisations. 
The success of this stage depends on the level of interdependence between the 
participants.  
Other scholars distinguish the role of agenda framing (Gray, 2004; O’Brien, 2012) as 
a specific way of stakeholders addressing conflict or problem at hand. In a study on 
environmental collaborations, Gray (2004) illustrated how stakeholders frame conflicts 
has an influence on the process and outcomes. She elaborated that participants may 
have different interpretations of the problem, thus construing their identity and 
consequently, behave defensively. By framing the agenda, the actors redefine the 
problem and tackle what action should be taken.  
Role of actors. Governance involves establishing administrative structures that 
moves governance to action (Thomson and Perry, 2006). This involves identifying which 
participants are eligible to participate, establishing clear lines of responsibilities amongst 
the participants, and creating monitoring or accountability mechanisms. Ansell and Gash 
(2008) described that a broadly inclusive participation of stakeholders must be actively 
sought in order to ensure a successful collaboration. By identifying the critical and rightful 
participants who are affected by the issue, and ensuring that all collaborating 
organisations are equally represented, the legitimacy of and commitment to the process 
are preserved (Gray, 1989; Imperial and Koontz, 2007). 
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When crafting rules as to which actors will be involved and what positions should 
they occupy, it is also important to take into account that not all participants will be able 
to partake in the decision-making at the same extent or at the same time. Deciding such 
levels of participation indicate how responsibilities and benefits are to be distributed 
(Gray, 1989). Literature also suggests that leadership roles are important to identify. For 
example, Gray (1989) and Wood and Gray (1991) identified the presence of a convener 
in establishing, legitimising, and guiding the collaborative alliance. Whilst it’s not a 
necessary precondition, the convener has the ability to identify and bring all legitimate 
stakeholders to the table. Logsdon (1991) demonstrated this in their studies on traffic 
congestion where the collaboration was convened by a previously assembled network 
of industry representatives who were negatively affected by the traffic problems.  
Collaboration is inherently political, which involves a lot of negotiation, bargaining, 
and  extensive discussions; thus, roles vary according to the existing context. 
Himmelman (1996) provided an elaborate typology on the other roles that stakeholders 
can take, such as catalyst, conduit, advocate, organiser, funder, technical assistance 
provider, capacity builder, partner, and facilitator – each of which stimulate the 
collaborative process. In collaborative public management literature, Moore and Koontz 
(2003) illustrated how institutional arrangements affect the roles that stakeholders play 
in the collaboration. In agency-based collaboration, for instance, provide technical advice 
to policy makers to improve strategic planning in local decision-making. The role of 
strong leaders is instrumental in influencing policy making as compared with citizen-
based collaborative groups, who oftentimes resort to traditional adversarial methods 
such as lobbying or petitioning in order to make an impact. The former is oftentimes 
conducted through less subtle and informal channels, as also explored by Ayres (2017) 
and Bailey and Wood (2017) where leaders use “hands-off” or “arms-length” influence 
to shape the practices and preferences of other actors. Imperial (2005) described this 
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role as being a coordinator or facilitator, where informal processes become useful to 
resolve disputes, organise meetings, or conducting negotiations. 
Some emphasise the role of catalysts, where leaders facilitate rather than directing 
(O’Brien, 2012) and stimulate the discussion with a vision and longer-term strategy in 
mind (Himmelman, 1996). In collaborative environmental management, citizen-based 
agencies oftentimes have individuals who play the roles of fixer, broker, or champions 
(Imperial, 2005). These roles tend to be strong supporters of the collaboration to either 
encourage more participants to get involved or to help find opportunities for joint action 
amongst the stakeholders. 
We argue that leadership is important in steering the direction of the collaborative 
governance. Stakeholders agree upon a set of rules in terms of who gets to participate 
in the collaboration and what participative or leadership roles, power, or responsibilities 
they undertake, which helps sustain the collaborative governance as it continues to 
evolve.  
Information. In experimental studies where interactions were tested multiple times, 
information about past actions and dialogue exchange between participants can 
influence the likelihood of collective action (Agrawal, 2001; Kopelman et al., 2002; 
Poteete et al., 2010). As the group is becoming more heterogenous or diverse, the level 
of optimal information being shared across the group also increases (Oliver, 1993). This 
could include information about their willingness to cooperate, their history of 
cooperation, the number of people they have known, etc. (Reuben, 2003), which could 
all be factored in when understanding if a heterogenous group is likely to make similar 
or dissimilar actions and make a dominant strategy to address the collective action 
dilemma. Kopelman et al. (2002) found that increased levels of communication through 
group discussion also yielded to positive cooperative effects and improved group identity 
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or solidarity. Both communication levels and information sharing constitute reputation, 
which can be built as the levels of interaction increase over time.  
2.6.3 Interaction 
Given a set of allowable actions, information, and the constraints provided by the 
exogenous variables (i.e. physical and material characteristics of the health commons, 
community attributes, and the rules-in-use), participants who occupy different positions 
then use different collaborative mechanisms in order to interact and produce their 
desired outcomes.  
Dialogue. After identifying who gets to participate, what positions they can take, and 
what their responsibilities are, we now discuss how these stakeholders must interact with 
one another in the decision-making arena. We focus particularly on dialogue as a 
strategy and consensus decision-making as an intermediate outcome to the 
communication process.  
Interdependence of the collaborating actors is built on face-to-face dialogue (Ansell 
and Gash, 2008). They continue to interact and exchange information with one another 
as the collaborative process matures from the direction-setting to the implementation 
stage. For instance, at the beginning of the collaboration process, actors use a more 
informal dialogue as a means of networking to establish shared interests (Himmelman, 
1996; Wanna, 2008). Imperial (2005) and Imperial and Koontz (2007) added that 
establishing networks is a useful way of adding structural stability as the collaboration is 
being developed. In a study on collaborative management of multi-actor watershed 
programs, the authors findings suggest that organisations with strong network ties can 
communicate and share information and ideas quicker, thus creating more opportunities 
to build interdependence and social capital. As the collaboration process develops, the 
stakeholders engage in more formal forms of dialogues, such as meetings or public 
forums. Having a forum can be a place for stakeholders to  create opportunities to 
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influence policies (Huxham, 1996), institutionalise decisions (Yang, 2017), exchange 
ideas (Roberts and Abbott, 2017), and coordinate their actions (Gerlak and Heikkila, 
2006).   
When stakeholders have the opportunities to participate in forums and engage 
interactions with one another, it builds interdependence amongst them and contributes 
to reaching an agreement on decisions by consensus. Gray (1989) discussed that 
personal forms of interactions result into subsequent debates over issues and exploring 
multiple options. This deliberation process ensures that stakeholders take advantage of 
the forums available to them where they can make reasoned communication with one 
another, such as having “hard conversations, constructive self-assertion, asking and 
answering challenging questions, and expressing honest disagreements” (Emerson et 
al., 2012:12).  
Face-to-face dialogue, however, is not always advantageous or essential. It could 
create conflicting decisions that may result in difficulties in reaching a consensus. 
Scholars suggest that informal forms of communication are also becoming a more 
frequently used strategy in the collaborative process. For example, Moore and Koontz 
(2003) identified that agency-based collaborative groups are more likely to use informal 
means of communication (i.e. unsolicited technical advice) to influence policy making. 
Peer pressure and daily staff interactions are also useful means to reconciling competing 
values without having to resort to formal forums (Imperial, 2005). Informal mechanisms 
have been widely explored in the multi-level governance literature (High et al., 2005; 
Tatenhove et al., 2006; Ayres and Bird, 2018), which illustrate the strong interest to 
explore informal institutions as a complement to formal modes of governance. Tatenhove 
et al. (2006) for example referred to informal dialogues as a lubricant to the formal 
processes, where actors have more freedom to experiment and engage without having 
to abide to or change the rules. Similarly, Ayres (2017) also exemplified that informal 
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discussions, such as reaching out to another stakeholder after a meeting, had a positive 
impact on the decision-making process. 
Shared norms. As participants continue to interact, they adopt rules and norms that 
govern their collaborative activities. Whilst formal rules were used to structure the 
relationships, informal institutions like shared norms were also found useful in facilitating 
the collaborative processes (Rodríguez-pose, 2013; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2018). Norms 
consist of shared understandings about which actions are obligatory, permitted, or 
forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), and influence human behaviour on how to 
behave in various social situations. For instance, individuals can decide to adopt a 
different set of rules and change their behaviour to conform to norms. 
Figure 7: The core relationships of collaboration 
 
Adapted from: (Ostrom, 1998) 
Trust, reciprocity, and reputation. Aside from social norms, trust, reciprocity, and 
reputation are also as equally important in facilitating an effective collaboration. Scholars 
have used individual strategic decisions models like prisoner’s dilemma to debate the 
likelihood of collective action occurring between individuals using the payoff matrices 
(e.g. cooperation vs. defection) (Tedeschi et al., 1969; Oliver, 1993; Reuben, 2003). 
Ostrom (1998) examined a series of infinitely repeated situations and found that as 
participants engage in repeated interactions with one another, individuals who acquired 
reputation led to developing levels of trusts and higher levels of cooperation (Figure 7). 
Collective action theory posits that institutions, including rules, norms, and strategies, 
structure the behaviour of the participants in a collaborative and collective agreement 
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(Ostrom, 2005, 2011). As social capital increases the likelihood of forming stronger 
network ties, therefore leading to more cooperation (Swann and Kim, 2018). This could 
involve frequent, informal social networking plays to promote the collaborative 
governance or to engage others in a dialogue about similar goals and interests.  
Trust is the extent to which members of this community feel confident that other 
members will not take maximum advantage of any situation, and that others will live up 
to their agreements regardless of their immediate interests (McGinnis, 2011a). If one 
trusts someone with a reputation of being trustworthy, then they are more likely to 
engage in productive social exchanges and cooperation. As the chain strengthens, more 
members encourage others to cooperate with those they have cooperated in previous 
encounters. This is referred to as reciprocity (Ostrom, 1998, 2010). This is a common 
practice where individuals tend to react positively to actions of others with positive 
responses, and negative actions of others with negative responses. Collaborative 
governance literature (Thomson and Perry, 2006), for example, illustrated that 
participants are more likely to willingly interact and behave accordingly if the other 
partners also demonstrate the same level of eagerness. 
2.6.4 Evaluation and outcomes 
After identifying the institutional arrangements in the action situation, participants 
interact and generate outcomes. We use Ostrom's design principles to evaluate under 
which conditions can institutional arrangements resolve collective action. 
Well-defined user and resource boundaries.  Having clear boundaries, makes it 
easier for the users of the commons to make arrangements on collaborative efforts. 
Since the earlier studies on the commons involved the management of natural or man-
made resources such as fisheries, watershed, irrigations, and forestry, a well-defined 
boundary is crucial. It identifies the inclusion and exclusion criteria through a 
geographical boundary on who gets to appropriate from the resource and which area are 
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they allowed to use (McKean and Ostrom, 1995; Agrawal, 2002). This is, however, 
problematic in areas where social or ad hoc boundaries are in place, or in polycentric 
settings where spill-over boundaries exist. Boundaries also sometimes emerge from a 
long natural process of historical competitive or cooperative interactions (McGinnis, 
2013a).  
Congruence with local conditions. In many setting of the commons, various rules 
emerge depending on the local conditions or the physical attributes of the resource 
involved (Ostrom, 1997). For instance, rules in appropriating water from a shared river 
will be different from the rules in grazing on a shared piece of land. Agrawal (2002) and 
Cox et al. (2010) also suggested that the rules should also be congruent with the 
characteristics of the users. This could include shared norms (e.g. culture, ideology, 
customs, etc.), past leadership experiences, level of interdependence, and group size. 
Collective choice agreements. This is the principle supporting the institutional 
arrangements that users make collectively, where they have first-hand and low-cost 
access to modify the operational rules and strategies of the resource (Ostrom, 1997). If 
the users do not have the bargaining power to change the rules, then they have more 
incentives to benefit from the system as identified earlier by the theory of collective 
action. This set-up is particularly common in small groups (McGinnis and Brink, 2012), 
where users of the resource also have the right to participate in making decisions. 
Monitoring mechanisms. Once initial agreements have been established, there is not 
guarantee that users of the resource will abide by the rules. Therefore, monitoring 
mechanisms are particularly important in order to generate incentives and motivation for 
the users to conform to the rules that they all collectively agreed in. Ostrom's (1990) field 
studies suggested that without these rules, systems are unable to survive for a very long 
time. For instance, studies on monitoring fisheries suggested that formal rules and 
regulations with various degree and type of penalties are good mechanisms to decrease 
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the likelihood of fishermen cheating (Rudd, 2004; Gerlak and Heikkila, 2006). This could 
involve a convening body and various committees to monitor and regulate the 
compliance of all users. The types of monitoring schemes also depend on the costs 
associated with it. In some smaller communities or multilateral partnerships with larger, 
nested networks, monitoring may be costly and difficult to implement (Swann and Kim, 
2018). For instance, in a study on 28 villages protecting their forestry, Agrawal and Goyal 
(2001) found that because of the size of the group benefiting from the resource, they had 
to externally hire a guard who monitored and maintained cooperative behaviour amongst 
the users. Baland and Platteau (1996) also specified that central monitoring can be 
extremely costly especially if there is only a single agency collecting all the information. 
They emphasised, however, the importance of imploring specialised monitoring driven 
by morals and norms to demotivate and incentivise users from breaking the rules. 
Graduated sanctions. Whether the monitoring rules are governed by an internal 
and/or external group, there should also be appropriate sanctions in place to punish 
those users who violate the collectively-agree rules. The type of sanctions also act as 
deterrent for participants from overusing the user and comply with their institutional 
arrangements. Ostrom (1990) highlighted the value of a system of sanctions applied in 
a graduated manner, rather than a single centralised punishment applicable to all kinds 
of violations. Not only does this allows the monitoring agents to resolve issues in a low-
cost manner, but also, it gives them the opportunity to implement lower sanctions and 
resolve any issues or disagreements before it escalated to a higher level of punishment. 
In this way, violators can reflect on their actions at an earlier stage and prevent the rule-
breaking behaviour in a more pragmatic manner. Of course, if they do decide to violate 
the rules again, more severe punishments should be imposed. 
Conflict resolution. Ostrom (1990) valued conflict resolution mechanisms that are 
easily available and costs cheaply to implement. This could be informal institutions such 
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as face-to-face communication, open dialogues, and/or other traditional modes of 
dispute resolution. In groups where community ties and shared norms or values are 
deeply embedded, interpersonal disagreements are usually resolved more effectively 
(Rangan, 1997). In larger groups, having a formal collaborative governance structure 
became a useful avenue to address any disputes (Jung et al., 2009).  
2.7 Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the literature on the role of the institutions and 
how it emerged as a response to collective action dilemmas, how formal and informal 
institutional arrangements were used to govern the commons, and what are the 
mechanisms that are common to addressing collective action problems that are found in 
collaborative settings. 
Based on the literature review, our research therefore argues that institutional 
arrangements can be devised to address collective action dilemmas. We argued that 
organisations benefiting from a shared resource can form a collaboration to collectively 
govern their commons, where group of leaders can act as stewards of their own 
commons and make collective decisions on behalf of their population. Stewardship of 
the commons involves crafting, enforcing, and monitoring formal and informal 
institutional arrangements to facilitate the decision-making process, shape the behaviour 
and incentives of the participants, and to constrain the access to the resources.  
These assumptions are based on the following theoretical framework: 
Collective action dilemmas: The theory of collective action is one of the theoretical 
foundations in explaining why humans behave the way they do when they are faced with 
a dilemma to cooperate as a collective unit. This theory assumed that individuals are 
short-term maximisers motivated by their self-interests rather than their concern for 
others or for society as a whole. Whilst state ownership or privatisation has proven to 
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resolve collective action dilemma, the study on the commons suggested that creating 
common property rights to share responsibilities towards consuming and/or managing 
the resource can be a cheaper and more effective alternative.  
Institutions: Ostrom (1998) offered an alternative individualistic conception to 
resolving collective action and posited that individuals are capable of designing new tools 
– including institutions – to change the structure of their environment, and adopt short-
term or long-term strategies based on the opportunities they face (Ostrom, 1998; McCay, 
2002). Institutions are “rules of the game” (North, 1990) that facilitate, guide, and 
constrain the behaviour of individuals and organisations. Collective action theory posited 
that when actors come together to collaborate, they develop a set of working rules in 
order to determine who will be eligible to make decisions, which actions will be allowed, 
and how costs will be distributed (Ostrom, 2005; Ansell and Gash, 2008).  
Collaborative governance: Collaborative governance is a new form of governance in 
the public administration and management literature, encompassing the engagement 
and networking arrangements between public, private, and third-sector agencies (Gray, 
1989). There are various elements of collaborative governance that are congruent with 
collective action theory, namely: governance, stakeholders, forum, collective decision-
making, consensus oriented, and shared vision or common purpose. We link all these 
variables together to form a modified model of the IAD framework. 
We embed the structural variables previously identified on our examination of the 
collective action literature, particularly focusing on the role of institutions as facilitating 
mechanisms to address social dilemmas. We linked them and present a modified 










3 Policy Background 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we established a theoretical framework supporting the 
assumptions of this research. We applied the theory of collective action using an 
institutional analysis approach in collaborative governance to identify that self-organising 
communities can thrive and sustain the commons by crafting, enforcing, and monitoring 
their own institutions (also referred to as “rules of the game”). However, one of the 
contributions of this thesis is extending this theoretical framework and applying it in the 
health policy context. In this chapter, we devise the concept of the ‘health commons’ to 
encompass the health and social care resources pooled as a shared property regime, 
wherein a population within a particular geographical boundary can contribute and share 
access to  (McGinnis, 2013a). Under the conditions analogous stated in the theories of 
collective action, common property regimes, and collaborative governance, we 
hypothesise that a group of individuals can emerge to take a stewardship role in 
governing the health commons on behalf of the population and create their own set of 
rules to facilitate the relationships of the individuals benefitting from that resource within 
a set of geographical boundaries. 
In order to contextualise the health commons, we also need to examine the policy 
background in the UK and look at the different approaches and mechanisms that the UK 
government have devised to govern the NHS. We want to understand the motivation 
behind the events leading to the Devolution of Health in some English city-regions and 
its implications on the competitive and collaborative relationship patterns across the 
different NHS organisations. More importantly, we want to examine the plethora of tested 
organisational restructuring and collaborative arrangements that have emerged over the 
decade in order to justify the use of collaborative governance as a means of governing 
the health commons. 
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This chapter therefore aims to explore the institutional evolution leading to the current 
decentralisation policies being implemented by the government and the current 
polycentric state of the NHS. We have identified in the previous chapter that multi-
sectoral organisations create collaborating arrangements in order to address a financial, 
moral, or instrumental imperative, by working together to resolve the collective action 
problem. By exploring the various characteristics of the key stakeholders involved in 
NHS England, we provide a rationale to the potential behaviours as to why certain 
organisations act the way they are as soon as they are immersed in a collaborative 
situation. This provides a contextual background to the study as we begin to examine 
the mechanisms utilised by the GMHSC Partnership in addressing their own social 
dilemmas. We look at the events leading to the Health Devolution in GM and how we 
can compare the case of the Partnership as stewards of the health commons. 
3.2 Health commons 
The aim of this section is to introduce what the health commons is – its emergence 
in the field of common pool research, its assumptions, and how it has been applied in 
the field of health governance. We highlight the importance of this emerging perspective 
in viewing health as a common property regime and how regional and local governances 
can act as stewards of the health commons by initiating and facilitating institutional 
arrangements in order to take charge of their own health resources. 
Although governing the health commons has always been present in the literature 
(see medical commons, Hiatt, 1975); studies were very limited to conceptualisation and 
not much on empirical examination. For instance, Saltman and Ferroussier-Davis (2000) 
explored the theory of stewardship and challenged its readers on its potential 
applicability on health policy; but failed to empirically investigate it on a particular health 
care setting. Later on, Saltman and Bergman (2005) conducted a historical analysis of 
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the Swedish health care system and offered insights on how it can be renovated as a 
health commons. It was, however, also shorthanded in offering any empirical advice.  
University of Indiana Bloomington scholar and Ostrom’s colleague Michael McGinnis 
pioneered empirical investigations on the health commons, along with other researchers 
in the ReThink Health initiative funded by the Fannie Rippel Foundation in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. They offered an alternative perspective in managing the health 
commons by crafting and monitoring institutional arrangements akin to that of Ostrom's 
(1990) ground-breaking discoveries on small communities benefitting from a common 
pool resource. McGinnis and his team developed a series of action-based research, 
workshops, and reports (both published and unpublished) to document the study 
(McGinnis, 2011b, 2013a; McGinnis and Brink, 2012; Linton et al., 2014) that explores 
how the regional health community of Grand Junction, Colorado managed to generate 
positive health outcomes to their population through self-crafted institutional 
arrangements. In particularly, they examined how collaborative stewardship between 
health care professionals, community service organisations, private insurers, and public 
officials effectively acted as stewards of their local health care resources. Under the 
conditions analogous to Ostrom (1990) and Cox, Arnold and Tomás's (2010) design 
principles to managing sustainable common pool resources, McGinnis (2018) was able 
to compare how we can recognise health resources as shared property between those 
who benefit from it, and how those said individuals (or organisations) can function as 
self-organising communities by crafting their own rules to monitor who, what, and how 
to appropriate from the commons.  
3.2.1 The “health commons” and its working assumptions 
McGinnis (2013) identified that the rising threat to long-term sustainability and 
fragmented governance of health care systems can be addressed by treating health care 
as a common property regime, where multiple users of this resource can collaborate and 
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act as stewards. Health commons encompass “all of the physical, financial, human, and 
social capital resources relevant to the delivery of health care and/or the promotion of 
population health in a geographic region” (McGinnis, 2013a:3).  
In the previous chapter, we illustrated how Ostrom (1990) demonstrated that local 
communities who are dependent on continued access to natural resources can, in some 
circumstances, work together to craft, monitor, enforce, and revise rules, thereby 
managing to keep such resources sustainable for long periods of time. McGinnis (2013) 
makes an interesting analogy that health care can be treated as commons, where ‘an 
institutional arrangement through which specific group of individuals share the 
responsibility for jointly consuming and/or managing shared resources.’ (p. 3). Health 
governance, therefore, may be regarded as the “health commons” in a way that an 
arrangement is made between a group of users share rights and duties, where they make 
collective decisions together to ensure the sustainability of the system (McGinnis, 
2013a).  
Drawing from Ostrom's (1990) design principles for sustainable governance of CPR, 
McGinnis (2013) believes that under specific conditions, users of health care can act as 
stewards to conserve the appropriation and provision of the ‘regional health commons’. 
Health system actors (i.e. government leaders, health care providers, private 
organisations, voluntary groups, etc.) act as stewards by generating resources, 
delivering services, and/or exerting influence over decisions through collaboration and 
coalition building (World Health Organization, 2007; Abimbola et al., 2014). They, 
together, form a stewardship team with the collective responsibility of overseeing the 
health commons, making decisions on behalf of its population to ensure that the resource 
will be sustained for later use.  
Upon examination on the functions of health governance, Travis et al. (2002) 
identified three broad tasks of an effective stewardship of the health systems, namely 
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“providing vision and direction for the health system, collecting and using intelligence, 
and exerting influence through regulation and other means” (p. 1). McGinnis (2013) 
pointed out although the act of stewardship in any health communities vary in different 
sizes i.e. from small communities (Linton et al., 2014) to large regional health 
governances (McGinnis and Brink, 2012), not all people involved make decisions that 
affect the system as a whole and make decisions to ensure the sustainability or 
availability of these resources. Moreover, physical and financial health resources may 
be more or less already allocated by another group, but with only a limited authority 
(Travis et al., 2002); therefore, stewardship encompasses a larger population and the 
task of planning and prioritising which programmes to carry forward. 
It is important to address the issue of excludability and subtractability of health care, 
and whether it is a public, private or common pool good. McGinnis (2011b) argues that 
the overall system of health and delivery of health care services is best understood as a 
‘common property’ that encompasses multiple types of resources, goods, and services.  
Table 4 below shows the variety of property rights associated with health care 
resources. One can argue for example that publicly-funded national health systems, 
such as the NHS, are non-excludable and rivalrous (Palumbo, 2017); however, there are 
certain services in the NHS where one needs to pay (e.g. ophthalmology and prescription 
services) which violates the assumption of non-excludability. Rather than viewing the 
health care resources as a CPR, what McGinnis (2011b) suggested is this critical point 
of departure of analysis to view the health care system as a ‘common property’ where a 
common set of rules are agreed as to who can access it, which services can be 
accessed, and how, where, and when can it be accessed (i.e. the commons). This means 
that participating providers of care (i.e. health care professionals, commissioners, etc.) 
engage in activities and make decisions according to collective rules, bound by formal 
and informal institutional arrangements.  
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Table 4: Comparison of the conceptualisation of CPR and Health commons 
 Common pool resources Health commons 
Common property 
regime 
Joint ownership of the fish 
in the lake 
Joint access to the commons via 
stewardship of health resources 
Common pool 
resource 
Population of fish in a lake 
Overall stock of health resources 
in the region 
Resource unit 
A fish once it has been 
caught 
Access to health services 
Appropriation 
Extraction of fish from the 
lake 




Stewardship team acting on 
behalf of population as a whole 
Appropriators: Fishermen 
who harvest from the lake 
Providers: Health care 
professionals; Users: patients 
Provision 
Replenish resource or 
maintain infrastructure 
Allocative efficiency in producing 
and maintaining health resources 
Rules 
Rules restricting 
appropriating behaviour of 
the actors 
Rules that shape how decisions 
are made by the stewards and 




maintenance of the 
resource 
Limitations on how parties can 
spend savings from programs or 
what initiatives they should 
undertake (e.g. NICE guidelines) 
Rule-making activities 
Self-organising 
communities create rules 




State intervening to local 
users  
Regulations from the state 
Tragedy of the 
commons 
Degradation or destruction 
of the resource 
Rising health care costs reducing 
overall economic productivity 
Sustainability 
Ensure future access to 
resource 
Financial viability, improved 
health outcomes, lower costs, 




Although the key findings from Ostrom's field studies on the design principles were 
applied mostly in the fisheries, forestry, and irrigation studies (see Cox et al., 2010), it 
continued to evolve and be applied in numerous contexts, varying from polycentric 
systems (Carlisle and Gruby, 2017), community settings (Imperial and Yandle, 2005), 
and collaborative governance (Yang, 2017). It has been, however, deeply unexplored in 
the health policy context, which is why the work of McGinnis and his colleagues were 
crucial into the contribution of the health commons to the discourse in the sustainability 
of common property regimes. Through a series of action-based research, McGinnis and 
his team focused their attention to the health community of Grand Junction, Colorado, 
with the primary intention of identifying the conditions to which the health commons can 
be sustained via collaboration and coordinated stewardship (McGinnis and Brink, 2012; 
McGinnis, 2013a, 2018).  
Grand Junction is a small municipality in Colorado, with a relatively low population 
and is geographically isolated from larger urban areas. For several decades, they have 
relied on an informal leadership team that took charge as stewards of their local health 
care resources. Their effective system was able to deliver an unusually high quality of 
care compared to neighbouring towns of similar size (Levin, 2010). These community 
leaders were led by a family of physicians, who built a financially based commons that 
provides reimbursements to physicians for health care services regardless of the funding 
source of the patients (i.e. private or commercial insurance, and/or Medicare or 
Medicaid). As a result, patients had equal access to private care and became less likely 
to access expensive emergency services.  
The key findings from their research on the health commons included: 
 Grand Junction leaders reached outside their boundary to call upon other 
organisations to join their reimbursement programmes. 
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 The leadership team makes up more than 85% of their local physicians, which 
meant their commons is managed by their very own health care providers. 
 The level of autonomy by the leadership team, was however, questioned 
because of their commitments to operate on behalf of Grand Junction and 
maintain their allegiance with their practices. 
 A health care collaborative was created to act as the collective consortium for 
various health care organisations within their community. They met monthly to 
discuss issues about their practices. 
 Monitoring principles were developed, such as peer evaluation process, to 
ensure that all participating physicians present their financial reports and the 
quality of their performance. 
 The leadership team exercise informal means, such as “taking someone out for 
coffee” (p. 5), as a form of sanction. This is masked as a gentle form of mentoring 
to encourage physicians to modify their behaviour. This also applies with conflict 
resolutions, where open communication has been a long-standing practice. 
 
These findings indicated that a community like Grand Junction, Colorado was able 
to successfully craft, enforce, and monitor their own institutional arrangements to take 
charge of their own health care resources and generate positive outcomes. Akin to 
Ostrom’s design principles, the local community leaders came together to act as 
stewards and act as an interdependent and collective unit. On a much updated report, 
McGinnis (2018) explained that the history of cooperation by the family physicians, who 
gained substantial control of the local health care services in their town, contributed to 
the long-term sustainability of their resources. They used informal institutions to 
moderate the behaviour of the providers, who also acted as decision-makers for the 
commons. Moreover, their crucial finding is the interaction between the leaders, where 
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they took advantage of their strong social ties beyond their geographical boundary and 
used this interdependence to build mutual trust and respect.  
The findings from the study of the health community in Grand Junction, Colorado, 
supported by the collaborative governance model and design principles outlined in the 
previous chapter, will be the foundation of this research in examining the institutional 
arrangements for sustaining the health commons.  However, we need to acknowledge 
the limitations of McGinnis’ conceptualisation of the health commons and his findings 
from Grand Junction, Colorado, and why its applicability to the UK context might be 
entirely different.  
The US health care system is complex and largely operated by the private sector, 
supplemented by some ownership by the federal, state, county, and city governments. 
McGinnis’ research and later reports were limited to this context, particularly on a small 
community like Grand Junction where it is driven by a top-down collaboration on health 
care stewardship.  
Whilst there were attempts to apply it in other areas in the US, they were 
unsuccessful in replicating the full scale of McGinnis’ study. Linton et al. (2014), for 
instance, examined Bloomington, Indiana’s health community and designed an action 
research to create a web-based health information commons for local health 
professionals and local governments to utilise. The methodological approach is quite 
different because the research team was trying to initiate a collective action rather than 
examining a setting that already has an inherent collaborative unit. Due to the difficulties 
posed by the uncertainty of current government health policies being implemented at the 
time (e.g. 2010 Affordable Care Act to name a few), this deterred local government 
agencies establish shared goals and make collective decisions. McGinnis (2013b) raised 
that local governance of health care needed traction in the US; however, it is almost 
impossible for regionalisation of health care, primarily because of the partisan politics 
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paralysing the debates for a reform at the state and national levels. Although there was 
already an existing community of collaborative relationships who meet informally via 
networking, these community organisations failed to create a strong foundation of 
collective action. Linton et al. (2014) acknowledged the challenges of this project and 
encouraged scholars to apply the theoretical contribution of the health commons to other 
contexts.  
Since then, there has been a limited but growing interest in expanding the study of 
the health commons to health care systems outside the US. For example, Wong et al. 
(2014) and Palumbo (2017) examined systems with universal health care coverage. 
Wong et al.’s (2014) extension of the health commons particularly mimicked the common 
pool resource regime settings by using small tight-knit indigenous groups in Malaysia. 
They examined the success of their health commons through the effective management 
of their shared natural resources and strong knowledge base on how to preserve their 
health systems for the future generations. Similarly, Palumbo (2017) offered a thought-
provoking theoretical narrative on the conceptualisation of the health commons into the 
publicly-funded health care systems in most European countries. Whilst there were no 
empirical evidence presented to support their framework, the author managed to extend 
the scientific inquiry on the health commons outside the US context and offer a 
framework that may allow future examination of sustainability issues in national health 
systems.  
Drawing from the limitations of the existing research on the health commons, this 
study aims to contribute to the existing discourse and fill the literature gap in two ways. 
First, we want to extend the theoretical inquiry on common pool resources and apply it 
in the health commons settings outside the US context. McGinnis’ studies focused on 
US health care setting, which is characterised by a predominant ownership of private 
firms with a shared control between the state and federal agencies, and commercial 
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organisations. This is widely incomparable to the UK setting. Although the two health 
care systems differ in many aspects, they both share the problematic narrative on 
addressing their dwindling finite resources and financial sustainability. 
Second, we want to establish an alternative perspective to addressing the problems 
on sustaining our NHS. Although there has been a wide amount of research available 
addressing how and why we should sustain the health resources in the UK through a 
plethora of state-led policies, place-based approaches, and/or partnership working 
(Alderwick, 2015; Ham and Alderwick, 2015; Ham, 2018a), empirical evidence using a 
collective action and institutional approach to regional stewardship of managing a 
particular segment of the NHS remained unexplored.  
3.3 The NHS and the devolution of the English local governance 
In the previous section, we emphasised the conceptualisation of the health 
commons. This section presents a thematic overview of the policy background of the 
NHS and the English local governance. In order to understand the motivation or rationale 
behind the Devolution policy, it is useful to highlight the issues and context that 
stimulated it. We look at the existing health and social care system and the various 
governance modes that emerged throughout the decades, and the birth of the Devolution 
policies in the English local governance context. We also explore the health reforms that 
evolved over time, particularly the “concerted attempt” (Greener and Powell, 2008:617) 
to marketise the welfare state, which influenced the constant reshaping of the structures 
of the NHS. By examining the different approaches and mechanisms that the UK 
government devised, we get to understand the motivation behind the Devolution of 
English cities and its implications on relationship patterns across the subnational layers. 
The GM Health Devolution has been the product of decades of oscillating pendulum 
between centralist, regionalist, and localist approaches by the UK government and the 
NHS. In order to organise our understanding on the evolution of governing structures in 
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the NHS and the local governments, we divide the historical narratives on the 
governance reforms and the centre-local relationships into three subsections: the 
centralist approach, the internal market, and the pragmatist era. First, we examine the 
centre-local or hierarchical relations and the establishment of the NHS during the welfare 
state era. Second, we look at the accounts of regionalisation and how the government 
responded through markets and corporatist approach to public services management. 
Lastly, we illustrate the post Devolution policies to highlight the “centralisation of 
decentralisation” approach of the Coalition government in addressing the localist 
agenda.  
3.3.1 Centralist approach 
The United Kingdom (UK) has traditionally been a unitary majoritarian state, which 
favoured a top-down hierarchical, quasi-elite mode of governing. This was described by 
Stoker (1998) as the “Westminster Model”, where there is a single, homogenous central 
government that is responsible to a sovereign Parliament and has a strong cabinet, 
accountability, and majority party control of the executive. There was a strong presence 
of the central authority in terms of rowing the direction and retaining control over the local 
governments, most particularly evident in England. This was illustrated in the literature 
significantly focused on ‘central-local relations’, describing the contentious relationship 
between the Parliament and the subnational governments as unequal and diminishing 
(Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Pearce and Ayres, 2012; Ayres and Pearce, 2013; 
Fenwick, 2015; Blunkett et al., 2016).  
The NHS was established in 1948 during the post-war settlement to cement the 
public provision of health care services as a state responsibility. It advocated for free (at 
the point of use) comprehensive health care services, including primary care (general 
practice, optometry, pharmacy, and dentistry), secondary or acute (hospital), and 
community (health visiting) services to the whole of the UK population (Gorsky, 2008). 
 
90 
Hospital services previously administered by local authorities were removed from their 
control, and the NHS became the responsibility of nationally elected officials who 
exercised top-down control on planning and management (Exworthy et al., 1999; 
Saltman et al., 2007). This model of hierarchy, where there is a central decision-maker 
on behalf of the population, was promoted at that time as a way of controlling the 
distribution of resources, increasing central accountability, and promoting efficiency in 
the delivery of health care services (Allen, 2013).  
Some accounts focus instead on the interaction between the state and the doctors, 
rather than the state and local relations (Klein, 2010). At its creation, the NHS delegated 
the day-to-day running or operationalisation of the NHS to medical professionals 
because of the unorganised and underdeveloped administrative structures at that time 
(Greener and Powell, 2008; Ham, 2009). At the provision level, GPs and hospitals still 
control much of the practice; therefore, the state effectively still purchased health 
services from them. This showed that although the NHS is centrally run by the state and 
accountable through the Parliament, provision of health services was delegated to GPs 
and consultants at the local level. This led to the state being paralysed in influencing the 
day-to-day running of the services, but are still being held accountable for the efficient 
delivery of the services (Greener and Powell, 2008). 
The prominent central-local relations of the British political system was characterised 
by bureaucratic hierarchies, where there is a high degree of centralisation of decision-
making and resource allocation and limited autonomy for the local governments 
(Rhodes, 1996). This  was described by Bulpitt (1983) as ‘dual polity’, where there is a 
distinct separation of powers between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. The former was a 
responsibility of the central government concerning matters such as macroeconomic 
policy, the economy, and national defence; whilst the latter involved the local 
government, administrative matters, and the delivery of public services in key local 
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areas. The elites in London were more concerned with matters that are deemed more 
important, whilst the local governments were dealing with parochial affairs and were left 
out of the limelight as they were largely self-governing (John, 2009; Shaw and Tewdwr-
jones, 2017).  
This illustrated that UK constitutional arrangements are constantly evolving and 
reforming where deals were brokered between rival elites (Blunkett et al., 2016), 
exposing the weakness of the centre and its inability to govern the periphery properly. 
Literature on modern reforms on England’s local governance have applied Bulpitt's 
(1983) framework to show the modes of governance used in managing territorial and 
political dilemmas for subnational governments. For instance, Ayres et al. (2018) 
demonstrated that the changing nature of centre-periphery relationships still exists in 
England, where the mode of statecraft is still dominated by central autonomy. Shaw and 
Tewdwr-jones (2017) also used Bulpitt's (1983) framework to illustrate the current 
disorganised nature of England's devolution reforms, where patchwork of local 
governance solutions was heavily influenced by the centre and rewards go to those who 
"dance to the tune of the government" (p. 222). 
3.3.2 Marketisation, competition, and the internal market 
The period between 1946 and 1997 illustrated that spatial and economic planning 
were characterised with a ‘central government localism’ approach (Wood, 1994; 
Harrison, 2012) by promoting centrally-controlled policies in a local scale of 
implementation. We see a shift from regionalist policies by the interventionalist Labour 
party to the disintegration of territorial structures by the Conservative government, both 
disarming the autonomy of local governments and highlighting the centralist nature of 
the government to command and control.  
The successive Conservative government under the term of Margaret Thatcher in 
1979 embraced the New Public Management (NPM) ideology of driving the management 
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of the public sector similar to that of the private sector, whilst prompting the marketisation 
of public services. This introduced a new style of governance that relied less on 
bureaucracy and formal structures, and more on third-party organisations to stimulate 
competition, choice, and incentives (Ham, 2009; Le Grand, 2011). Local autonomy 
weakened as central government controls over the public sector increased. The 
Conservatives viewed local governments as an obstacle to modernise the economy, 
hence, leading to the abolition of the previously established institutional structures under 
the Local Government Act of 1972, further constraining the role and capacity of the local 
state (Pike and Tomaney, 2009). This was achieved primarily through tighter financial 
control on public spending, and planning bodies that were tasked to represent the local 
views were removed.  
When market mechanisms were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
provision of public services were removed from local authorities and were heavily 
influenced by competition and contractualisation to the private and voluntary sector. This 
brought further fragmentation of services and spatial inequality arising from privatisation 
and establishment of arms-length agencies to enable provision of services (Taylor, 1997; 
Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001) on the behalf of local authorities. More importantly, this 
resulted into the hollowing-out of the state which led not to a loss of central power, but 
rather influence and control were secured through the formation of self-organising 
networks (Rhodes, 1996; Taylor, 1997).  
The provision of public services was geared towards a more bureaucratic, customer-
oriented, and private sector style of management. Contractual arrangements were used 
to facilitate transactions between three key roles (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001:159): 
the policy makers responsible for determining overall strategy; the client side responsible 
for setting and monitoring standards; and the service provider responsible for delivering 
services. This was adopted by various agencies of the government as joint authorities 
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were established for fire, police, and transport services, whilst work contracts were 
introduced (Local Government Act 1988: Parts 1 and 2) to induce competition for utilities 
and public services. 
This led to one of the most significant changes in the direction of the policy and 
governance of the NHS in the late 1980s. As part of the government’s commitment to 
increase accountability, greater allocative efficiency, and reduction in the power of 
specific professional groups, the NHS created a market-oriented and competitive 
approach to state provision through the internal market. The internal market was 
divided between the providers (those who provided services like hospitals, local 
authorities, and community services) and the purchasers (those who purchased services 
from them like the health authorities (HAs) and GP fundholders). By separating the NHS 
organisations into purchaser and provider roles, it induces competition in the provision 
of services and promote responsiveness to the needs of the population by increasing 
patient choice (Le Grand, 1997; Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010). The main argument 
was that it enhances the ‘technical efficiency’ (Allen, 2013:3) with the least amount of 
costs, i.e. ensuring the greatest output for the least resources used.  
When the New Labour sat in office on 1997, they heralded a modernisation reform 
that promises development of community leadership within the local government and 
working in partnership to meet local needs and to promote good governance (Sullivan et 
al., 2004). More importantly, they committed to “clean up politics...and decentralise 
political power throughout the United Kingdom” promising to “give Britain the leadership 
in Europe which Britain and Europe need” (Labour Party, 1996).  Statutory powers were 
granted from the central government to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in 1998 
in order to meet this pledge. This involved new institutional arrangements in terms of the 
multi-level governments in the UK, devolving policy-making, delivery and monitoring, and 
decision-making responsibilities to a Parliament in Scotland and Assemblies in Wales 
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and Northern Ireland respectively (Pearce et al., 2005; Pearce and Ayres, 2012). 
Moreover, the devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland also led to the division 
of the NHS health care system into four: NHS England, NHS Scotland, NHS Wales, and 
HSC Northern Ireland. A separate account reports the impact of the devolution to the 
four countries of the UK (see Bevan, 2014). 
This reflected the transition from top-down processes to a less facilitating role of the 
state. It advocates for costs efficiency, service effectiveness, managerial improvement, 
and restructuring of the delivery of public services. Localisation has fuelled governments 
to reform public services delivery by bringing decision-making down to the subnational 
governments through devolution and delegation. This is to provide autonomy on key 
aspects of public service delivery and to improve public service performance.  
3.3.1 Promoting cooperation 
The New Labour promoted increased patient choice and a more collaborative 
approach. The NHS abandoned most of the features of the internal market experiment 
and abolished competition on the commissioning bodies or purchasers. Instead, 
‘cooperation’ was promoted as a way of promoting uniform national standards of care 
(Niemietz, 2016). There are several accounts itemising the implications of the internal 
market to the succeeding reforms (Le Grand, 1991; Cutler and Waine, 1997; Hughes et 
al., 1997; Mays et al., 2001; Propper et al., 2008; Brereton and Vasoodaven, 2010).  
First, the creation of the internal market was a result of the increasing power of 
medical professionals in controlling the way the NHS was being run with minimum 
accountability. As a way of taking over control and legitimacy, the state reduced the 
responsibilities held by medical professionals and introduced tighter regulations through 
regulatory compliance rules to monitor their practice (Greener, 2008). This period saw 
the establishment of several regulatory institutions, such as what is now the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which provides recommendations on 
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cost-effectiveness of treatments, the National Service Frameworks (NSF), which 
provides clinical guidelines in identifying and disseminating medical best practice, and 
what is now the Care Quality Commission  (CQC), which is an inspector of health care 
facilities (Niemietz, 2016). 
Second, in order to facilitate effective hospital performance management in 
accordance with the new regulatory guidelines, the role of general managers was 
introduced. They stood outside the hierarchies of professionals to create a chain of 
command and to promote accountability and performance management (Leach and 
Percy-Smith, 2001). This was influenced by the NPM movement characterised by 
‘managerial revolution’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000), where elected officials are left with a 
more peripheral role and managers are in charge of administration, evaluation, and 
performance management of public services. This marks a fundamental shift from 
'administering' towards 'managing' (Saltman et al., 2007) with regulatory and 
management functions devolved and the contracting out of public services to the private 
or internal market (Le Grand, 1991; Hope and Bornwell, 2000). 
3.3.3 Governance restructuring 
The NHS has undergone multiple dramatic structural changes throughout the last 
two decades, as a result of the ever-increasing demand on health care services and 
tighter budget allocations (see NHS White Papers, 1997, 2002, 2010). In this section, 
we want to break down the governance structures before and after one of the most 
revolutionary reforms in the history of the NHS (Checkland et al., 2015), the Health and 
Social Care Act (HSCA) 2012.  
3.3.3.1 Before HSCA 2012 
As outlined earlier, prior to HSCA 2012, the NHS was deeply rooted in the internal 
market principles and purchaser-provider split created in the 1990s. NHS trusts 
(providers) were established to mirror the NPM movement during the Thatcher era and 
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to function as a corporate-like institution headed by a Board of Directors consisting of 
Executive and Non-Executive Directors (Blackler, 2006). They are semi-autonomous 
hospitals provide acute, community, and mental health services. Then there were HAs 
(purchasers), which were local administrative units carrying out NHS functions such as 
strategic planning and purchasing of services within a specific geographical area.  
As a means to abandon the internal market and introduce integrated care, the NHS 
White Paper The New NHS, modern. dependable. It outlined the need for an 
organisational restructure based on “what has worked but discard what has failed” (p. 3) 
with patient needs at the forefront of the NHS priority. In 2000, to fulfil the modernisation 
reform of the New Labour and the promises of the 1997 NHS White Paper, Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) were created to replace HAs. They were led by managers, as opposed 
with clinicians, who were only limited to advisory roles, and ultimately carried out 
commissioning functions for primary, community and secondary health services 
(Checkland et al., 2015). PCTs were overseen by Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), 
alongside the hospitals that have yet been converted into Trusts. Primary care providers 
(i.e. GPs and community nurses), on the other hand, remained in the scene through the 
establishment of Primary Care Groups (PCGs). They aimed to bring services closer to 
the patients, holding a devolved responsibility for budget and planning their resources 
based on their local needs (National Health Service, 1997). 
Evaluation on the effectiveness and implications of these new structures illustrated 
that the quasi-market culture in the 2000s still persisted and bred a further organisational 
divide between the providers and purchasers of health care services, with little to no 
impact on the improvement of the quality on performance and delivery of services 
(Blackler, 2006; Le Grand, 2007; Propper et al., 2008; Timmins, 2008; Bevan, 2014; 
Niemietz, 2016). Whilst there were promises on costs efficiency, service effectiveness, 
managerial improvement, and restructuring of the delivery of public services through 
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decentralisation, critics argued that the same problems were never addressed. Propper 
et al. (2008), for instance, presented empirical evidence that the creation of the internal 
market resulted in a small negative effect on the quality of health outcomes. Since 
competition is dependent on the geographical area, their results showed that hospitals 
in competitive areas led to higher cumulative emergency admissions and death rates. 
Niemietz (2016) posited that because of the tighter regulations and increasing 
competition, hospitals were pressured to perform at higher standards in order to retain 
funding. This instead led to principal-agent problems (Greener and Powell, 2008; Allen, 
2013), wherein providers were like ‘knaves’ acting on their own convenience instead of 
like ‘knights’ who should be acting on behalf of the patients, and patients were being 
treated like ‘pawns’ rather than ‘queens’ (Le Grand, 1997, 2003). Despite the high 
transaction costs posed by the internal market, some (Le Grand, 2007; Bevan, 2014) still 
believed it had the greatest potential to deliver high quality of health care services. 
3.3.3.2 After HSCA 2012 
With the Cameron Coalition government coming in on 2010, majority of the set pieces 
that were initiated by the previous Labour government were annihilated. The 
Conservatives had long opposed regionalisation, whilst the Liberal Democrats favoured 
the strengthening of local authorities in participating in planning and development 
(Pearce and Ayres, 2012; Pemberton and Shaw, 2012; Shaw and Tewdwr-jones, 2017). 
Accompanied by a long period of austerity, some were not as enthusiastic with public 
service reforms that did not really bring any substantive changes from the previous 
governments (Niemietz, 2016).  
The HSCA 2012 (also known as the Lansley reforms) aimed to improve the overall 
quality and choice of care for patients through local partnerships and integrated care 
systems as a response to the changing health needs and challenges of managing care 
for people with long-term conditions (see NHS White Paper, 2010). The top-down 
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reorganisation has abolished several structures in the system, including the PCTs and 
SHAs, and has transferred commissioning of services to new structures called the CCGs 
that were (meant to be) led by GPs The rationale behind this is to transition the system 
from a manager-led to clinician-led commissioning culture, putting health care experts 
who know patients' needs best at the core of the decision-making in the NHS 
(Department of Health, 2012).  
In addition, the NHS England was established as an arm’s length body of the 
Secretary of State for Health and to replace the autonomous NHS Commissioning 
Board4 . They received statutory responsibilities for commissioning primary care to 
arguably cover a wider geographical footprint (see NHS White Paper, 2010). Since the 
aim of HSCA 2012 is to promote a patient-centred approach through a more joined up 
working between local authorities and local NHS organisations, statutory entities like the 
Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) and Healthwatches were embedded in the local 
health systems (Local Government Association, 2012). To ensure streamlines of local 
and national accountability across all parts of the system, regulatory bodies (e.g. what is 
now NHS Improvement {NHSI}, CQC, NICE, etc.) were also put in place (Figure 9). 
To further complicate the governance structures, NHS England has published on 
2014 a Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014) to set a national vision for 
collaboration. The promoted the delivery of new care models and increased integration 
by sharing responsibilities on leading the system with local leaders, communities, and 
clinicians. New programmes of work (e.g. Better Care Fund, Vanguards, and 
Accountable Care Organisations (ACO) to name a few) were promoted to emphasise 
the need for the integration between health and care systems, through shared pooled 
                                                          
4 Its predecessors were all part of the Department of Health prior to receiving statutory 
independent status  
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budgets between local councils and CCGs, joint governance structures, and joint 
planning responsibilities (Checkland et al., 2015).  
Figure 9: The new and current NHS 
 
  
This marked the beginning of another era for the NHS where collaboration, 
integration, and partnership working being promoted. The government seemed to have 
a vision of moving away from the culture created by choice and competition towards a 
more patient-centred and integrated approach. This was orchestrated through several 
iterations on the existing NHS governance structure, abolishment of old existing 
structures and replacement with newer bodies but with similar functions, and promotion 
of repackaged policies.  
The HSCA 2012 has impacted the current system, perhaps far more than the initial 
establishment of the internal markets back in the 1990s (Allen, 2013; Checkland et al., 
2013, 2015, 2016; Timmins, 2018). The biggest reorganisation in the history of NHS 
reforms has been dubbed as “the world’s biggest quango” (Timmins, 2018) primarily 
because of the shortcomings between the vision and the outcomes it produced a few 
years down the line. The establishment of NHS England was a shot in the dark to attempt 
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to “liberate the NHS” (National Health Service, 2010). It wanted to free itself from political 
interference and to depoliticise the decision-making from the Whitehall, which is the 
antithesis to the top-down hierarchical form of governance that existed when the NHS 
was first established. However, Hammond et al. (2019) suggested that the relationship 
between the state and NHS England still remained through the layers of upwards and 
downwards formal accountability arrangements. This was illustrated by Timmins (2018) 
when he highlighted that the relationship between the Secretary of State for Health and 
the NHS Chief Executive was interdependent; the former dictates the budget and the 
latter runs the organisation based on those constraints. 
3.3.4 Post devolution: Localism, partnerships, and city deals 
The Cameron Coalition government signalled the beginning of a localism agenda, 
rejecting the full scale of Labour’s regional approaches and promoting the vital role of 
local authorities in responding to people's needs and delivering services closer to the 
communities (Communities and Local Government, 2011). The Localism Act 2011 
suggested that decision-making was to be brought closer to citizens by increasing 
freedom and flexibilities for local governments in order to enable them in achieving their 
desired outcomes. This was done through City Deals, local enterprise zones, and various 
other measures, steering away from traditional one size fits all subnational arrangements 
which were previously seen in past reforms. With the government's commitment to offer 
bespoke City Deals on a case-by-case basis based on the “spatial levels at which 
decisions are made”, this meant that a combination of powers were to be allocated at 
various areas further reinforcing the element of asymmetrical devolution (Shaw and 
Tewdwr-jones, 2017:217).  
The City Deals marked a revolutionary attempt to devolve responsibilities amongst 
core city-regions in order to boost economic growth outside London. There was a 
renewed interest in the concept of ‘city-regions’, emphasising these areas as self-
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contained metropolitan territories, with linked commuting flows extending from the city to 
surrounding rural areas (Coombes, 2014).  
To galvanise the metropolitan governance of city-regions, the Coalition government 
granted statutory status and created what was called Combined Authorities (Local 
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009). This became the legal 
framework through which the elements of the previously agreed City Deals and LEPs 
were coordinated and implemented. It also inspired the “Northern Powerhouse” 
movement of George Osborne, which sought to bring together northern English cities 
(i.e. the “super metro-region” of Liverpool–Manchester–Leeds–Sheffield) and function as 
a single economy at scale to counterbalance London, and to address the spatial 
disparities between the North and South (Colomb and Tomaney, 2016; Lee, 2017).  
Although it was a significant agenda at that time, the concept itself was vague; it is 
not a defined institution or plan, but rather an idea which shaped government policy and 
ignited political discussions over rebalancing the economy and reducing the North and 
South divide. Martin (2015) and Lee (2017) argued that the Northern Powerhouse can 
be viewed as a long-term strategy, focusing on various policy actions around a single 
goal. However, given that significant resources to fund this vision were limited, it became 
more of a form of branding or re-packaging of already pre-existing policies to be more 
coherent and focused. It did, on the other hand, foster a collaborative working to bolster 
city-regional ambitions with elected mayors, creating a momentum for the “Devolution 
Deals” (Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016) to pave way for spatial 
rebalancing on economic development.  
Amidst the Scottish referendum in 2014, then Prime Minister David Cameron raised 
the “English question” and proposed restricting the rights of Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish MPs in the Parliament on voting matters relevant to England (i.e. “English 
vote for English laws”) (Armstrong and Ebell, 2015; Colomb and Tomaney, 2016). It 
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highlighted the rise of English nationalism and how the central government departed 
from regionalist agendas proposed by previous governments. Localism became the new 
brand of the Coalition government, emphasising the role of local authorities in delivering 
the needs of the communities but masquerading the pressures on austerity and using it 
as a leverage to persuade city-regions to take the deals. By devising repackaged or 
rebranded policies (e.g. LEPs, City Deals, Combined Authorities, and now Devolution 
Deals to name a few), they were able to exert their influence through arms-length 
agencies. This further brought the polycentric nature of the subnational governments in 
England, as network arrangements and fragmentation continued to flourish in multi-
sectoral relationships. 
3.4 Implications 
The literature primarily focused on the formal institutional arrangements that resulted 
in the establishment of the current governance structures. This section now focuses on 
the implications of formal policies and how the various pockets of the system reacted 
and behaved. 
The Coalition efforts served as a catalyst for the emergence of networks of public, 
private, voluntary, and community agencies to come together in planning and delivering 
services to localities. This was illustrated by the following: First, local and regional actors 
were able to adapt to the oscillating institutional changes by forging strong informal 
arrangements that foster public-private collaboration and partnership working despite the 
absence of a statutory framework. For example, when metropolitan councils were 
abolished in 1986, Greater Manchester created a coalition of its ten unitary local 
authorities to form Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA). This was a 
clear indication of Greater Manchester's organic efforts to continue low-profile joint 
initiatives and pursue a variety of public- and private-sector partnerships to develop 
metropolitan growth across the city-region (Deas, 2014). It fostered high levels of trust 
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and cooperation between local actors, allowing them to function as self-organising 
networks.  
Second, the strengthening partnership networks meant a departure from the 
traditional centralist approaches of top-down imposition of planning and strategic vision. 
Instead, local autonomy was empowered by redistributing some powers and funding 
back to the communities for them to take charge of their own resources and use them 
the way they deemed. The government essentially allowed local authorities to have more 
freedom to work together in new ways to meet local peoples, given that drive down costs 
and foster growth to support the local economy (Communities and Local Government, 
2011). For example, the retention of locally-raised business rates by each local authority 
represented a significant move towards fiscal devolution (Sandford, 2017a).  
However, others argued that there was still an element of local delivery of central 
objectives. Bailey and Wood (2017) described the establishment of LEPs and elected 
mayors as reconfigured networks for the benefit of the central government to exert arms-
length influence and constrain the actions of local authorities. Similarly, Pike et al.'s 
(2015) study on the emergence of LEPs also illustrated that LEPs kept direct connections 
with the central government, ensuring that their localist behaviours were in tune with 
central government agendas whilst functioning alongside local authority leadership 
structures. Deas (2014) branded this as “contractual localism” whilst Shaw and Tewdwr-
jones (2017) similarly cited it as “centrally orchestrated localism”, highlighting how the 
devolved local responsibilities were determined by the centre in exchange of meeting 
contractually agreed performance and efficiency checks based on underpinning national 
policy guidelines. Clearly, the enhanced freedom and flexibility came with an increased 
cost, disguised by repackaged policies as bottom-up solutions to better enable and 
facilitate economic development to lower level institutions.  
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These accounts do not discount the tensions and the challenges arising from the 
localist policies imposed upon by the central government. First, under the period of 
austerity, Shaw and Tewdwr-jones (2017) showed that key drivers such as budgetary 
pressures and uncertain economic conditions influenced the decisions of the current 
government to resort to devolution. They served as temporary political and territorial fixes 
with an overriding objective of assisting in the reduction of public sector deficits. Pearce 
and Ayres (2012) explain that the devolution deals were being pursued alongside a 
government target to eliminate the public sector budget deficit, which meant that local 
authorities relying on central government grants face substantial cuts. This pressured 
local councils to absorb public service cuts in exchange of the promise of additional 
powers and future funds from the Devolution deals (Shaw and Tewdwr-jones, 2017). 
This was described by Bailey and Wood (2017) as network framing, where fiscal 
conditions were used by the central government to exert influence over local authorities. 
This also represented the arms-length influence of the state in terms of the proportion of 
local government spending, “taking one hand and giving with the other with strings 
attached" (Bailey and Wood, 2017:978).  
Second, another pervasive challenge is the problematic centre-local relations and 
the contradicting implications of the decentralisation policies. The Devolution agenda 
was meant to be a significant step away from the power-hoarding top-down government 
and a shift towards empowering local councils, communities, etc. It was designed for 
local authorities to create bottom-up initiatives and put themselves forward to the 
Devolution deals, with the state providing policy guidance on how to apply. However, 
evidence suggested that the guidelines (i.e. to create a business case and an 
implementation plan) were purposefully vague in order to allow the government for some 
"wiggle room...to seek the outcome they wanted" (Ayres et al., 2018:859). Pike et al. 
(2015) also exhibited that this was also present when the LEPs were first introduced, 
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characterising the experience of “guided localism” as a “British vice” of masking 
centralisation as decentralisation.  
Third, there will always be an element of competition arising from the retention of 
market principles inherited from the Thatcher government. When the first wave of City 
Deals was introduced, local authorities had to enter competitive bids in order to gain 
advantage over the negotiations with the central government. Incentivisation has 
become a common theme to encourage competition between neighbouring areas, where 
poorer areas lose out on more affluent areas over funding allocation (Ayres and Pearce, 
2013; Deas, 2014; Bailey and Wood, 2017). This was not true across all cases however, 
as some areas fostered voluntary and collaborative arrangements amongst local leaders 
in order to carry out local initiatives. For example, despite the absence of formalised 
governance structures, Greater Manchester's organic and voluntarist efforts enabled 
them to make collective decisions making them the viable pilot for the Devolution models 
(Deas, 2014). 
Lastly, there were some indications of democratic deficit or the lack of public 
engagement and consultation by the central state. Ayres et al., (2018) described that 
“local elite assimilation” dominated the appointment of LEPs, where key decisions were 
oftentimes made by a small number of key officials. When the subsequent Devolution 
deals were introduced, the council leaders took upon themselves to make a decision 
without consulting the public or engaging the citizens. This contributed to weak citizen 
mobilisation and lack of legitimation of the Devolution process. It implied the entrance of 
post-political forms of governance, where political elites dominate the decision-making, 
with a restricted basis on discussion and debate amongst a predefined consensus 
(Deas, 2014). 
The English governance context was also unfortunately mirrored  by the 
implementation of NHS policies. First, it is without contention that the quasi-market 
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reforms in the 2000s resulted in further fragmentation on the delivery of services as 
higher transaction costs emerged from the entrance of market-like structures to induce 
competition amongst multiple purchasers of health care services, such as private 
companies and non-profit or charitable institutions. Niemietz (2016) highlighted that the 
New Labour abolished the internal market created by the Conservatives, only to 
repackage it half a decade later into a newer version that not only disrupted the system, 
but also inherited the weaknesses that the internal market already made. Second, there 
are still elements of centralised and hierarchical control in the NHS after the Lansley 
reforms. NHSE remained to promote top-down policies, alongside with performance 
metrics and layers of upwards and downwards formal accountability arrangements 
(Timmins, 2018; Hammond et al., 2019). Third, the creation of markets bred a culture of 
choice and competition amongst organisations, which generated silo mentalities, 
principal-agent problems, and purchaser-provider split (Greener and Powell, 2008). This 
made it more difficult for current policies to implement collaborative or integrated models 
of care. Lastly, literature suggested that there is a movement away from local paternalism 
with national accountability to national paternalism. Greener and Powell (2008) 
suggested that the new reforms emphasise the role of local delivery of services with NHS 
England playing a meta-governor role of dictating centrally arranged strategic policies. 
The evidence presented in this section illustrated a disorganised, cluttered, and 
fragmented path towards the English decentralisation. This was characterised by the 
pendulum swing between regionalist and localist agendas promoted by different 
governments, which illustrated the lack of long-term vision and united voice in terms of 
what the future of England local and regional governance should look like. Whilst the 
Labour governments focused on regionalisation and the creation of regional 
governments within the state, the Conservatives more often than not switch back to 
localist approaches as a way of disarming the localities in order to preserve the unitary 
state of the UK. With the entrance of the Coalition government, we see various 
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institutional arrangements to promote policies that strengthen the autonomy of local 
authorities in order to address spatial disparities and rebalance the economy. 
3.5 The Manchester model 
In the previous section, we evaluated the path that paved way to the current 
fragmented state of English regional governance. We saw the different attempts of the 
central government to decentralise power but still exert influence on the regional and 
local nodes. In this section, we focus our attention to Greater Manchester and how it 
pioneered the English city devolution packages.  
3.5.1 The devolution argument of the Manchester model 
It came to no surprise that GM was the frontrunner and the best viable candidate to 
the devolution deals when it was first introduced. GM’s metropolitan status was initially 
established in 1974 when the governing arrangements of Greater Manchester County 
Council (GMCC) was created through the Local Government Act 1972. When the 
metropolitan councils were abolished in 1986 following the Local Government Act 1985, 
the 10 remaining unitary authorities formed the Association of Greater Manchester 
Authorities (AGMA) to maintain voluntary collaboration and joint working.  
Several evidence-based reports recognised the development of the “Manchester 
Model” (McKillop et al., 2009; Holden and Harding, 2015) as the exemplary prototype 
when the Devolution deals were first raised by former Chancellor of Exchequer, George 
Osborne, in his Northern Powerhouse speech. Because of its history of organic 
cooperation and formal institutionalisation of governance structures, it is without a doubt 
that GM would be the ideal frontrunner for the remarkable deals.  
“But something remarkable has happened here in Manchester… the once 
hollowed-out city centres are thriving again, with growing universities, iconic 




Scholars and think tanks closely monitored GM’s successive approaches over the 
last two decades (Deas and Ward, 2002; Deas, 2014; Haughton et al., 2016). Many have 
acknowledged the organic efforts and institutional capacities inherent within the 
conurbation (The Economist, 2013; Deas, 2014; Holden and Harding, 2015; Haughton 
et al., 2016), whilst others were more critical about the role of the quango-like coalitions 
and policy elites in influencing the administrative and strategic direction of the 
governance (Blunkett et al., 2016; Haughton et al., 2016; Kenealy, 2016; Prosser et al., 
2017). Others have focused on the existing Devo Health aspect, particularly on the 
existing overlapping health and social care structures and how this polycentric nature of 
governance have affected the spatial rescaling (Checkland et al., 2015; Lorne et al., 
2018) and relationships (Sandford, 2017b) within the local NHS organisations. 
Whichever angle you look at it, however, it is undeniable that GM had all the necessary 
tools it needed to anchor its way on top of the political arena, putting itself ahead of 
everyone else in seeking devolved powers through bottom-up solutions alongside 
community-based models of delivery of public services across its conurbation. 
Scholarly articles and evidence-based reports more often than not passively mention 
the long-existing historical cooperation existing within its 10 local authorities and 
acknowledging this as one of the foundations to GM’s successful bid to the devolution 
deal (Holden and Harding, 2015; Lorne et al., 2018; Walshe et al., 2018). Deas (2014) 
provided a more detailed qualitative account on the institutional evolution of GM 
structures, highlighting the role of subnational spatial regeneration and the transition 
from hard to soft institutional spaces. Similarly, Haughton et al. (2016) conducted a 
qualitative study on how scalar fixes inspired the development of the Manchester model 
and how this nurtured the current city-region initiatives. Their evidence suggested how 
GM adopted agglomeration economics to create an evidence-based political appeal to 
support urban growth and manage spatial inequalities across the city-region. 
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Studies have also drawn interest to examine the evolution of city-regional institutional 
arrangements and used GM as a primary example as to how a new post-political form 
of governance is emerging. For instance, Deas (2014) viewed GM as a voluntarist model 
having made exemplary progress in shaping economic policies and governance. 
Through a qualitative study with semi-structured interviews undertaken post-
establishment of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and the GMCA, the author 
acknowledged the efforts of GM in utilising hard and soft institutions into promoting 
cooperation amongst its constituent local authorities. GM's preference to non-
bureaucratic administration reflected business- and quango-like structures, where policy 
elites dominate the decision-making arena leaving little to no effort for citizen 
participation. The author claimed that such institutional structures represented an 
erosion of local democracy and the beginning of a post-political form of governance 
characterised by colonisation of decision-making by policy elites.  
Similarly, Colomb and Tomaney (2016) drew lessons on the recent strategic planning 
and territorial development of city-regions and how it addressed the fragmented 
administrative and institutional boundaries that was inherited from centralised patterns 
of governance. It reflected on GM's ability to withstand these unprecedented challenges 
and recognised the role that policy elites have played to set-up Manchester as the 
potential northern rival to London. In a series of qualitative research projects examining 
the centre-periphery relationships in the English devolution context, Ayres et al. (2018) 
explained that there has been a degree of local elite assimilation throughout the 
negotiation process of the devolution deals. This view as also confirmed by Kenealy 
(2016) and Prosser et al. (2017), citing that the Devo Manc deals were poorly promoted 
for citizen engagement, and was highly technical and targeted to policy experts or 
elected representatives rather than the public. We have seen how the political landscape 
in GM have evolved from informal to formal cooperative structures. This evidence of 
stable and focused model of local leadership has put GM in a pedestal, developing a 
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reputation for “being easy to deal with and efficient, with a network of hard and soft 
institutions” (Deas, 2014). 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we devised the concept of the health commons to encompass the 
health and social care resources pooled as a shared property regime, wherein a 
population within a particular geographical boundary can contribute and share access to 
(McGinnis, 2013). We contextualised this to the current health policies and local English 
governance reforms. Overall, we unpacked the contextual background and the 
institutional evolution that led to the current polycentric state of the NHS and the 
oscillating reforms of centralist, regionalist, and localist approaches in the local English 
governance setting. We also identified why Greater Manchester was a pioneering model 
to the latest decentralisation policies and the reasons behind its success. This policy 
background will guide our understanding on the institutional arrangements that led to the 






The aim of this chapter is to address the chosen research design and methodology 
of this study. In the previous chapters, we presented a theoretical inquiry on the study of 
the commons and how institutions have emerged to address the collective action 
problems of small communities depending on a common pool resource. We then 
contextualised that in a collaborative health governance setting and posited that we 
could apply the same design principles on sustaining the commons to local health 
systems as long as there is a group willing to act as stewards.  
Therefore, this study wants to address the following questions: 
1. Under what circumstances can collaborative governance mechanisms create a 
system of stewardship in governing the health commons? 
2. What are the formal and informal institutions that emerged as a response to 
collective action dilemmas? 
3. How are institutional arrangements influencing the different levels of collaborative 
processes in the governance of the health commons? 
 
As outlined in the theoretical chapter, the research is built on the following theoretical 
framework (Figure 10). We argue that health systems leaders of a regional or local-based 
health system can come together and act as stewards of their health commons. 
Together, they can devise institutional arrangements and collaborative mechanisms in 





Figure 10: Modified theoretical framework 
 
In order for us to successfully explore this phenomenon, this research employs a 
critical realist approach using qualitative research. We particularly use case study 
methods to focus on the context of Greater Manchester’s Health Devolution policy and 
unpack the collaborative governance that emerged to take charge of their own local 
health economy. A combination of interviews and documents were examined to evaluate 
the collaborative and institutional mechanisms in place to resolve their collective action 
dilemma. In this chapter, we provide a justification on this research design, why these 
methods were chosen, which data collection and data analysis tools were used, and 
which philosophical position supports the methods of this research. The chapter 
concludes with a review on the ethical procedures conducted to mitigate the 
methodological risks of the study. 
4.2 Methodological approaches in the study of the commons 
and institutions 
Social scientists have historically relied on quantitative methods and formal 
theoretical models to address policy problems (see Moses and Knutsen, 2007). As an 
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attempt to make social science more scientific, statistical methods, experiments, and 
formal theoretical models dominated the fields of psychology, economics, and political 
science particularly during post-World War II era. Moreover, proponents of quantitative 
methods embraced the scientific power of positivism to logically deduce insights about 
processes and test existing theories to generate formal models (Poteete et al., 2010; 
Johnson et al., 2016). Whilst the role of quantitative and theory-driven research has 
always been important, this was met by criticisms by the advocates of qualitative 
methods.  
Qualitative approaches in the social sciences emerged as critics argued that studying 
relationships require more than just measurement, but rather, a deeper examination of 
human agency influenced by meaning and interpretation is needed (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005; Mohajan, 2018). Formal theoretical models failed to capture aspects of social 
conditions and unearth real situations where formal and informal institutions or cultural 
understandings occur. Therefore, institutional theorists used small-N case studies 
methods to provide thick descriptions on social context and causal relationships (Poteete 
et al., 2010; Suddaby and Lefsrud, 2012). However, with the shift from old to new 
institutionalism, scholars began to utilise large-N samples using empirical methods and 
multi-variate techniques to identify causal mechanisms that produced institutional effects 
on organisations (Von Beyme, 2009; Suddaby and Lefsrud, 2012). The social sciences 
continued to evolve with its methodological approaches, whilst still recognising the 
dominant role of theory and deductive approach to empirical inquiry. For instance, 
textbooks still recommend theory-building as the prescription to conducting political 
science research projects (Moses and Knutsen, 2007; Johnson et al., 2016). 
Studies on the commons and collective action have utilised a diverse set of 
methodological approaches in order to prove that sustainability can be attained if self-
organising communities establish their own institutional arrangements, as opposed with 
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state-led or private-owned approaches. Using comparative case studies and 
experimental field work generated by other scholars, Ostrom (1990) was able to 
establish a rich empirical base and collect from a sample of 14 cases. Successful cases 
uniquely exhibited collective action behaviour where they crafted and developed their 
own diverse institutional arrangements to managing the shared natural resources and 
was able to sustain them for a period of time. Her contribution on managing the commons 
inspired the use of experimental-based models as a means to bridge the gap between 
theory and observational findings (McGinnis and Walker, 2010), which encouraged a 
three-way interaction between theory, experiments, and field work.  
This signalled the movement of the political and social sciences from the traditional 
positivist approach rooted in formal models and empirical analysis, to a more deliberative 
and diverse approach in addressing complex policy problems. In a piece called Beyond 
Positivism, Ostrom (2014) acknowledged the role of formal theory and models in 
identifying the critical elements in a policy problem and how it's important in asserting 
the relationships between variables. However, she also identified the limits of the value-
laden theory and quantitative empirical measures to describe relationships, and the need 
for scholars to depart from positivist generalisations and move towards diverse 
methodological approaches that are more participatory and experimental (Ahn and 
Wilson, 2010; Forsyth and Johnson, 2014). Critics, however, still questioned the validity 
of Ostrom’s neo-institutionalism and rationalist stance in terms of her methodological 
approaches in generating empirical evidence. de Sardan (2013) argued that her efforts 
to steer away from simplistic formal models led to little knowledge on the explanatory 
factors or variables found in her case studies. This was also supported by Agrawal 
(2014), who pointed out the need for any advances on the commons and institutions to 
use more sophisticated analytical methods that will allow more rigorous testing on the 




Despite this, the impact of Ostrom’s work on configuration on rules of the game 
influenced the future application of the commons across interdisciplinary studies in 
different contexts. Poteete et al. (2010) wrote a volume of on interdisciplinary methods 
in the study of the commons, ranging from case study methods, field-based research, 
meta-analysis, action research, experiments in the laboratory and field, and agent-based 
modelling. Although case studies were one of the most commonly used methods (Gerlak 
and Heikkila, 2006; Koontz, 2006; Rahman et al., 2012), others such as mixed methods 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2005), meta-analysis (Milinski et al., 2002; Yi et al., 2018), 
agent-based modelling (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001), field experiments (Cardenas et al., 
2013), and qualitative comparative analysis (Heikkila, 2004) also proved to be emerging 
in the literature. This illustrated that researchers wishing to advance the study on the 
commons acknowledged that no single method can fully address the collective action 
problem and that a pragmatic movement for diverse methodological traditions is needed.  
4.3 Research design 
In the previous section, we illustrated how the positivist stance and quantitative 
methods dominated the studies in social sciences and transitioned into a more deliberate 
and pluralistic methodological approach in building empirical knowledge. As illustrated 
by scholars who explored the role of institutions in governing the different contexts of the 
commons, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are valuable and that the field 
does not affix to a single approach in advancing knowledge. This study, however, finds 
the value in the qualitative research approach – particularly in the use of case study 
methods – and its ability to contextualise causal mechanisms and to explore a social 
phenomenon (Yin, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). In the later sections, we will provide 
more detail on the justification of the chosen research approach. 
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In this section, we lay out the research design. Research design is the plan or 
proposal to conduct research, with a primary purpose of providing clear guidelines and 
procedures on what you intend to do (Creswell, 2009; Myers, 2013). Myers (2013) 
identified that a good model for qualitative research design should have a set of 
philosophical assumptions, a research method, data collection techniques, data analysis 
approach, and a written record of the findings.  
4.3.1 Philosophical assumptions 
Every research project is based on some philosophical paradigms that provide 
context for the grounds of the research problem (Crotty, 1998; Myers, 2013) (Figure 11). 
Paradigms are defined as worldviews or belief systems (Plano Clark and Creswell, 2008) 
or it could be an epistemological stance, shared beliefs, or a model of examples 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010) that guide the researchers. There are two main elements 
of philosophical assumptions that provide good foundations in social sciences research 
– ontology and epistemology.  




Adapted from: (Crotty, 1998; Myers, 2013) 
Ontology mainly refers to the nature of reality and the study of being (Creswell, 2007), 
the issue of what exists or ‘what is’ the nature of existence (Neuman, 2011),  and ‘what 
the world is made of’ (Crotty, 1998). In the field of political science research, Moses and 
Knutsen (2007) identified two main ontological stances: naturalism and constructivism. 
Naturalism seeks to discover and explain patterns that exist in nature driven by the need 
for scientific legitimacy. Constructivism, on the other hand, is rooted on the possibility 
of multiple and equally valid realities. Constructivists believe that we do not just 
experience the world directly, but rather, we channel our perceptions of the world.  
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010) reminded researchers to treat paradigms with caution 
because there is the temptation to follow a single package of assumptions, when in fact 
a range of methodological presumptions do not necessarily have to go together. Instead, 
Moses and Knutsen (2007) recommended the use of ontological and epistemological 
positions to assist the researcher in picking the appropriate philosophical assumptions 
needed to address the research problem in question. Whilst this research does not 
necessarily identify in any of these two typologies, we do acknowledge their importance. 
We direct our attention instead to epistemology and how the relationship between theory 
and research will help us address our research problem. 
Epistemology describes the nature of knowledge and ‘what it means to know’ (Crotty, 
1998). It primarily focuses on the relationship between the researcher and the subject 
(Creswell, 2009) and refers to the assumptions on how to best study the world and the 
method of determining is true (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Johnson et al., 2016). Myers (2013) 
identified two main underlying epistemological positions in social sciences research, 
namely positivist and interpretivist approaches. Positivism originated from the natural 
sciences, where it relies heavily on logic and reason i.e. naturalistic or scientific methods 
(Flick, 2009). For positivists, reality is independent of the observer, where reality can only 
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be experienced through direct observation. With regards to the relationship between 
theory and research, positivism believes scientific method (i.e. empiricism) is the only 
way to observe and measure the phenomena we experienced (Trochim, 2006). This is 
usually done through deductive reasoning, where the researcher tests concepts and 
patterns known from competing theories and applies it to know which context it will work 
best (Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
Interpretivism, on the other hand, is a post-positivist approach rejecting the central 
tents of positivism. For interpretivists, reality is a constructed nature of reality and the 
only way individuals or participants can understand certain phenomena is through 
interactions (Flick, 2009; Myers, 2013). Social constructs, such as human behaviour, 
emotion, attitudes, experiences, etc., are detailed by the rich description of the lived 
experience of human beings. The researcher, therefore, draws empirical evidence from 
such data and builds theory based on the observed patterns that emerged 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). This is referred to as an inductive form of reasoning.  
Given the two epistemological approaches, this research relies on Ostrom’s (1990) 
advancement of the study of the commons which sits on the post-positivist realm but not 
entirely rejecting the value of theory-testing and empirical methods. We acknowledge 
the weaknesses of both positivism and interpretivism and we posited that neither 
recognises that observation is fallible, and that theory is revisable. We then turn to other 
forms of post-positivist stances that draw from both methodological strains of positivism 
and constructivism. We also need to associate with a philosophical paradigm that will 
enable us to draw causal mechanisms and patterns of relationships as it is the central 
tenet of our research problem. Based on this, this research employs a critical realist 
stance, where it accepts that theory can only be impartial representations of reality (i.e. 
weakness of positivism) and that we may have to rely on some underlying events and/or 
contexts that we cannot observe (i.e. weakness of constructivism).  
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Emerging through the works of Bhaskar (1975) and expounded by critical realists like 
Sayer (1992) and Collier (1994), critical realism is a post-positivist paradigm and serves 
as an alternative approach to the two dominant philosophical paradigms. It places a 
heavy emphasis on the use of causal mechanisms to describe the world, with the 
performative function of using power, agency, structure, and relations to the 
contextualisation of the research problem being examined (Easton, 2010; Smith and 
Elger, 2012; Fletcher, 2017; Vincent and O’Mahoney, 2018).  
Figure 12: Three levels of reality according to a critical realist (iceberg metaphor) 
 
Source: (Fletcher, 2017; Vincent and O’Mahoney, 2018) 
Critical realism is appropriate in this research for two main reasons. First, our 
research problem requires us to identify causal mechanisms that led to the establishment 
of institutional arrangements in a particular context. Critical realism treats reality as 
theory-laden and not theory-determined. This means that whilst critical realists recognise 
theories as useful in framing the context and guiding the research context or problem, 
there are also theories that help us get closer to the underlying structures of “real” world, 
i.e. causal mechanisms (Figure 12) (Easton, 2010; Shannon-Baker, 2016; Fletcher, 
2017). In this research, therefore, we recognise that there is a rich theoretical basis as 
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to why collective action problems occur; however, we want to know under which 
circumstances did it work and what factors influenced or caused it to emerge. This also 
means that we are testing if the elements in our theoretical framework work in our chosen 
context (i.e. theory testing/deductive), but also generating new insights on the 
unobserved structures that caused the observed phenomena to occur (i.e. theory 
building/inductive). This is also known as the process of abduction, where there is a 
back and forth movement between deduction and induction (Shannon-Baker, 2016). 
According to Pawson (2006), critical realism adopts a generative understanding of 
causation in policy, where it breaks the habit of basing evaluation on ‘What works?’ but 
rather on ‘What works, for whom, in what circumstances and why?’. Instead of seeking 
to describe a policy, critical realists account for engaging with the contextual factors 
influencing outcomes of activities to provide useful evidence. This was illustrated by 
Pawson and Tilley's (1997) model on realistic evaluation: Mechanism + Context = 
Outcome (Figure 13), where the scientific inquiry does not only focus on the outcomes 
produced by the policy intervention in question, but also the significant conditions in 
which the interventions took place.  
Figure 13: Critical realist view of causation 
 
Source: (Sayer, 1992; Pawson and Tilley, 1997) 
Second, our research needs a suitable methodological approach that will support the 
search for causal mechanisms in the given context. Since critical realism is more of a 
meta-theoretical stance and a general philosophical framework, it does not have any 
associated set of methods; instead, it reconciles the weaknesses of quantitative and 
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qualitative approaches and recognises the utilisation of both methods (Shannon-Baker, 
2016; Fletcher, 2017). Easton (2010) explained that identifying mechanisms requires the 
‘why’ and the ‘how’ that qualitative research employs, and also recognising the formal 
theoretical or linear statistical models that quantitative research provides in order to 
guide the relationships of the mechanisms. Given the extent of my research questions, 
qualitative research is the chosen and more suitable methodology because we want to 
explore a phenomenon that has not been observed in this context before (i.e. the health 
commons in the context of Greater Manchester). Qualitative research has the power to 
create an exploratory reflection on individual accounts of attitudes, motivations, and 
behaviour in order for us to understand the context as to which actions and decisions 
have taken place (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Hakim, 2000).  
Some of the advantages of qualitative approach in a critical realist approach are:  
 the distinctiveness of qualitative research tend to not rely solely on statistical or 
empiricist methods only (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Bryman and Bell, 2011);  
 instead, it assists the researcher to take an existing model on mechanisms and 
adopt its analogies to other known subjects, which will then be used to explain a 
set of observable patterns (Roberts, 2014) 
 researchers actively engage with people in real organisations (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) to gather more information that is not necessarily observed at 
an empirical level, which therefore, extends new insights on how causal 








Table 5: Summary of philosophical paradigms 
 Positivism Constructivism Critical Realism 
Ontology (Nature 
of reality) 
There is a single 
reality 
There are multiple 
constructed realities 
There is a reality 
independent of our 
thinking and all 




the knower to the 
known) 
Knower and the 
known are 
independent 




causal languages to 





















based on theoretical 
observations rather 
than empirical level 
 





4.4 Research methodology 
The aim of a critical realist research design is to identify and explain how and why 
causal mechanisms affect or result into a particular phenomenon using relationships 
identified by the theoretical framework. In order to provide an in-depth exploration and 
abduct causal mechanisms from empirical manifestations (Vincent and O’Mahoney, 
2018), qualitative research methods using a case study design is employed. Sayer  
(1992) suggested that this form of intensive method in critical realism addresses where 
the context is known and what produces change. In this section, we examine the 
remaining elements of the research design (Figure 14) that focuses on the data collection 
techniques and the tools to data analysis that were used to frame and address the 
objectives of this research. 
4.4.1 Case studies 
Geva-May (2005) stated that in the social sciences, case study is a prominent mode 
of research method. Since policy research is about defining and solving existing 
problems embedded in complex systems by drawing on social science theories (Geva-
May, 2005), using case studies is a useful method in providing a fully contextualised 
definition of the problem.  
Whilst some suggested that statistical analysis and nomothetic approaches should 
be the prescribed methods in examining institutions and collective action (Von Beyme, 
2009; Suddaby and Lefsrud, 2012), case study research has proven it has the 
explanatory power to frame a good deal of processes as opposed strictly to just empirical 
outcomes. As identified in the early section of this chapter, case studies were widely 
used in the study of the commons. Varying from small to large-N studies, case studies 
in the commons provided not only a good empirical base on organisations illustrating 
successful (and failed) collective action, but also challenged existing theories through 
various context-specific relationships (Poteete et al., 2010).  
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From a critical realist’s perspective, case study is able to define the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
in outcomes (Easton, 2010). Compared with the generalised variables produced from 
sole quantitative analysis, case studies seek to trace explanatory and operational links 
across a multitude of factors and relationships (Yin, 1994). Moreover, case studies can 
be tested through experiments, multivariate analysis, meta-analysis, and agent-based 
models, which illustrates its analytical strength in terms of theory development (Poteete 
et al., 2010). This shows its flexibility to adapt between quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and analysis techniques, where it relies on multiple sources of evidence and 
uses theoretical propositions to guide the iterative process of the research. 
The role of theory is essential in research design because it identifies the purpose of 
the case study. Since case studies are based on multiple data sources, building 
constructs could lead to replication of emerging theory. (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) 
describe that theory building from case studies bridges qualitative evidence to 
mainstream deductive research (i.e. abductive approach), which explains its increasing 
popularity in research. Inductive and deductive logic mirror each other, where inductive 
theory building produces new theory from data, and deductive theory testing uses data 
to test theory. This approach is embedded in rich data, making case studies likely to 
produce accurate and testable theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
4.4.2 Case research design 
Case study methods are, therefore, an appropriate qualitative methodology for this 
research because it proposes to gain an in-depth understanding of a concerned 
phenomenon in a real-life setting (Yin, 1994). A critical realist case approach is well 
suited if the phenomena is clearly bounded but complex (Easton, 2010), which is 
illustrated by the collaborative governance structure of the Partnership. The Partnership 
is made up of multiple organisations working across different health sectors in Greater 
Manchester (GM). This study is set within the 10 local authorities of GM, where we limit 
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our case to the group of organisations that are situated within this geographical boundary 
and are formally committed to the Health Devolution policy. Our units of analysis, 
however, are spread out across three levels of decision-making based on Ostrom's 
(2005) multiple levels of analysis as outlined in the previous chapter. We will expand the 
application of this analytical framework in a later section below. Based on Yin's (1994) 
designs for case studies, our research is classified as an embedded single-case design 
with multiple units of analysis (Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Embedded single-case design of this research 
 
4.4.3 Limitations of case studies 
We need to address the weaknesses of our chosen case study design – these are 
selection bias and generalisability (Poteete et al., 2010). Since this research is focused 
in a single case only, this meant that selection bias may not truly represent variation on 
the relationships between the causal mechanisms and outcomes (Yin, 1994). This also 
means that there is limited possibility for generalisation of results. Since our chosen 
methods do not involve any empirical or statistical analysis, full replication of the case 
study research may be more difficult. 
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There are multiple reasons why GM is the only case chosen for this study. In the 
previous chapters, we introduced Greater Manchester health and social care devolution 
as the particular phenomenon that we wanted to study. In particular, we wanted to focus 
on the role of the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care (GMHSC) Partnership as 
stewards of the overall health economy of the 2.8 million population of the GM 
conurbation and how they devised institutional arrangements to make collective 
decisions regarding the sustainability issues of their health commons. 
First, although the Devolution across English local governance has been 
implemented across multiple city-regions, our focus is narrowed down on the health 
policy aspect. This makes Greater Manchester an extreme case to this research topic 
because it is the most advanced amongst all other devolved regions and it is the pioneer 
on receiving devolved health functions from the National Health Service (NHS). Second,  
Yin (1994) identified that a single-case design can represent the critical test of a 
significant theory. Since the concept of the health commons has been unexplored in the 
UK setting as outlined in the previous chapters, the GMHSC Partnership presents a 
unique opportunity not only to advance theoretical research, but also to become a model 
and draw lessons from for future health devolution policies in England. Third, GM was 
selected out of logistical convenience to the researcher. GM was the only city-region to 
receive delegated health functions at the time the research projected began, therefore, 
it was sensible to focus only a single location. Lastly, GM was the only case selected for 
this research because of the perceived methodological barriers on recruiting participants. 
There were ethical difficulties to recruiting participants who are NHS employees, which 
posed methodological time constraints to this research. This will be detailed in a later 
section of this chapter. 
In order for us to address the limitations of our single case study, we apply Yin's 
(1994) four tests to assess the quality of a case study research. These are: construct 
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validity – establishing the operational measures of the concepts being studied; internal 
validity – distinguishing patterns and making inferences; external validity – knowing 
whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study; and 
reliability – ensuring that the results of the cases can be repeated. Using these criteria, 
strengths and weaknesses of case studies are derived. 
Construct validity. One of the strengths of case study is the depth and richness of 
information gathered from the research. Case studies are descriptions of instances of 
phenomenon that are typically based on a variety of data sources, which may be 
available beyond conventional historical study (Yin, 1994; Creswell, 2007). The use of 
evidence in case studies address broader historical and behavioural issues, enabling 
convergence of lines of inquiry and development of the process of triangulation. This 
increases the quality and richness of the research. 
Internal validity. A distinct characteristic of case study research is that it has a unit of 
analysis, either an individual or a collective organisation, in a bounded system. There 
are clear boundaries, which identify the problem or phenomenon to be examined, 
capturing the deeper examinations of a single unit and retain a holistic flavour (Geva-
May, 2005; Myers, 2013). This makes case studies exemplary. Case studies focus on 
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the examined problem, probing to meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events and describing one example of a more general category (Yin, 1994; 
Geva-May, 2005; Myers, 2013). Description of the cases is used to draw conclusions 
about the phenomena being studied. However, this limits the ability of case study to 
establish causality. The emergence of randomised field trials or ‘true experiments’ (Yin, 
1994:15) establishes causal relationships, or the efficiency of a ‘treatment’ in producing 
an ‘effect’, which case studies cannot directly address.  
External validity. A well-written case study is representative, wherein it represents a 
real story that most researchers can identify with ‘face validity’ (Myers, 2013). Since most 
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case studies examine contemporary events, they are tightly connected with theoretical 
generalisations and not just represent samples of larger studies (Yin, 1994). However, 
this leads to little basis for scientific generalisation because the goal of case studies is 
to expand theories (analytic) rather than enumerate frequencies (statistical) (Yin, 1994; 
Geva-May, 2005).  
Reliability. The most important characteristic of a good case study is ensuring that 
the results of the cases can be repeated. If other researches could replicate the results 
of the case study, then it allows minimisation of errors and biases in the study (Yin, 1994). 
A well-documented study, through a case study protocol and database, increases the 
reliability of the research. Each case stands on its own that serves as replication, 
contrasts, and extensions to emerging theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Given 
that, theory development and building constructs could lead to replication of the case 
study. Exploring or testing theories within context allows the researchers to get close to 
action. Also, building theories create empirically valid results and constructs from case-
based evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Myers, 2013). The 
greatest concern on case studies is the lack of rigor (Yin, 1994). Due to the multiple 
sources of evidence that researchers can use, some tend to not follow systematic 
procedures, or allow equivocal biases to influence the direction of the findings of the 
case study. Therefore, it is important to carefully plan the research design to prevent lack 
of rigour to be present. 
Table 6: Strengths and weaknesses of case study approach 
Type of test Strengths Weaknesses 
Construct 
validity 
Rich and in-depth 
information 
Time consuming 
Access to data 
Internal validity 




Single unit of 
analysis in a 
bounded system 
Exemplary 
External validity Representativeness 
Little basis for 
scientific 
generalisation 
Poor research design 




Lack of rigor Theory building and 
development 
 
4.4.4 The case: Greater Manchester Health and Social Care devolution 
This research uses an embedded single case design to examine the contextual 
mechanisms that influenced the GM Health and Social Care Partnership in governing 
the health and social care services in the conurbation. It is an appropriate methodology 
for this research because it proposes to gain an 'in-depth' understanding of a concerned 
phenomenon in a 'real-life' setting (Yin, 1994). More importantly, from a critical realist 
point of view, case studies are effective in framing causal mechanisms and 
“understanding how the dominoes fall in long causal chains” (Thomas and Koontz, 
2011:106).  
Greater Manchester (GM) is a metropolitan region and combined authority in the 
North West of England, with an estimated population of over 2.8 million and comprises 
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of local authorities, namely Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, 
Stockport, Tameside and Glossop, Trafford, and Wigan (Figure 16). The combined 
authority collectively has an overall gross value added (GVA) of £66.4 billion, making it 
the largest city-region economy outside London (Office for National Statistics, 2018a, 
2018b). 
Between 2014 and 2015, GM has landed a landmark devolution deal with the 
government, which included not only devolved powers in planning, land, transport, and 
fire services, but also some delegated health functions from the NHS. A Memorandum 
of Agreement (MOU) was signed in February 2015 between representatives from the 
Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), NHS England, and the GM 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (GM CCGs) to secure the devolution of all health and 
social care funding to Greater Manchester. 
Figure 16: Greater Manchester’s administrative boundaries 
 
 
In this study, the sample of interest were the organisations that make up the Greater 
Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership. They are a collective unit, which was 
tasked to provide strategic direction to the overall development of the health and care 
economy of the city-region. It is made up of the following organisations: 10 local 
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authorities, 12 CCGs, 15 NHS trusts and foundation trusts, and NHS England, which 
make up as the units of analysis in this research. Greater Manchester has been selected 
as the sole case in this study because it is the most advanced case amongst the 
devolved English city-regions. GM has a strong track record of collaboration, integration, 
and various governance structures in place to collectively manage health and care 
services locally.  
4.5 Data collection methods 
The role of the researcher in qualitative research (Creswell, 2009) is involved in 
setting the boundaries for the study and collecting information to answer emerging 
research questions. Purposefully selected sampling and ethical issues must be 
considered prior to data collection, which involves careful selection of individuals and 
sites to inform your research problem. Qualitative research methods may have different 
data collection techniques. For example, grounded theory uses observations, interviews, 
historical records, and surveys (Urquhart and Fernández, 2013). Ethnography mostly 
uses fieldwork and observational protocols, interviews, and documents (Creswell, 2007). 
Case study relies on extensive documents and records of interviews and fieldwork (Yin, 
1994), whilst action research uses fieldwork observations and interviews (Myers, 2013). 
Critical realist case studies can choose from an array of qualitative methods of data 
collection techniques, where triangulation of data is necessary to bolster validity and 
reliability (Easton, 2010; Thomas and Koontz, 2011). Case study research uses 
triangulation of methods, drawing from a combination of multiple sources of evidence to 
create converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 1994; Poteete et al., 2010). Using multiple 
sources of evidence allows a more in-depth and contextual evidence base and increases 
the breadth of a case study’s scope. Myers (2013) named three main categories for data 
collection, namely interviews, fieldwork, and documents, respectively.  
 
132 
 Interviews allow the researcher to gather rich data from the participants, 
especially when the participants cannot be directly observed. It could be in a form 
of a structure, unstructured, semi-structured, or focus groups (Flick, 2009; Myers, 
2013). However, interviews may be problematic if the participants provide biased 
responses and filter the information due to lack of trust with the researcher 
(Creswell, 2007).  
 Fieldwork or participant observation involves gathering data by interacting and/or 
observing people in their natural setting. Fieldwork could be in the form of a non-
participant or participant observation (Flick, 2009), where the role of the 
researcher varies on whether he/she decides to watch from the outside or interact 
from the inside. This technique enables the researcher to have first-hand 
experience with the participants, however, it may also be seen as intrusive and 
lack of enculturation, leading to problems in gaining rapport with the sample 
(Creswell, 2009; Myers, 2013).  
 Documents enable researchers to access information of participant observations 
and interviews, through public (e.g. meetings, newspapers, reports, etc.) or 
private (e.g. journals, diaries, letters, etc.) records. Such documents are written 
materials may be a historical proof of someone’s thoughts or actions (Myers, 
2013). While documents may be convenient and time saving (Creswell, 2009), 
access may be a problem. Materials may be incomplete and not provide authentic 
and representative information (Myers, 2013). 
 
Table 7: Strengths and weaknesses of data collection techniques 
Data Collection 
Category 





Rich data from 
participants that cannot 
be directly observed 
Filtered information 
and biased responses 





May be seen as 
intrusive 
Researcher control 
over direction of the 
questions 
Not all participants may 







Gaining access to the 
research site 
In-depth data due to 
researcher's immersion 
to the culture 
Enculturation or the 
process of learning the 
culture’s acquired 
values 
Unusual aspects may 
come up during the 
observation 
Certain participants 
may have a hard time 








access at a convenient 












Materials may be 
incomplete and not 




Adapted from: (Myers, 2013) 
4.5.1 Documents 
The first phase of the data collection is to gather relevant documents to establish the 
various formal institutions utilised in the formation of the collaborative governance. This 
included a variety of public documents, such as general meeting reports and agenda 
items between NHS England and Greater Manchester leaders (December 2015 to April 
2016) and the Partnership board (April 2016 to July 2019), strategic documents and 
frameworks, and Chief Officer’s Reports (December 2015 to July 2019). Moreover, 
legislative documents itemising the statutes leading to the Devolution policies were also 
examined to include the formal institutions that influenced the formation of the GMHSC 
Partnership. Formal rules come in the form of legal documents and statutes, which 
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encompass laws, policies, and regulations of government (Rodríguez-pose, 2013) and 
they are valuable in setting up the initial ground rules of the collaborative governance. 
4.5.2 Interviews 
The second phase of the data collection is to conduct semi-structured interviews on 
selected stakeholders of the GMHSC Partnership, particularly those who were involved 
in the governance, evaluation, and implementation of the overall Health Devolution 
policy.  
Interviews are important in gaining access to individual experience, particularly in 
revealing causes of action (Smith and Elger, 2012). Rules-in-use are oftentimes not 
written down; it is conceptualised and understood by the participants where it has 
evolved over long periods of time (Ostrom, 2007; Poteete et al., 2010), therefore, 
understanding the institutional shaping of governance formation requires that the 
research goes beyond large-scale surveys based upon national samples (Lowndes and 
Pratchett, 2005). As Ostrom (2007:39) explains: ‘obtaining information about rules-in-
use requires spending time at a site and learning how to ask non-threatening, context-
specific questions about rule configurations’. To unearth the ‘real’ rules that shape 
participation – informal as well as formal – it is necessary to ask people ‘how things are 
done around here’ and ‘why is X done, but not Y’ (Poteete et al., 2010; McGinnis, 2011a).  
Since we are unable to conduct field studies and engage in an ethnographic mode 
of collecting data, this research relied heavily on the information provided by the semi-
structured interviews in order to identify the emerging institutions from the GMHSC 
Partnership and draw relationships from its underlying mechanisms. Supported by the 
theory of collective action, we wanted the interviews to reveal the types of rules that they 
crafted and enforced, along with the unravelling of the exogenous factors and 
collaborative mechanisms that they used to successfully foster collective action.  
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An appropriate framework guiding the interaction between the researcher and the 
respondent is crucial to a theory-led critical realist approach. According to Pawson and 
Tilley (1997), interviews should be theory-driven, where the interviewer’s interactions 
with the interviewee are drawn from conceptual framework. This critical realist approach 
recognises that the interviewer and the interviewee have different levels of expertise 
characterised by wider contexts and outcomes of action, reasoning, choices and 
motivation, and conceptualisations from the theory (Smith and Elger, 2012). The 
interactive process then generates responses which contributes to the formulation a and 
evaluation of structural and causal mechanisms from the “real” and unobserved level. To 
apply Pawson and Tilley's (1997) critical realist approach to interviewing, we derived the 
interview questions from the abduction of empirical evidence from the literature search 
guided by the collective action theory (Table 8). Although the questions were directly 
informed by theory and our conceptualisation of formal and informal institutions, we 
framed the questions to be flexible in order to enable the respondent to draw from their 
own subjective experiences and provide a more personal narrative account.  
Table 8: Sample interview questions arising from the abduction process 
Rules Definition 
Corresponding 





specify how participants enter 
or leave their positions 
Set of 
participants 
Who is eligible to 
hold a certain 
position? Which 
positions are 
assigned to certain 




a set of positions that actors 
may hold, each of which has a 




Positions to be 
filled by 
participants 
Who are the actors 









specify which set of actions is 
assigned to which position; 
prescribed actions that actors 
in positions must, must not, or 
may take in various 
circumstances 
Set of allowable 
actions 
What are actors 
allowed to do? 
Aggregation 
specify the transformation 
function from actions to 
intermediate or final outcomes 
Control that 
individual has in 
regard to this 
function 
How do we agree 
on decisions? How 




specify the information 




What are the types 
of information 
available? How do 
they communicate 
this across? What 
channels do they 
use? 
Payoff 
specify how benefits and costs 
are required, permitted, or 
forbidden to players; assigns 




What are the 
incentives that 
drives motivation? 
Scope specify a set of outcomes 
Potential 
outcomes 
What are the types 
of outcomes that 
usually result from 
this decision? 
Adapted from: (Ostrom, 2005; Heikkila and Andersson, 2018) 
4.5.3 Pilot study 
In order to detect potential problems in the initial research design and 
instrumentation, a pilot study is important to be conducted in a qualitative research 
design. Piloting the interviews can help identify any flaws on the interview protocols, 
which then allows the researcher to make the necessary modifications to the 
instrumentation and the final research design (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Majid et al., 2017).  
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Using a small subset of the target population as the pilot sample (Bhattacherjee, 
2012), pilot interviews were conducted with four policy experts from the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) on July 2018. Since the piloted sample do not 
have any expertise or working knowledge about the current Health Devolution policy, the 
questions were instead directed to their experiences on collaborative governance and 
the underlying mechanisms that help them generate successful policy outcomes. For 
example, the participants were asked to draw from their recent experiences on collective 
decision-making and identify how they overcome the challenges in working in a multi-
sectoral organisation. The outcomes from the pilot study were later on adopted to the 
final interview instrument (see Table 9). 
Table 9: Refined interview questions 
 
4.5.4 Recruitment process 
Selection of participants is an important aspect of research. Pawson and Tilley (1997) 
emphasised the importance of selecting key informants that have expert knowledge on 
the topic. Purposive sampling method based on the selected characteristics of a 
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population was employed “to choose strategically key informants based on the 
researcher’s perception that the selected cases will yield a depth of information or a 
unique perspective relative to the phenomenon of interest” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2010:357). We focused on a particular subgroup, in which all the sample members were 
similar, such as occupation or level in an organisation's hierarchy. Using this technique, 
parameters or boundaries were initially established to delimit the characteristics of the 
key informants will be observed.  
Our inclusion criteria included the following: 
 Must be staff of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. This include any of 
the 10 Local Authorities of Greater Manchester 
o Bolton Council, Bury Council, Manchester City Council, Oldham Council, 
Rochdale Council, Salford Council, Stockport Council, Tameside Council, 
Trafford Council, and Wigan Council) or,  
 Must be staff of the NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) or NHS 
Foundation Trusts (FTs) within Greater Manchester.  
 Must also be holding a position in either the NHS or in the council that has a role 
in decision-making. Position may vary from councillor, director, policy associate, 
project lead, commissioner, etc.  
 Must be working in Greater Manchester directly affecting the various work 
programmes within the devolution health agenda, including decision-making 
duties, developing policy, implementing policy, commissioning or evaluating 
programmes, etc. 
 
To recruit participants, a gatekeeper from the GMHSC Partnership has been 
identified, as per NHS ethical protocol. This person served as the main contact person 
throughout the recruitment process. An invitation to recruit for participants was sent out 
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to the members of the Partnership according to the inclusion criteria. Participants who 
agreed to take part of the study recommend others who they may know who also meet 
the criteria. Therefore, snowball sampling method was utilised as a means of a 
convenient method of asking participants to recruit more individuals to join the study 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). This draws on participants’ own expertise in developing 
the sample as well as expanding the sample beyond contacts known to the researcher. 
To avoid informational redundancy, recruitment of participants ceased once data 
saturation is achieved. This means that the researcher recruits participants until nothing 
new is apparent, and there is enough information to replicate the study (Saunders et al., 
2018). 
A total of 38 participants were recruited for the study (Table 10), which included 
members of the GM HSCP project management and executive team; CCG directors; 
Public Health directors; senior leaders from local authorities; General Practitioners (GPs) 
and clinicians from provider and foundation trusts; and members from voluntary sector 
and other partner organisations who were involved in multiple streams of decision-
making within the Partnership. They acted as key informants for the study, providing 
narratives about the emergence of the Partnership, how the organisations interact with 
one another, how collective decisions were made within the governance, and how the 
health devolution and the Partnership had impacted the delivery of health and social care 
services in GM.  
Interviews were conducted between July and December 2018 (Table 11). 
Participants were given the choice to pick a venue that is comfortable for them, such as 
their office or a nearby coffee shop. Participants were not presented a copy of the 
interview schedule; however, they were briefed what the study was about and were given 
opportunities to ask questions or further clarifications. This also allowed the participants 
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to comfortably converse in an open dialogue and engage in a free-flowing interaction 
with the researcher without feeling constrained to address all questions. 
4.6 Data analysis techniques 
Once data from the documents and interviews have been gathered and collected, 
data triangulation is used to corroborate the findings and strengthen the validity of the 
case research design (Yin, 1994).  
Table 10: List of participants recruited for the study 
Identifier Role Organisational 
group 
C01 Senior CCG Lead 
CCG 
C02 CCG Integration Lead 
C03 CCG board member 
C04 CCG board member 
F01 Foundation Trust Senior project director 
NHS Foundation Trust F02 Foundation Trust Senior officer 
F03 PFB Senior officer 
G01 Partnership project management lead 
GMHSC Partnership 
G02 Partnership finance lead 
G03 Partnership project management lead 
G04 Partnership project management lead 
G05 Partnership project management director 
G06 Partnership project management director 
G07 Partnership project management lead 
G08 Partnership senior director 
G09 Partnership project management lead 
G10 Partnership project management lead 
G11 Partnership project management lead 
G12 Partnership project management lead 
G13 Partnership senior director 
G14 Partnership project management lead 
G15 Partnership senior director 
G16 Partnership project management lead 
G17 Partnership senior director 
L01 Councillor (Health and Wellbeing board) 
Local authority L02 Local Authority Senior Leader 
L03 Councillor (Public Health) 
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L04 Councillor (Public Health) 
L05 Local Authority Senior leader 
L06 Healthwatch senior lead 
P01 Consultant, partner 
Partner organisation 
P02 Senior project lead, partner 
P03 GP senior officer 
P04 GP senior officer 
P05 VCSE Director 
P06 Senior project lead, partner 
P07 Senior CCG board member 
P08 Senior CCG board member 
 
Table 11: Timeline of data collection 
 
 
4.6.1 Framework analysis 
This study uses a framework approach developed by Ritchie and Spencer (2002) for 
use in applied health policy research. The method begins with a theory, followed by 
conceptual codes induced from the relevant theoretical framework. This is then used to 
formulate questions and deduced for the qualitative interviews, which are then re-coded 
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back into the framework and re-defined before and during data analysis (Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005). This analysis technique is suitable to the critical realist approach, which 
promotes an abductive process between theory and data.  
The framework approach involves a systematic process of sifting, charting, and 
sorting material according to key issues and themes and uses a 'spreadsheet' approach 
to facilitate recognition of patterns and contradictory information (Gale et al., 2013). 
Following Ritchie and Spencer's (2002) five-step process to framework analysis (e.g. 
familiarisation, identifying themes, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretation), 
we emphasise the importance of the analytical process in highly interconnected stages. 
There is no right or wrong way to approaching a framework analysis. Ritchie and Spencer 
(2002) stated that although the process is usually presented in a particular order, there 
is no implication that it is a mechanical process; rather, it involves constant zooming in 
and out of the various stages of the elements of the framework to determine the 
relationships, mechanisms, and institutions emerging from the data. 
4.6.2 The IAD Framework 
As identified in the previous chapters, this research uses the Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework to capture all the elements (e.g. external variables, 
action situation, interactions, outcomes, and evaluative criteria) in managing the health 
commons. It claims an explanatory power to unpack the details of the institutional 
operations, which will be useful in understanding how a set of rules, norms, and beliefs 
are embedded within common property regimes and influence the way they address 
problems and enforce such existing institutions.  
More importantly, in order for us to situate the institutional rules that emerged and 
how participants interact in each phase, we recognise that institutional choices can occur 
in three levels. Ostrom’s multiple levels of analysis illustrate how all rules are nested in 
another set of rules (Ostrom, 2005:58), where one level of actions and outcomes 
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obtained from the previous level affect the proceeding level. For example, constitutional 
rules refer to who, when, and how can participants engage. These then affect the 
collective-choice activities, where choices about which institutions or strategies should 
be used in resolving collective decisions. These collective-choice rules then influence 
how day-to-day transactions and decisions are made by the participants in operational 
situations.  
These three levels helped us identify the embedded units of analysis in our single-
case research design (Figure 17). We were able to examine and compare how various 
rules and interactions emerged from the GMHSC Partnership and the organisations 
involved in it, and how the decision-making processes at different levels of Partnership 
activities occurred. In the operational situation, we focus on how the key stakeholders 
and partner organisations interacted with one another to deliver and implement the GM 
Strategic Plan. In the collective-choice situation, we look at how the Partnership acted 
as the steward to GM’s health economy and how it fulfilled its oversight role in strategy 
building, delivery, and monitoring and assurance. We also want to explore how various 
participants come together in the collective-choice action arena to make decisions 
collaboratively and collectively. Lastly, the constitutional situation refers to the role of 
NHS England as a key player to the GMHSC Devolution agreement and how it controlled 








Figure 17: Modified multiple levels of analysis 
 
4.6.3 Analysis 
The process of framework analysis began by reading national level policy documents 
outlining the legislative process of the Devolution in Greater Manchester. This helped 
me familiarise the overall political context of local governance in England and how the 
Devolution policy arose as a solution. Moreover, agenda documents from public 
meetings between the NHS and leaders of the GMCA were examined to identify how 
Health Devolution emerged. As interviews were being conducted, I continued to immerse 
myself with public documents being published on GMHSC’s website and other evaluative 
reports being conducted by University of Manchester. After the transcription of the 
interviews from various individuals involved in the GMHSC Partnership were conducted, 
the data was analysed and coded into NVIVO in accordance with the various elements 
in the IAD Framework.  
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Using data from both documents and semi-structured interviews, I followed Polski 
and Ostrom's (1999) guidance to using the IAD framework where I took advantage of 
the IAD framework’s analytical power to break down the themes from the policy 
documents and interviews into manageable sets of practical activities.  
We carry out a two-part analysis to examine the (1) institutions that emerged during 
the establishment of the Partnership, and (2) the collaborative interactions between the 
actors involved and process outcomes resulting from this. First, I identified the 
exogenous variables that influence the action situation and constrain the types of 
institutional arrangements being informed. These are the physical attributes, community 
attributes, and rules-in-use. We particularly focused on identifying the factors that were 
critical during the initial stages (negotiation and formalisation) of the Partnership. The 
three factors altogether constitute the antecedents that shape the impetus to collaborate 
and the starting conditions necessary to take collective action. 
Second, we proceeded to the examination of the action situation where we zoom in 
on the collective-choice arena (i.e. the Partnership) highlighting how institutions and 
structural attributes of the contexts affect the behaviour of the actors participating in it. 
We assume that the action situation occurs after the period of the establishment of the 
Partnership to its implementation stages, where we observe how individual behaviours 
and rule configurations changed over time. We go through each element of the action 
situation and examine how each element corresponds with a set of formal and informal 
institutions emerging as an outcome of the interactions from the action situation. 
We summarised and concluded the analysis of the data by looking at the emerging 
patterns of interaction and outcomes according to Ostrom’s multiple level of analysis as 
a result of the different institutions set up within the constitutional, collective-choice, and 




4.7 Ethical procedures 
Ethical considerations are important in research, especially when dealing with human 
subjects and protecting the privacy of their data (Bryman and Bell, 2011). To comply with 
the ethical procedures, this study obtained an ethical approval from both the University 
(sponsor) and the Health Research Authority (HRA) (NHS sponsor). HRA Approval was 
introduced as the process for applying for ethical approvals for any project-based 
research involving NHS in England and Wales, such as patients or staff (Health 
Research Authority, 2016). Because this study involved recruiting participants who are 
NHS employees, an electronic application was formally lodged in the Integrated 
Research Application System (IRAS) website.  
The ethics application process took almost 5 months in total, including preparation 
and ongoing feedback and consultation with the University ethics team. The application 
included the submission of a research protocol outlining the study procedures 
(recruitment process and inclusion/exclusion/withdrawal criteria), reporting procedures 
for adverse events, data handling and archiving procedures, monitoring and audit of 
data, regulatory procedures (data protection and confidentiality), and dissemination of 
the results. Consent forms, participation information sheets, interview questions 
template, and letter of invitation to participant were also included in the IRAS application.  
4.7.1 Data handling and record keeping 
Data for the interview was recorded in an audio recorder with real-time file encryption 
and password protection. Moreover, notes were also taken during the interview. Audio 
recordings were encrypted and stored in an encrypted and password protected university 
computer, and on a secure network, safe from unauthorised access and processing, 
accidental loss, damage or destruction. Transcribing of audio recordings were conducted 
solely by the principal investigator (i.e. the student). Once the recordings have been 
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transcribed, the documents were stored in password protected word documents and 
saved to a secure university network. 
All transcripts were anonymised, and an identification log was securely stored 
separately from the anonymised data. The anonymised data was coded, and the 
codebook was stored in a separate location from the anonymised data. The audio 
recordings will be stored until the completion of this project and an additional 3 years to 
verify the validity of the research in the unlikely event that it is challenged. After this 
period the recordings will be deleted according to the university’s archiving and 
destruction procedures. All printed and electronic data were encrypted and stored in a 
secure safe from unauthorised access and processing, accidental loss, damage or 
destruction. Paper consent forms, audio recordings, identification log, and codebook 
were also kept separately, under lock, and were stored in a secure, separate location 
from the anonymised data. 
4.7.2 Reflection on the ethics process 
Due to the tedious process of the HRA, there were a few factors that posed as a 
methodological barrier to this research (see McDonach et al., 2009). First, we 
acknowledge the value and importance of the NHS ethical approval. However, it is 
possible that not all social science postgraduate researchers may be aware that such 
system exists should they take interest in conducting research involving the NHS. I do 
thank the University Ethics team for extending their hand to help me submit a strong and 
robust proposal, which led to the approval of my application with minor amendments. 
Second, it is worth noting that the processing time lasted at least 8 weeks from the 
original submission (April 2018) to the final approval (June 2018), including the time to 
revise for minor amendments. This also does not take into account the time since I 
started preparing the documents for the application. The research design, at that time, 
was still not fully developed and I needed to finalise everything within a short period of 
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time whilst taking into account the flexibility of the proposal just in case any changes in 
my research occurs. I was made fully aware of that any deviations from the approved 
protocol may result into another application. These limitations discouraged me from 
attempting to expand my case research design and reaching out to other policymakers 
involved in Health Devolution outside GM. 
Despite the difficulties, there were good outcomes from my application. Having the 
HRA approval allowed me to reach my participants without any hesitations. The 
participants were more comfortable joining my research knowing that I have received 
ethical approval to interview them. This also meant that all research instruments used 
for the interview were pre-approved by the HRA. More importantly, I learned a valuable 
technical skill that I could apply in future research projects that will involve recruitment 
NHS participants. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter lays out the research design and methodological tools that guide the 
analysis of this research. We employ a qualitative research because of its We employed 
a qualitative research approach using case study methods to gain an in-depth 
understanding on the GMHSC Partnership and the institutional mechanisms that they 
used to govern the health commons. Although we have a single, we have embedded the 
IAD’s multiple levels of analysis to address the limitations of our chosen case study 
design. A combination of interviews and documents were examined to evaluate the 
collaborative and institutional mechanisms in place to resolve their collective action 
dilemma. Using the IAD framework, we triangulated and analysed the data and carried 
out a two-part analysis. Ethical procedures were also outlined to illustrate the HRA 
application process and the value of this experience to the researcher. Results will be 




5 Exogenous factors 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have established the theoretical grounds to justifying 
how various institutional arrangements can be created in order to govern the health 
commons. We also introduced the city-region of GM and how we’re using the GMHSC 
Partnership as our case to argue that local decision-makers can devise, enact, and 
monitor their own rules to act as stewards of their own health commons. The question 
on whether the commitments made in 2015 are being delivered effectively or not is 
beyond the scope of this study (see GMCA, 2018; Lorne et al., 2018; Walshe et al., 
2018). Instead, this thesis analyses how a group of collaborating organisations 
developed their own mechanisms in order to take charge of their health commons, and 
how they crafted institutions to enforce and monitor amongst themselves on who, how, 
and what they can appropriate from their shared or pooled resource.  
Following Ostrom’s IAD framework as an analytical tool, we carry out a two-part 
analysis to examine the (1) institutions that emerged during the establishment of the 
Partnership, and (2) the collaborative interactions between the actors involved and 
process outcomes resulting from this. It specifically addresses the objectives of this 
research to unearth the external factors leading to the formation of the collaborative 
governance, the mechanisms used during the collaborative process, and the formal and 
informal institutional arrangements made in order to address the collective action 
problem. By using this theoretical perspective, we aim to evaluate on whether these 
arrangements can be sustainable to governing the health commons and whether it has 
potential to be replicated elsewhere; and whilst the principles may not be directly 
comparable to a natural common property regime setting, we are hopeful that we draw 
some lessons on how this can be examined by scholars in the future. 
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In this chapter, we particularly focus on the factors that were critical during the initial 
stages (negotiation and formalisation) of the Partnership. First, we identify the physical 
attributes of the goods and services being considered, which have significant influence 
on the formation of the governance regime. In health commons literature, we refer to 
these as the physical resources that are pooled together by the collaborating 
participants, i.e. human capital, geographical boundaries, financial resources, etc. 
Second, we examine the community attributes that reflected the common understanding 
or socially accepted norms in which the participants share with each other. These include 
social capital and their joint collective interest to solve problems, which in effect influence 
the behaviour of the actors. Lastly, we explore the initial set of rules that when the 
Partnership was established. Based on the physical and community factors, the 
participants determine, formulate, and enforce rules to order their relationships. These 
three factors altogether constitute the antecedents that shape the impetus to collaborate 
and the starting conditions that are necessary to establish a collaborative governance.   
5.2 Physical attributes 
Physical conditions influence the action situation and constrain the institutional 
arrangements being formed. They provide significant implications for policy design and 
collective action, which are all critical aspects of the policy-making process (Polski and 
Ostrom, 1999). In this research, we refer to health commons as the unique common 
property regime setting that encompasses a variety of human, physical, financial, and 
social capital relevant to the delivery of health and social care services. We explore in 
this section the physical attributes of the health commons that the Partnership is looking 
after, i.e. the health and care economy of Greater Manchester, of which is being shared 
between a segmented population. These include the physical structures and health care 
services, the financial resources being pooled, and the geographical boundaries 




5.2.1 The Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership 
The decision-makers of the city-region of Greater Manchester established a 
governing body who will be responsible for the regional stewardship or collective 
management of the health commons. Through the Devolution deals, a new Greater 
Manchester Health and Social Care (GMHSC) Partnership was introduced to bring 
together 375 statutory institutions, including 10 local authorities, 10 CCGs and 13 NHS 
trusts and foundation trusts, along with representatives from primary care, Healthwatch, 
community and voluntary sectors, Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire 
and Rescue Service, and NHS England, to take charge of the health and social care 
economy of the city-region and to undertake the responsibilities outlined in the Health 
Devo MoU. The body is responsible for strategic planning and financial and monitoring 
oversight of the £6 billion budget for health and social care in GM. Decision-making was 
based on subsidiarity, i.e. making decisions at the most appropriate level, meaning that 
the NHS in Greater Manchester is not going to be controlled by either the councils nor 
the NHS centrally, but by working collaboratively and promoting inclusivity amongst its 
partners. 
As stewards of the health and social care economy of the 2.8 million residents of 
Greater Manchester, the system covers the geographical boundaries of the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority, including the NHS organisations within the 10 local 
authorities of Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, 
Tameside and Glossop, Trafford, and Wigan, and the 10 local councils.  
In addition, the following are also part of the GMHSC system and are represented in 
the Partnership: 
                                                          
5 37 at the time of signing MoU on 2015, but Manchester CCGs/Trusts have merged. Current 
count is 33 organisations 
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 Primary Care providers 
o 500 General Practitioner Practices; 
o 450 General Dental Services; 
o 700 community pharmacies; 
o 300 community optometry services; 
 At least 300,000 carers; 
 27 social housing providers; 
 14,500 voluntary and community organisations; 
 Greater Manchester Police; 
 Greater Manchester Fire & Rescue Services; 
 NHS England; and  
 2.8 million residents of Greater Manchester 
5.2.2 Autonomy and accountability arrangements 
The devolution deals brought about new arrangements for NHS England to transfer 
certain responsibilities to local organisations that will drive the policy direction towards a 
more place-based commissioning and decision-making. With the overarching principle 
of “all decisions about Greater Manchester will be taken within Greater Manchester” 
(AGMA et al., 2015:5), Health Devo was presented as a catalyst for GM to make local 
decisions about how their resources are to be spent and how national policies will be 
implemented. This, however, raised a question on the level of autonomy awarded to GM 
– whether the newly established Partnership is receiving devolved powers similar to that 
of the statutory arrangements in NHS Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (i.e. full 
devolution), or NHS England is merely delegating some responsibilities to GM to make 
regional decisions on strategic planning and delivery (i.e. delegation). 
As it stands, devolution of health and social care in GM resembled the latter, largely 
because there was no statutory or legislative basis. Instead, it came in the form of what 
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was called the ‘Warner amendments’ (The King’s Fund, 2015) to the National Health 
Service Act 2006 via the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 Schedule 4 
(CLGD Act 2016 hereafter) in relation to delegation and joint arrangements that support 
and improve the integration of health and social care services and place-based 
approaches (see NHS England, 2015a). It also expands the range of possibilities for 
local organisations to work together whilst making their own decisions, with the health-
specific amendments focused in the extent of devolved NHS functions to combined 
authorities or local NHS organisations acting together through a joint committee. 
First, the legislation does not in itself transfer NHS England’s supervisory powers or 
functions over CCGs. This is in order to preserve the ‘N’ out of the NHS and to ensure 
that the national standards and assurance processes are not lost in the devolution 
process. Second, the amendment also ensures that the Secretary of State retains his/her 
statutory duties, including regulatory and supervisory functions fulfilled by the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC) and the like. This meant that there will still be a significant 
degree of national oversight and control, reinforcing the retention of existing 
organisational statutory responsibilities and lines of accountability. Third, NHS England 
may delegate specialised commissioning and other functions to a joint committee, 
including at least one combined authority and/or LA, and at least one CCG. This allows 
CCGs to share commissioning functions with combined authorities. This also clarifies a 
distinction between the powers of the directly-elected Mayor and those of the combined 
authority, making them responsible for different services (i.e. health is not under the remit 
of the directly-elected Mayor). 
The extent of the devolved responsibilities was outlined in the Health Devolution 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (AGMA et al., 2015) and the subsequent 
documents clarifying accountability and monitoring principles (NHS England, 2015a, 
2015c). To further clarify the nature of devolution in respect to NHS England functions, 
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a document was released on September 2015 to set out the overarching models of 
devolution of NHS England functions in terms of the current legislative framework and 
how the devolution agenda linked with the current policy on STPs (NHS England, 2015c). 
This framework was set to encourage future devolution proposals to consider asking 
within the lines of delegation rather than full devolution of planning and commissioning 
functions (Figure 18). Drawing from the existing powers under NHS Act 2006, the lowest 
level in devolution spectrum is a ‘seat at the table’ for commissioning decisions. This 
meant that decisions about a function are taken by the function holder but with an input 
from another body, hence the expression ‘seat at the table’. There is no legal or 
organisational change on parties involved, and lines of accountability and responsibility 
(e.g. budgetary and funding for overspends) remain with the original function holder.  
Figure 18: Devolution spectrum of NHS functions 
 
Source: (NHS England, 2015c) 
The next level entails co-commissioning or joint decision-making, where two or more 
bodies with separate functions come together and make decisions together on each 
other’s functions (see NHS Act 2006 Section 75 Partnership arrangements between 
NHS bodies and local authorities). Following that is the level on delegated 
commissioning arrangements, which is the current arrangement received by GM. 
Exercise of the function is delegated to another body, including decision-making and 
budget. Lines of accountability and responsibility (e.g. budgetary and funding for 
overspends) still remain with the original function holder. Lastly, the bottom end of the 
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devolution spectrum involves fully devolved commissioning where the function is 
transferred to another legal body on a permanent basis, including responsibility, liability, 
decision-making, budgets, etc. The new body will be the new owner of the accountability 
and responsibility for the transferred functions, as in the case of the devolved NHS in 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
The success of the revolutionary Health Devo deal formed the basis of the principle-
based decision criteria designed by NHS England for future health devolution proposals 
from areas who are considering asking for extra freedom on health functions. Based on 
an assessment criteria framework (see NHS England, 2015b), areas seeking devolved 
arrangements of NHS England functions are to be assessed through a formal process 
using the NHS England board-agreed principles and decision criteria. The framework 
evaluates the robustness of the proposal through the following areas: 
 A vision clearly articulating the benefits of devolution; 
 A ‘health geography’ supporting coterminosity and devolved decision-making; 
 Quality and continuity of care linked to the safe transfer of responsibilities; 
 Impact on other populations, including appropriate safeguards for users of local 
services from outside the relevant geography; 
 Financial risk management and mitigation actions identified; 
 Support of local health organisations and political leadership, demonstrating 
cooperation amongst all parties; 
 Demonstrable leadership capability and track record of collaboration between 
NHS bodies and local government; 
 Demonstrable track record of collaboration and engagement with patients and 
local communities; 
 Clear mitigation plan and exit route in the case of failure; 
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 Accountability and governance arrangements with an MoU in place as 
necessary; and 
 Organisation impact assessment, as well as employment model and 
arrangements in place 
 
It was expected that the formal process will take approximately 18 months from the 
expression of interest in a devolution deal, which was mirrored from the progress that 
GM has demonstrated. Subsequently, the framework was implemented to those who 
were invited to submit proposals for their own bespoke devolution deals on early 
September 2015. 
Devo Health illustrated the redistribution or delegation of responsibilities to a semi-
autonomous entity like the combined authority of GM through the GMHSC Partnership. 
This new layer in the health and social system is created to provide some form of regional 
oversight whilst retaining a degree of accountability back to the central government, 
mimicking the regional health authority models that were abolished by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012.  The degree of autonomy is therefore limited to the devolved (or 
rather, delegated) NHS functions, such as administrative responsibilities (such as 
planning and commissioning); financial responsibilities (such as handling the total budget 
and allocating the budget within the system); and political and strategic responsibilities 
(such as objective and outcomes setting). This covers system services such as, acute 
(including specialised services) and primary care (including GP contracts), community 
and mental health services, social care, public health, and health education, research 
and development (The King’s Fund, 2015). This arrangement was agreed upon by NHS 




Because of this set-up, GM still remains part of the NHS and social care system 
subject very much to the NHS constitution and mandate. GMHSC’s member 
organisations (i.e. CCGs and local authorities) will retain their statutory functions and 
existing accountabilities for funding flows (AGMA et al., 2015:4), and the CCGs and 
Foundation Trusts will still be accountable to Whitehall or NHS England, and the Local 
Authorities will still be accountable to the public voters (Figure 19). This also means that 
the NHS statutory organisations are still subject to national monitoring and regulatory 
agencies, such as CQC and NHSI. It is the Partnership’s responsibility to also respond 
to national ‘asks’ or ‘must-dos’ and ensure that they are keeping up with national 
guidance and strategies. 
Figure 19: Accountability lines 
 
Source: (Quilter-Pinner, 2016) 
5.2.3 Financial arrangements 
During the 2015 Spending review, a £7.7 billion health and social care spending over 
the next five years is forecasted for Greater Manchester, with at least £6.2 billion allotted 
on health services like mental health, GP services, specialist services and prescribed 
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drugs, and £1.5 billion on local authority budgets for public health and social care 
services (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015g). Given the existing pressures in the system 
and fragmentation of services, it is unprecedented that GM is facing a challenge of £2.1 
billion financial deficit by 2020/2021. In order to secure that the vision of the Partnership 
and the Health Devolution will materialise, GM needed to make financial arrangements 
in order to not only operate as a single Partnership body, but also to ensure that all the 
right decisions are being made to ensure the financial sustainability of the GMHSC 
system. In order to address this, GM submitted a Strategic Financial Plan in August 2015 
to NHS England as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), outlining how 
the Partnership intends to meet the clinical and financial challenges during the five-year 
CSR period and what resources are required to significantly close the financial gap 
(GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015g:47).   
Whilst Health Devo brought flexibility in terms of making decisions and bringing 
resources closer to the communities, it does not necessarily come with the power to fully 
control the budget. This meant that GM did not really receive any fiscal devolution powers 
(i.e. in the case of the fully devolved nations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), 
but rather, delegated responsibilities on how to make decisions on spending its £6 billion 
annual budget (i.e. commissioning arrangements). Existing funding flows between NHS 
England and CCGs for commissioning health care services still remained, as well as 
commissioning social care services by local authorities.  
To clarify, a Partnership project management director said, “we don't play a role in 
terms of the partnership team in saying where a proportion of that money should go to 
Bolton, a proportion should go to Manchester to Tameside” (G05). The annual GM health 
and social care spending was set through a national allocation formula during the 2015 
Spending Review for a five-year period. Like the rest of the country, the money comes 
from the Parliament through the Department of Health, then to NHS England, and 
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essentially down to the CCGs of Greater Manchester. The only thing that has changed 
is that instead of NHS England North West regional office having the responsibility to 
support strategic direction and to monitor the quality, financial, and operational 
performance of the NHS organisations within its remit, this was delegated to the 
Partnership (G05, G06).  
One of the Partnership senior directors described this arrangement as “actually most 
of that's a seat on the table… made up of effectively existing NHS budgets so that the 
bulk of them are the CCG allocations” (G13), where CCGs hold the budgetary functions 
but the Partnership makes collective decisions on how and where to spend it. However, 
the beauty of devolution is that Greater Manchester is managing the £6 billion pot in its 
entirety. It allows GM the flexibility to set priorities and have local discretion on how to 
meet national targets (C03). Whilst it is the remit of the Partnership to make sure the GM 
system is financially sustainable and to make sure that the partner organisations are 
delivering what is asked of them, the CCGs and providers are still subject to performance 
assessment and assurance processes by the NHS England regulators in order to ensure 
that they are meeting their targets (G06).  
“The £6 billion is a way of capturing all of the money that's spent on the GM 
population on health and social care. And increasingly we have the ability to be 
more directing locally on how that's spent but all within the rules of the NHS 
Constitution so all of the national targets around referral to treatment, around 
A&E and four-hour waits, all of those things that are in the NHS Constitution we 
still have to meet. All of the priorities that are in the national plans, we still have 
to meet, but we have much more discretion over how we go about it.” (G13) 
 
The second and perhaps the more impactful element to the Devo Health funding 
arrangements is the £450 million Transformation Fund (TF) injected to the GM health 
and social care system from NHS England (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016a) from 
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2016/2017 to 2020/2021. A one-off access to the TF was part of the resources required 
to reduce the £2 billion financial gap and also to boost transformative changes on the 
delivery of health and social care services within the city-region, as outlined in the high 
level Strategic Financial Plan. The amount was set by NHS England based on the 
evidence submitted by GM on what was deemed to be the minimum amount required to 
deliver clinical and financial sustainability over the five-year period.  
Figure 20: Funding arrangements 
 
As part of the Devolution deal that GM received, the three-year non-recurrent £450 
million TF was ring-fenced and was considered to be the only pot of cash fully devolved 
to GM (G02). This was not only allocated for funding the implementation of 
transformational programmes, but also to double-run services and operational costs (i.e. 
salaries for Partnership posts). There was a positive response to this because it allowed 
the partners to have an exclusive access to a lump sum of money upfront in order to 
deliver better health outcomes in a financially sustainable way and to close the financial 
gap. This brought an impact to NHS organisations, particularly to their planning and 
procurement process. Bidding to the national pot can be quite tricky because things could 
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change during that period, making it more difficult to put in a plan that could cover a long-
term period. Because of this, CCGs can only plan for a limited period of time (i.e. one 
year) instead of a three to four-year duration in order to avoid having to re-bid in case 
anything changes (C04). Figure 20 summarises the initial funding arrangements that 
were devolved from NHS England to Greater Manchester.  
5.3 Community attributes 
The attributes of a community refer to the degree of common understanding between 
the potential participants who share values, beliefs, and preferences about policy 
strategies and outcomes (Polski and Ostrom, 1999). In the health commons, this 
involves the inherent attributes of the participants that influence the level of participation 
and their willingness to collectively govern the commons. In the case of Greater 
Manchester, the decades of collaborative relationships and the desire to address 
problems collectively contributed to the galvanisation of the GMHSC Partnership. 
5.3.1 Greater Manchester’s track record of working together 
Greater Manchester has had a long history of collaboration long before the devolution 
deals were introduced, as illustrated in the previous chapter. They’ve always had a 
strong reputation and a track record of working together, which is why it came to no one’s 
surprise that GM was a viable candidate for the devolution deals. There was a sense of 
pride that GM, more than anywhere else, have succeeded in working together despite 
the absence of any statutory mandates from the central government. This voice, in 
particular, was more present with local authorities where key leaders were proactive in 
recognising the needs of the GM economy by taking upon themselves to pursue and 
maintain voluntary relationships. A coalition between the 10 localities in the city-region 
have been forged through the AGMA after the abolition of the Greater Manchester City 
Councils (GMCC) in 1986. The two decade-long of coordination and organic efforts were 
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rewarded when an opportunity to establish a more formal city-regional governance 
emerged in 2011 through the GMCA, the first of its kind in the UK.  
These, in addition with trust-building and joint working resulting from the structures 
of relationships, became GM’s recipe to success – all they had to do was wait for the 
right moment. When the Northern Powerhouse agenda came up, GM grabbed the 
opportunity to lobby with key political leaders (i.e. George Osborne, etc.) to push the 
devolution agenda forward and to convince them why GM was in a strong position to 
receive the deal (G13, L05). A local authority senior leader who played a key role during 
the negotiation process expressed, “the government could feel we had ourselves 
arrangements that make things happen, you know so they had confidence that if they 
were to give us some devolution, we were probably less likely to make a mess of it than 
other parts of the country.” (L05) In effect, the existing structures (i.e. AGMA, GMCA, 
etc.) became key drivers to landing the Devolution deal because GM was successfully 
able to display that they have a strong governance presence to make decisions more 
effectively as a collective group. It has placed GM in a unique pedestal to putting forward 
a more convincing and attractive bid for Devolution. 
5.3.2 Tensions in the local health and social care system 
The GM’s local NHS organisations, however, have followed a different path. The 
reforms were described as a “… pendulum swing from centralisation then back to a very 
local emphasis in services” (C01) by a senior CCG lead, resulting in an extra layer of 
structures added to the existing local governance arrangements and more fragmentation 
in the already complex health system (C01, C02, C03, F02). The constant 
reconfiguration of the system has bred a different culture amongst NHS organisations; 
some have found themselves competing with one another in order to survive (P03, P05, 
F03) whilst others used the chaotic, fragmented system as an opportunity for joint 
working and informally meet as a collective unit (L03, C02).  
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Evidence from the interviews suggest that the HSCA 2012 reforms in particular, have 
affected the relationships between primary care providers (i.e. GPs, optometrists, 
dentists, etc.), CCGs, and provider Trusts. The CCGs for example, were intended to be 
clinically led, where GPs and other clinicians have the opportunity to influence 
commissioning decisions for their local population. However, a senior CCG lead felt the 
intentions to make GPs more involved in commissioning of services from arrangements 
that have been in place for PCTs have backfired (C01). In theory, the commissioner is 
supposed to say and know what the needs of the population area, then come up with 
solutions to address those needs then commission them from a provider organisation. 
In reality though, the commissioners that have moved into clinical commissioning are 
GPs who do not have any knowledge expertise in, for example, radiotherapy, 
chemotherapy or surgery. “They have expertise in general practice. And so, a criticism 
of commissioning has been that it's weak and ineffective. And that it doesn't have the 
expertise to deal with the things that it's trying to tackle.” (C01)   
These particular weaknesses have affected how services are being commissioned 
locally, resulting in poorer health outcomes in the area and variations across the GM 
system. The Lansley reforms also resulted in a huge gap between primary care providers 
and CCGs, where there was a separately distinct voice between the two. CCGs only 
commission GP services but no other primary care services (i.e. optometry, pharmacy, 
and dental services are commissioned by NHS England), hence, the services are not 
consistent across the system. Because the way CCGs were set-up to work separately 
and independently, it was likely that they produce different solutions and end up with one 
part of the system blaming and criticising one another rather than working together to 
deliver better collective outcomes for the people of GM (C01).  
In addition, some believed that conflict of individual, professional and organisational 
interests come to play. Clinicians are tasked to give their advice and expertise regarding 
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their local areas under the remit of their commissioning duties, but then they also have 
their day jobs which might affect their perspective in bringing in services (P03, C01). 
Because clinicians are representing their own organisations, there is a possibility for their 
decisions to be influenced by their attachments from their own discipline or the area they 
represent.  
“Everybody starts behaving differently, because you are commissioning 
yourself. You are signing off on making decisions about your own personal 
income...They're bringing their organisation but also bringing their role in that 
organisation and what that means to them. Are you sitting there as a CCG 
employee? Are you sitting there as a GP? Are you sitting there as a small 
business owner? What exactly are you?” (P04)   
 
Because of the “lack of what feels like parity of esteem in provider land between what 
the NHS call providers, which is secondary care, and what we think as providers in our 
world” (G15), the GPs felt like they needed a single voice for their roles to be 
represented. Some believe that the concept of what a provider is misunderstood in the 
first place because of the way NHS England uses the terminology (G15). It 
misrepresented GPs or the primary care and community providers and referred to 
hospital providers instead. Therefore, GPs believed that up until Devolution was 
introduced, the discussions have always been favoured to and dominated by 
commissioners (P03, P04). Whilst the intention to embed GPs in the commissioning 
culture, it has not really been effective in getting funds out into the communities. “GPs 
who've become commissioners are either outweighed by more powerful voices or 
ignored, or they'd become a commissioner and changes their point of view of the GP.” 
(G15) a Partnership senior director described. GPs see themselves as less inferior and 
in direct competition with Trusts in terms of providing services because there is a 
tendency for CCGs to prioritise the hospital trusts because they are “big powerful entities 
with very powerful chief executives and so they can have a strong influence on the 
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commission” (G15). This view highlights the provider-purchaser split that was caused by 
the creation of the NHS internal market in the 1980s and was heightened furthermore by 
the Lansley reforms. 
“Patients should feel like they've been referred into one NHS, but in practice we 
haven't got one NHS. We've got lots of individual organisations that when you've 
added them together, it's the NHS, but they don't necessarily work in that way.” 
(C01) 
 
The existing structures created on 2012, such as Health and Wellbeing boards 
(HWB), also brought difficulties in terms of coordinating decisions and being on the same 
page with CCGs, Trusts, Primary care providers, and the voluntary sector. Local 
authorities particularly voiced out the presence of power struggle when it comes to 
making joint decisions regarding community health services in the Health and Wellbeing 
boards. Fuelled by the budget cuts that LAs had to endure during periods of austerity, 
LAs are also pressured to deliver community-level services and develop joint working 
with GPs, CCGs and Trusts at the same time. Although the structure was created to 
bring together key local health and care leaders in a table and make joint decisions, LAs 
believe that “it's hard trying to be equal partners with the CCGs” (L02) especially when 
a vast majority of the money lies in their (CCGs) hands. GPs and LAs believe that since 
CCGs hold the money, “all of a sudden, the CCGs make all the decisions which actually 
wasn't what it was supposed to be” (P04).  Because of the CCGs’ statutory obligation to 
hold the money or referred to as a “piggy bank” by a participant (G06), there was a tug 
of war in terms of who has more power to make the decisions and which decisions to 
prioritise.  
An LA Senior leader,  for instance, illustrated a scenario  where “a vast majority of 
the money was in the hands of the CCG who if they didn't want this… you could get 
halfway through, they could plan and not got enough money, and they could say well it's 
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a great plan, but we can't do all that preventative stuff because we've got to do in the 
hospital.” (L02) Thus, the differences in interests and priorities make it more difficult to 
compromise a decision, especially because of the way the existing structures have been 
set-up. Local authorities felt like there were little efforts to integrate an already 
fragmented health and social care system especially on the side of the CCGs. 
“Make everybody on health and wellbeing board equal partners. We're not telling 
clinicians how to be clinicians. But if we agree a plan and we're going to spend 
that, what we should have the power as a board to… sign it off; but a lot of 
people think we've got the power to stop things or to change things.” (L02) 
 
This is not the case, however, in some areas where the political tension is not as 
strained as other localities. For instance, an LA councillor described its Health and 
Wellbeing board as an alliance rather than a place where separate organisations meet 
(L01). The CCGs and the LAs forged a relationship through an integrated commissioning 
board, where the HWB plays a strategic arm overlooking the decisions being made for 
their local population. Others think they are trying hard to overcome the barriers and to 
do everything by trust and goodwill (L02), although the way the system is set-up does 
not really allow them to do coordinate their voices and reduce the level of uncertainty on 
their decisions. The concept is that everybody generally comes to an agreement. In 
reality though, HWB is there as a last stop for political sign-off and there is no room for 
discussions as soon as it reaches the table (i.e. all arguments must have already been 
done beforehand); otherwise, there’s no point (C04).   
“Everybody's got to agree to it beforehand because otherwise there's no point. 
You don't want an argument at health and well-being board. It's too late by then. 
And one thing I should say throughout all of this is these arrangements are very 
difficult to make. It’s cumbersome legally, they're cumbersome practically. So, 
the only right way that it's been made to work is by political leadership on both 
sides. And when I say political, it's small p as well as the big P. So that means 
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the councillors wanted this to work. The leadership within the council, the chief 
executive and so on wanted it to make it work. They think that it's the right way 
to go.” (C04) 
 
The Provider trusts also offered a similar perspective. The way Foundation Trusts 
were set-up was never really geared towards collaboration because they were meant to 
compete with one another in order to be sustainable and “stay in the business” (F03). As 
opposed with primary care providers, the hospitals have an organisation-based cultural 
profile, where they are driven by a board to make the right decisions on their financial 
sustainability. It goes without saying that a hospital trust's activity and business are 
driven by GPs because that's where the referrals are, but the link between the GPs and 
Trusts is noticeably cracked as described earlier (G15, F02).  
Moreover, there is a level of difficulty in terms of coming together as a collective GM 
unit and make joint decisions for the greater good per se, because chances are if 
decisions will negatively impact one's Trust or changes of service will have a 
disadvantage on another, then they are more likely to make a choice that will benefit 
their own organisation thus making it less likely for a collective unit to reach a joint 
unbiased decision. Whilst there is an intention for Trusts to overcome their vested 
interests, at the end of the day, they are internally accountable to their organisations and 
their board of directors. "{We} are sovereign organisations. We have a board of directors 
and I am accountable to my board of directors for delivery. And it's very hard to blur those 
boundaries in organisations. So how do you actually work together but be accountable 
to your own board of directors?" (F02) In addition, NHS Trusts are also accountable to 
NHSI as their regulator. NHS trusts and foundation trusts need to adhere to NHS 
standards, driven mostly by centrally mandated policies, and this added pressure 
contribute to the way they behave and interact with other stakeholders in the GM health 
and social care system. 
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“The way Provider trusts were set-up in the system isn't, never really geared 
towards collaboration. They're established as autonomous organisations. They 
have a responsibility to their governors and membership and local population. 
So, if anything, like the system as a whole, providers are constituted there to 
compete. They're set-up to compete more than to collaborate, and I think that's 
the tension you still have in the system.” (F03) 
5.3.3 Joint collective interest to solve problems 
Perhaps what makes GM an interesting candidate to become stewards of its health 
commons is its sheer determination to jointly solve problems as a single, collective unit. 
There is evidence from the interviews suggesting that joint working has always been 
intrinsic in the GM NHS organisational culture despite the breeding competitive culture 
of the NHS imposed upon the organisations. The local NHS groups have the inherent 
desire and appetite to create opportunities and make things happen, ahead of their 
organisational differences, competing interests, and political tensions. 
For instance, representatives from 10 PCTs historically met as an Association of GM 
PCTs to carry out joint commissioning functions across the city-region since  2005 
(Walshe et al., 2018). Following the introduction of the 2012 Lansley reforms, the 12 
CCGs of GM came together to form the Association of GM CCGs as a continuation of 
the work previously done by the collective GM PCTs (National Health Executive, 2013; 
NHS in GM, 2013). Because of the previously established relationship between the 
PCTs, the emergent directors and chief officers of the CCGs were already familiar with 
each other through organic partnership working. The new Association of GM CCGs 
transitioned to carry out commissioning functions supported by a robust GM-wide 
governance arrangement called the Association of Governing Groups (AGG)6.  
                                                          
6 AGG was abolished after Devolution to transition to integrated commissioning through the 
Joint Commissioning Board 
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Since then, GM has always had a single voice when dealing with commissioning 
arrangements across the region. The CCGs of GM recognised the variation in system 
where there are services being duplicated 10 or 12 times in each local population (C01), 
hence, it only made sense for them to have a single conversation and coordinate with 
each other to tackle collective problems. Whilst the AGG was meeting on an informal 
basis (i.e. Association of GM CCGs is not a formal organisation but more of a partnership 
agreement), it helped in building coordination amongst the CCGs where they all 
collectively agree and recognise that something needs to be done centrally in GM. 
“I guess from the perspective of the 10 CCG chief executives coming together 
and saying there's lots of common challenges facing us in GM. We need to come 
together as a collective. It was more a case of them being an informal session.” 
(G05) 
 
The GM provider Trusts also have a similar arrangement where the chairs, chief 
executives, the directors of operations, the chief finance officers, etc. meet collectively 
through informal meetings, which have emerged post 2012 Lansley reforms. However, 
it was more of "a gentleman's agreement " (F02), where there was some degree of 
accountability but there were no formal arrangements on working together. The 
discussions with CCGs were also not strong enough for them to arrive at a collective 
decision or solving problems, to a point where if an organisation has challenged a 
decision, the CCGs succumb to defeat (F02). Despite the barriers, they do however 
recognise the need for joint decisions through a more formal and enforcing forum. 
GM primary care providers (GPs in particular), on the other hand, are members of a 
body called Association of GM Local Medical Committees (LMC), which is a loose 
association supporting general practice. As opposed with GP-led CCGs, the 
representative group LMC aims to coordinate GPs across GM and to provide a single 
professional voice across the city-region. They coordinate with a variety of other 
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organisations, such as the community and voluntary sector and the GP Federation, to 
deliver services that meet the needs of the GM population (Association of GM LMCs, 
2019).  
Primary care is a big group, which include general practice, pharmacy, dental, and 
optometry, and it is such a complex and difficult group to collectively govern especially 
when GM LMCs operate under informal agreements and terms of reference. They have 
a collective objective of breaking the hospital-primary care divide and foster a 
collaborative relationship with neighbourhoods and communities in order to raise 
awareness about primary care services. Whilst GPs could be competitive to receive 
contracts for certain services that might be given to hospitals instead, GPs are more 
collaborative by nature because they are small businesses trying to help one other (G15). 
This was illustrated by the GP Federation, which is a network-based commercial arm of 
GPs working at scale (British Medical Association, 2018a). In GM,  
“I'm not sure there were enormous barriers at the time we were securing the 
deal. I think there was appetite and support. I think it's a different thing on the 
back of the deal that then gets in to so now that we've got devolution. How do 
we work it in. What's the nature role of the partnership team in relation to the 
partnership. So I think one of the trickier areas is confusing some of those, so 
people see the partnership as the team here and not the organisations. So I 
think there's a bit of I don't know what to call it really, it's kind of system OD if 
you like or some of the sort of psychological development of partners in the 
system to see themselves as leaders of the partnership and not people who 
work with a partnership of Greater Manchester and leaders in an individual local 
place. Now that actually that's quite if we think of a maturity model for 
collaboration, that's really at the high end of that. So it's a kind of civil society 
model you know where people establish a community through the vehicle a 
partnership and understand what their stake and their contribution and their 




If we look back at the assessment criteria framework that NHS England has designed 
to measure the robustness of the devolution proposal, it is without a question that GM 
ticks all the boxes. However, it also illustrates the contrast between the evolution of GM’s 
political landscape and its NHS structures. On one hand, you have GM with a strong 
track record of collaboration, and on the other hand, you have the existing NHS 
structures and its culture of competition restraining the potential of organisations to fully 
partake in a collaboration. In the following chapter, we shall look at how the formation of 
the GMHSC Partnership addressed these barriers through various institutional 
mechanisms. 
5.4 Initial set of rules 
In the IAD framework, rules shape behaviour and influence how individuals make 
decisions. They can be enforced prescriptions about which actions are allowed to do, or 
sometimes, they can be a shared understanding resulting from the habitual behaviours 
of participants (Ostrom, 2011).  In this section, we look at the rules-in-form or the formal 
institutions (i.e. contracts, legal documents, statutes, etc.) that were established to 
prepare for the operation of the Health Devolution. Rules-in-form are formalised or 
written down rules, and mainly presents a general legal framework on how decisions and 
actions should be taken by individuals in particular settings (Ostrom, 2011).  
Perhaps it is important to clarify that the information that will be presented is based 
on the contents of the documents at the time of the formation of the Partnership, as we 
are only focusing on the initial institutional arrangements that were made prior to the 
formal operation of Devo Health on April 2016. We acknowledge that the governance 
and other institutional arrangements initially set out in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) or during the preliminary agreements in 2015 have already 
evolved, and these will be analysed in the next chapter as mechanisms to adopting to 
the collaboration process. 
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5.4.1 Memorandum of Understanding 
When the MoU for Devo Health in GM was signed on February 2015, it was clear 
that the city-region will take control of the £6 billion per annum budget for health and 
social care. This MoU represented the formal agreement that outlines the framework for 
achieving the devolution of health and social care responsibilities to the participating 
organisations in GM. MoUs are oftentimes used in the NHS to record joint working 
agreements that are not legally binding (NHS Improvement, 2018). Whilst it is not a legal 
document, MoUs institutionalise the common intent and agreement between the parties 
in question and identify the roles and responsibilities of those involved. The Devo Health 
MoU was signed for by local authority representatives of the AGMA, NHS England, and 
the GM CCGs. Under this initial agreement, providers (general practitioners or GPs) 
were not formally included, although letters of support were present from the GM NHS 
Trusts, FTs, and North West Ambulance Service. 
The Devo Health MoU (AGMA et al., 2015) set out key important things about the 
ambition for full devolution of funding and decision-making for health and social care 
within GM from shadow form on April 2015 leading to its full operation on April 2016 (i.e. 
the build-up year). First, it set out the commitments made in the initial Devo Manc 
agreement to develop a business plan (GM Strategic Sustainability Plan) for the 
integration of health and social care services in GM. This plan, later known as ‘Taking 
Charge’, underpinned the strategic framework on how to achieve the collective ambition 
of the city-region to improve the health outcomes of their population within the next 5 
years (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015g). Second, the MoU illustrated a roadmap 
identifying key milestones on how and when the participating organisations were to 
achieve their aims during the build-up year. This included the rationale and objectives of 
the devolution, what it aimed to deliver and how it will be achieved, and the principles on 
how they will implement any changes within the said time frame. Lastly, the document 
identified the overarching governance structures and the funding responsibilities that will 
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be devolved to GM. Perhaps this is the most important element that clarifies the nature 
of the devolution arrangements and how it affects the autonomy and accountability 
principles of the participating organisations. 
The MoU recognised the importance of addressing the health and wellbeing of all 
residents of GM, whilst achieving not only clinical but also financial sustainability. It also 
acknowledged the needs to deliver an improved provision of services through a 
collaborative partnership across the integrated system. This included world class 
research institutions, such as universities and science knowledge industries, and NHS 
England as contributors to developing health innovation. 
A few months later, several other stakeholders supplemental MoUs to cement further 
partnership workings. Officers were assigned to lead on the development of MoUs as 
the governance group was being developed. These included groups who did not initially 
sign the MoU but needed to be engaged with, such as primary care providers (GPs, etc.), 
patient groups, and the voluntary/third sector. For instance, Public Health England et al. 
(2015) signed an MoU to solidify the shared commitment to the improvements of the 
health of the GM population. It particularly focused on prevention, early detection, and 
early intervention, through a unified public health leadership system. Another MoU was 
signed to tackle how research and innovation can contribute to generating solutions to 
improve the health economy of GM (Health Innovation Manchester, 2015), and another 
to endorse partnership working between Sport England and GM to develop behavioural 
change approach to sport and physical activity (Pleasant, 2016). These agreements 
were all in conjunction with the initial commitments outlined on the Health and Social 
Care MoU signed in February 2015.  
5.4.2 The Health and Social Care Devolution Programme  
The shadow period of April 2015 to April 2016 was escorted by a transition 
management team comprising of representatives from the main stakeholder groups (e.g. 
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GMCA, NHS England, CCGs, NHS Trust Providers, etc.), who were either on 
secondment, attachment, or working in addition to their existing roles (GMCA and NHS 
in GM, 2015e). Over the next 12 months, they worked closely with NHS England under 
the umbrella of the GM Devolution Programme Board (also sometimes referenced to as 
the project management office [PMO]) and were responsible for overseeing the transition 
to the full operation and final form of GMHSC devolution on April 2016.  
The Programme Board was an additional governance put in place to support key 
workstreams. This was a task and finish group led by key representatives from GMCA, 
CCGs, Trusts, NHS England, and Department of Health. They were responsible for 
providing direction and oversight on the development of the key workstreams 
underpinning the high-priority deliverables outlined in the MoU (GMCA and NHS in GM, 
2015d, 2015c). These 5 areas were: strategic planning; establishing governance 
arrangements; devolving responsibilities and resources; partnerships, engagement, and 
communications; and implementation priorities. Each programme area was led by a 
member of the transition group and had different tasks on hand. 
5.4.3 The GMHSC strategic plan and sustainability framework 
The focus of the programme during the early stages was to produce a GM health 
and social care strategic plan by mid-December. A lot of the work behind it involved the 
development of locality plans with the 10 local authorities and the transformation 
initiatives, collaborative working across and within the provider sector, and work already 
taking place or emerging across GM. The draft was taken through the governance 
structures of the 37 organisations for stakeholder engagement.  
In December 2015, the GMHSC strategic plan was signed off and was published 
under the branding, ‘Taking Charge of our Health and Social Care in Greater 
Manchester’ (or simply Taking Charge) with a collective vision of achieving the “fastest 
and greatest improvement in the health and wellbeing of the 2.8 million people living 
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across GM” (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015g:8). The document outlined in detail how the 
city-region is going to deliver this vision and key outcomes through a set of strategic 
objectives: 
 Transforming the HSC system to help more people stay well and take better care 
of those who are ill; 
 Aligning our HSC system to education, skills, work and housing; 
 Creating a financially balanced and sustainable system; 
 Making sure services are clinically safe throughout 
 
Taking Charge also recognised the key importance of transforming population 
health, with the need to address the existing poor health outcomes variation in GM and 
to glue together the fragmented pieces of the system. This meant that the plan focused 
on a place-based approach by pulling services together and integrating them around 
communities rather than on the different organisations that deliver the services. 
Moreover, Taking Charge also emphasised the importance of overcoming the financial 
sustainability challenge of closing down the £2.1 billion deficit on 2020/2021 by 
integrating commissioning services at a GM or cluster level7.  
5.4.3.1 Locality plans 
To achieve this, each of the 10 localities – Bolton, Bury, Rochdale (including 
Heywood and Middleton), Manchester, Oldham, Salford, Stockport, Tameside (including 
Glossop), Trafford, and Wigan – have mapped their own 5-year locality plan, which 
outlines which is focused in place-based approaches to innovatively pull services 
together and integrate them in their respective communities. The outcomes and key 
                                                          
7 Neighbourhood (more than 500,000); locality; cluster (more than one locality); or GM-level 
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deliverables of these locality plans shaped by the overall GM Strategic Plan and were 
signed off by their Health and Wellbeing Board (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016h). The 
locality plans included steps on the comprehensive integration of HSC that form a 
platform for both integrated commissioning and provision. This meant that CCG and LA 
commissioning functions were to align single service models, with a single 
commissioning plan, pooled budgets, and integrated governance, decision-making and 
commissioning skills.  
5.4.3.2 Local Care Organisations 
The integration of health and social care services is one of the priorities of the NHS 
and is a fundamental piece to the growth and reform strategy of GM. The Partnership 
responded to this through the establishment of Local Care Organisations (LCOs), which 
is an umbrella term used in a GM-level referring to single service integrated models that 
bring together community health and social care services for each locality, including 
community, social care, acute, mental health services, third sector providers, and other 
local providers such as schools (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015g). This involved 
integration of services, jointly exercising health functions, and pooled funds between 
CCGs and LAs to allow more control and freedom within the partnership agreements. 
These arrangements were already occurring nationally prior to devolution8, and the 
LCOs were variations of the national-led new care models on integrated care (see 
Accountable Care Organisations and Integrated Care Partnerships (Ham, 2018)). 
5.4.3.3 Transformation themes 
One of the key strategic policies of the Partnership was to promote transformational 
changes that cover all aspects of care and support in GM (GMCA and NHS in GM, 
                                                          
8 see Integration Transformation Fund or Better Care Fund, (NHS England and Local 
Government Association, 2015) 
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2015g). These themes were: population health; community-based care and support; 
acute and specialist care; back clinical support and office services; and enabling better 
care. To drive the transformation changes required, a one-off £45 million Transformation 
Fund (TF) was injected from NHS England to the GMHSC system (GMCA and NHS in 
GM, 2016a). This is to incentivise and encourage localities to put forward a strong locality 
plan that aligns with Taking Charge. Aside from the transformational themes, the GM 
Strategic Plan also identified 5 crosscutting programmes focused on mental health, 
dementia, learning disability, cancer and children’s services.  
5.4.4 Initial governance arrangements 
With the purpose of enabling the system and creating new models of inclusive 
decision-making (AGMA et al., 2015:4), governance arrangements were put in place to 
facilitate the GM Strategic Plan. This leadership governance was necessary to drive and 
oversee the changes, to engage the system with the individual programmes, and to act 
as a single Partnership team dedicated in supporting organisations locally and across 
GM.  
During a standing conference on September 2015, it was agreed that the governance 
principles will be produced through an iterative process. A governance group drafted a 
governance and accountability framework that was essential to support a devolved 
health and social care economy in GM. Keeping in mind the lines of accountability and 
statutory functions of the member organisations, the governance pathway was outlined 
(Figure 21) in several iterations to emphasise the arrangements needed to ensure 
inclusivity amongst localities, CCGs, providers, trusts, and national bodies. The team 
focused on four distinct packages: the establishment of a Partnership board and 
executive board, the Joint Commissioning Board (JCB), legal and accountability 
framework, and development of further MoUs. Governance structures were also being 
developed to incorporate the existing collective collaborating organisations in the 
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decision-making streams as advisory groups (i.e. Association of GM CCGs, Association 
of GM LMCs etc.).  
Figure 21: Governance April 2016 to December 2017 
 
Source: (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016f) 
During the transition period, the Governance group designed a set of proposals 
outlining a decision-making framework and scheme of delegation for the SPB and the 
SPB executive board. A series of focus group sessions were conducted over a three-
week period with all relevant stakeholder groupings to stimulate discussions and 
encompass inclusivity. It included 11 people through telephone discussion, 4 people 
through email feedback, the wider leadership GMHSC team, and the AGM CCGs (GMCA 
and NHS in GM, 2015b). The governance structure proposals (Figure 21) were finalised 
through a ‘straw man’ document and were engaged with people from LAs, CCGs, 
Provider trusts, and NHS England, then taken back to GMHSC using an agreed approval 
process. By the end of October 2015, the shadow governance arrangements were live. 
It comprised of what was then called the Strategic Partnership Board (SPB) and the 
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Strategic Partnership Board Executive (SPBE)9 and was transitioned to its full operation 
on April 2016. This was later on revised on January 2018, as initially agreed that the 
governance structure will be adjusted as necessary to reflect the different stages of 
implementation. 
5.4.5 The GMHSC Strategic Partnership Board  
The Strategic Partnership Board (SPB) was responsible for setting and monitoring 
the overall strategic vision and direction for GM health and social care economy. To 
ensure holistic approach and inclusivity on its membership, representatives from the GM 
health and social care system were incorporated, including but not limited to the GMCA, 
10 AGMA authorities, 12 CCGs, 15 provider trusts, GM LMC, GM Centre for Voluntary 
Organisations (CVOs), and NHS England. Representatives from the NHSI, CQC, Public 
Health England (PHE), Health Education England (HEE), GM Fire and Rescue Service, 
and GM Police and Crime Commissioner were also invited to attend as non-voting 
members of the Board.  
The SPB convened monthly from October to December 2015. It is not a legal body 
and its decisions are not binding; however, it provides recommendations for its members 
to formally adopt them following their own organisational governance procedures, which 
may include delegation to a group of its members where possible (GMCA and NHS in 
GM, 2015a, 2015b). The key responsibilities of SPB were:  
 To set the framework within which the Strategic Partnership Executive will 
operate 
                                                          
9 The governance framework was modified on January 2018, which will be outlined in the next 
chapter. This initial governance arrangements were essential to highlight the steps taken by the 
Partnership to crafting institutional rules 
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 To agree the strategic priorities in accordance with the NHS Five Year Forward 
View to be delivered across the localities 
 To approve content of GM Strategic Plan and 10 locality plans 
 To agree the criteria and determining the access to the Transformation Funding 
and ask allocators (NHS England and GMCA) and recipients (LAs and CCGs) to 
adopt them 
 To ensure ongoing organisational commitment across the GM health economy 
to both the devolution agenda and a devolved health system 
 To be responsible to the people of GM and to each other for the financial and 
clinical sustainability of GM health economy, through the agreement and delivery 
of the GM Strategic Plan 
 To provide mutual assurance function over the outcomes linked to the 
commissioning decisions taken by members to deliver the GM Strategic Plan 
 To agree on an assurance framework developed jointly with regulators where 
required, to ensure that there is formal assurance from each individual party in 
delivering on their commitments to the GM Strategic Plan 
 To provide leadership across the GM devolved health system and be 
accountable to ensuring that key priorities from the GM strategic plan are 
achieved 
 To receive regular update reports from the Executive board on the ongoing 
process and delivery of the GM strategic plan, and regular reports of GM’s 
performance against agreed assurance metrics 
 
5.4.6 The GMHSC Strategic Partnership Board Executive 
The Strategic Partnership Board Executive (SPBE) was essentially in charge of the 
operational and transactional issues relating to delivering the GM vision outlined in the 
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MoU and GM Strategic Plan  (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015a, 2015b). During the 
transition period, the SPBE is expected to deliver on: 
 Completion of the GM Strategic Plan, ready to operationalise by March 2016 
 Development of an Implementation plan from April 2016 
 Overseeing financial and governance performance across GM 
 Enabling the implementation and locality plans, and ensuring they support the 
direction of the GMHSC 
 Assuring the operational delivery of health and social care, in line with the 
devolved functions from NHS England (e.g. CCG assurance) 
 Leading GM commissioning where agreed and endorsed by Partnership Board 
and Joint Commissioning Board 
 Sponsoring, driving, and facilitating GM Transformational projects 
 Understanding overall performance and delivery of services across the whole 
system 
 Establishing effective working arrangements with regulators 
 Leading on the development and delivery of public and political engagement 
 
The SPBE comprised of a Chief Officer and 5 Executive Lead roles at Director Level. 
The Chief Officer is responsible for 6 key areas, namely strategic development and 
leadership; direct management of all functions, programmes of work and teams 
operating at a pan-GM level; support and develop concept of subsidiarity within the GM 
HSC system whilst developing collaborative working across organisational boundaries; 
assurance of CCGs in line with the requirements of the SPB and NHS England, and in 
relation to any jointly held funds with LAs; direct commissioning of functions including 
specialised services and non-medical primary care services for GM; and collaborating 
with the regulators and national bodies to influence and shape their interactions with any 
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part of the GMHSC. The Chief Officer is directly accountable to NHS England, ensuring 
that the key stakeholders deliver the NHS Constitution. 
The 5 executive lead roles are as follow: 
 Chief Operating Officer. Deputy to the Chef Officer and operate on a day-to-day 
basis to anticipate and manage specific workstreams and emerging agenda on 
behalf of the Chief Officer. This role also oversees the day-to-day performance 
management agenda across the GM system. 
 Executive Lead for Strategy and System Development. Responsible for the 
implementation of the GM Strategic Plan and delivery of locality plans, whilst also 
securing standardisation in delivery and access of health and social care. This 
role is the lead contact for CCGs, Provider trusts, local councils, and regulators 
in relation to the strategy working across GM. 
 Executive Lead for Commissioning and Population Health. Responsible for taking 
a long-term perspective in terms of the overall health and well-being of the GM 
population, including the transformation models of care, GM growth reform, and 
other wider determinants of health and care. It facilitates cross-sector working 
and identifies new ways to engage relationships between the stakeholders and 
the GM population. 
 Executive Lead for Finance and Investment. Responsible for ensuring financial 
sustainability and day-to-day operational finance responsibilities. This role looks 
after the Transformation Fund and develops investment decision-making process 
required to ensure that the fund is allocated for best effect and impact. 
 Executive Lead for Quality. Responsible for NHS England functions (i.e. quality 
surveillance and re-validation of doctors and nurses) and for assuring the quality 
of care delivery within GM. This role is occupied by a clinician, which links a wider 




Apart from the Chief Officer and Executive Leads, SPBE also comprised of 4 
representatives each from CCGs, LAs, and Providers and 1 representative from NHS 
England, fulfilled through the position of the Chief Officer of the GMHSC Partnership. In 
addition to the SPB and SPBE, a supporting and enabling structure is needed to secure 
administrative services like operational IT support, general administrative support, 
operational HR support, and legal support (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016f).  
5.5 Summary 
This chapter examined the external variables or existing pre-conditions that led to 
the Devo Health in GM, where we particularly focused in identifying the factors that were 
critical during the initial stages (negotiation and formalisation) of the Partnership. Using 
the three exogenous variables identified by the IAD framework, we were able to identify 
the factors that shaped the impetus and the starting conditions that are necessary to 
establish the GMHSC Partnership. 
First, we examined the physical attributes. In this context, we refer to the physical 
resources that were pooled together by the collaborating participants. Our evidence 
suggests that first, Health Devo in GM emerged with no statutory basis. Instead, NHS 
England and a group of key influential leaders negotiated a devolution deal that outlines 
range of devolved NHS functions to be delegated to the GMHSC Partnership via the 
Chief Executive. This was formalised through an agreement called Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU). This MoU highlighted the financial and accountability 
arrangements that could potentially foster or hinder the interactions of the participants in 
the action situation. 
Second, we looked at the community attributes that reflect the shared norms between 
the participants. Our evidence illustrated that the Partnership has had decades of 
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flourishing collaborative relationships, demonstrating that having a strong history of 
collaboration can lead to collective action. However, there were also cracks and tensions 
in the existing HSC system, which reflected the impact of the previous NHS reforms. The 
relationships amongst the organisations were characterised by strained relationships, 
competitive nature, and partisan behaviour towards their own organisations. This could 
also potentially foster or hinder the interactions of the participants in the action situation. 
Finally, we examined the initial working rules that the Partnership established in order to 
facilitate and organise the relationships of its participating members. Initial governance 




6 Action Situation 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examined the three factors that shaped the impetus to 
collaborate of the Partnership and how constitutional rules-in-use influenced the 
emergence of the GMHSC Partnership. In this section, we focus on the action situation, 
particularly on the collective-choice arena (i.e. the Partnership) influenced by the 
constitutional rules on determining who is eligible to participate (i.e. the initial institutional 
arrangements used to establish the Partnership) and the rules to be used in crafting the 
set of collective-choice rules.  
The action situation is the centrepiece of the IAD framework where it highlights how 
institutions and structural attributes of the contexts affect the behaviour of the actors 
participating in it. In this chapter, we attempt to situate the “black box” of the collaborative 
process by bringing together the exogenous variables identified in the previous section 
and how the actors use these to delimit their behaviour in making decisions and 
strategies, creating patterns of interaction, navigating through the system, and 
generating outcomes.  
Ultimately, this research wants to understand how the actors behave in the action 
situation, influenced by physical properties, community attributes, and rules-in-use 
identified earlier. Actors hold different positions and pursue various tasks and enter the 
action arena with diverse preferences regarding their perceived costs and benefits 
associated with their actions, and which mechanisms, information, skills, and resources 
they will use to relate with one another. The actions they take then result into different 
modes of interaction which in turn produce outcomes. For instance, a potential outcome 
of a collaborative governance is to agree via consensus with the rest of the team and 
come up with a collective decision. The participants have the option to use a default 
 
186 
action of engaging in a dialogue and cooperate, whilst the alternative is to challenge the 
decision and refuse to coordinate actions.  
We assume that the action situation occurs after the period of the establishment of 
the Partnership to its implementation stages, where we observe how individual 
behaviours and rule configurations changed over time. In this chapter, we explore the 
seven elements which make up the internal structure of the action situation: (1) 
participants; (2) positions; (3) potential outcomes; (4) set of allowable actions; (5) control 
in function; (6) information available to participants; and (7) perceived costs and benefits. 
Each of these elements corresponds with a set of rules, which emerges as an outcome 
of the interactions from the action situation. This will be later on discussed at the 
succeeding chapter. 
6.2 Participants 
Participants refer to the decision-making entities or actors in an action situation. This 
research divides the participants or actors into three: (1) the key stakeholders, (2) the 
partner organisations, and (3) the core staff of the GMHSC Partnership team. It is 
important for the three to be distinguished because they play different positions within 
the action situation. 
6.2.1 Actors in the Partnership 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the devolution deals resulted in the 
establishment of a new GMHSC Partnership in order to bring together 3310 statutory 
institutions, including 10 LAs, 10 CCGs and 13 NHS trusts and FTs, along with 
representatives from primary care, Healthwatch, community and voluntary sectors, 
                                                          
10 37 at the time of signing MoU on 2015, but Manchester CCGs/Trusts have merged so total 
count is updated to reflect these organisational changes 
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Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, and NHS 
England.  
There are four key stakeholders in the Partnership who signed up to participate in 
the Health Devolution deal in Greater Manchester. These are the CCGs, the Trusts and 
FTs, the Primary Care providers, and the LAs. All four groups are represented in the 
Partnership governance board. The CCGs and LAs, in particular, are amongst the 
agreeing parties who signed the initial MoU in February 2015. Meanwhile, the GM NHS 
Trusts and FTs provided a letter of support to the devolution agreement, whilst the 
Primary Care providers were not initially consulted (G15). The latter, including the GP 
Federations, was approached later on to be represented in the Partnership governance 
board and the Primary Care Advisory Group.  
In detail, the four groups are comprised of the following (GMCA and NHS in GM, 
2016h): 
 10 local councils; 
o Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Bury Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Manchester City Council 
o Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Salford City Council 
o Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council 
o Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council 
 10 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs); 
o Bolton Clinical Commissioning Group 
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o Bury Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Heywood, Middleton and Rochdale Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Manchester Health & Care Commissioning11 
o Oldham Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Salford Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Stockport Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Tameside and Glossop Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Trafford Clinical Commissioning Group 
o Wigan Clinical Commissioning Group 
 12 acute, community and Mental Health (MH) Trusts & 1 ambulance Trust;  
o Bolton Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
o Bridgewater Community Healthcare NHS Trust 
o Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust12 
o Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 
o Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust 
o Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust 
o Stockport NHS Foundation Trust 
o Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust 
o The Christie NHS Foundation Trust 
o Wrightington, Wigan and Leigh NHS Foundation Trust 
o North West Boroughs Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 
o Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust13 
o North West Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust 
 Primary Care providers 
                                                          
11 Formerly Central Manchester CCG, South Manchester CCG, and North Manchester CCG 
12 Formerly Central Manchester NHS FT and University Hospitals of South Manchester NHS FT 
13 Formerly Greater Manchester West Mental Health FT and Manchester Mental Health FT 
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o 500 General Practitioner Practices; 
o 450 General Dental Services; 
o 700 community pharmacies; 
o 300 community optometry services; 
 
In addition to the key stakeholders, the GMHSC also signed MoUs with partner 
organisations in order to deliver the key programme enablers identified in the GM 
strategic plan “Taking Charge”. These included PHE and Sport England, Health 
Innovation Manchester, GM Work Estates, GM Healthwatches, GM pharmacy industry, 
and the Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise (VCSE) sector. By signing an MoU, 
a framework of support and engagement is ensured between Partnership and its partner 
organisations, ensuring that they have aligned and shared their ambitions towards 
achieving the target outcomes in GM's devolution agenda. 
Moreover, the delegation of NHS functions to GM via the devolution agreements 
meant that NHS England remained to be a key partner and very much part of the 
Partnership, particularly through the Chief Officer and several Executive Directors posts. 
The MoU states the clear purpose of NHS England’s presence in the Partnership and 
that is to “actively lead and facilitate the links to other national bodies to help all key 
bodies (e.g. Department of Health, CQC, NHSI, and HEE) align to achieve the outcomes 
described in this MoU” (AGMA et al., 2015:10).   
6.2.2 Employment arrangements of the core Partnership team 
Apart from the delivery of the programmes outlined in the GM Strategic Plan, the 
Partnership also received delegated statutory responsibilities from NHS England – for 
instance, the delivery of A&E targets, the role and function of CCGs, and making sure 
the system is financially viable to name a few (G06). This meant that the Partnership 
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team needed to employ staff members to deliver some of these responsibilities, including 
operational, monitoring, and implementation and delivery of the GM Strategic Plan. 
Because of the nature of the structural arrangements of GMHSC (i.e. the Partnership 
itself is not a statutory organisation), it does not employ staff, nor does it have any formal 
streams to hold money (G14). The staff recruited within the core GMHSC Partnership 
team were either on secondment, fixed contract, or appointed on a permanent basis (see 
Table 12). 
Table 12: Employment roles 
Identifier Role Employment 
G01 Partnership project management lead Permanent 
G02 Partnership finance lead Fixed-term 
G03 Partnership project management lead Secondment 
G04 Partnership project management lead Secondment 
G05 Partnership project management director Fixed-term 
G06 Partnership project management director Secondment 
G07 Partnership project management lead Secondment 
G08 Partnership senior director Permanent 
G09 Partnership project management lead Secondment 
G10 Partnership project management lead Permanent 
G11 Partnership project management lead Secondment 
G12 Partnership project management lead Fixed-term 
G13 Partnership senior director Permanent 
G14 Partnership project management lead Fixed-term 
G15 Partnership senior director Fixed-term 
G16 Partnership project management lead Permanent 
G17 Partnership senior director Permanent 
 
According to NHS staff policy, secondment, in its simplest terms, is a temporary 
transfer from their substantive (permanent) post to another post either in the same or 
another organisation. The contractual terms, such as salary, working hours, location, 
etc., vary depending on the secondment period, but it is anticipated that it occurs over a 
defined period of time normally not exceeding 2 years in total. The employee is expected 
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to return to their old post at the end of the secondment period. In the case of GMHSC, 
the Partnership is the host organisation where the employee works during secondment 
and the seconding organisation is the employee's main employer, where all his/her 
contracts and pay checks still come through. Placements can either be from an external 
NHS (i.e. from one NHS organisation to another) or non-NHS organisation (i.e. from a 
LA department, etc.). Unless the secondment is a post with a higher grade or more 
contracted hours, the seconded employee will have the same basic salary and receive 
other employment conditions of their original contract (i.e. sick leave, etc.). For more 
information, see NHS Confederation (2016).  
Secondment is not to be confused with fixed-term contracts, wherein the duration of 
the role is specified between 12 to 36 months and there is limited funding for the post 
available. The contract finishes at the end of the specified period, and either when the 
specified task has been completed or when the funding for the post comes to an end. It 
can be renewed for a short-term period extension, otherwise, the contract finishes. The 
fixed-term employees are hosted by either NHS Manchester Clinical Commissioning 
Group, Manchester City Council, or the GMCA, and funded by the Partnership through 
the Transformation Fund. Most of the fixed-term staff were for task-and-finish roles, 
project management and implementation, or specialised functions. The lines of 
responsibilities and accountability remain with the Partnership, and the host 
organisations are merely there to channel the wages because the Partnership is not a 
legal entity.  
“We then got quite a few people on fixed term contracts and what's happened 
there mainly is that we've got Transformation Fund the £450 million as you know. 
We've used a proportion of that money to basically pay for some posts in the 
partnership team to kind of lead Greater Manchester level work. But obviously 
that funding is only for a limited time, so those roles could only be offered on a 
fixed term basis. So, when someone has got one of those roles, say for 2 or 3 
years until 2020, the only option really is they need some sort of statutory body 
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to formally employed them. So, the Manchester CCG is being used to do that.” 
(G05) 
 
Finally, a Partnership employee can also be appointed on a permanent basis. The 
executive team in particular are permanent posts with the exception of the associate 
leads (G13). For example, an Executive Director is employed and hosted by NHS 
England, where they carry dual roles as Partnership executives for operational purposes 
and as NHS local directors for NHS England functions (i.e. financial sustainability, 
monitoring and assurance, quality, etc.). In addition, several staff from NHS Greater 
Manchester (former NHS local area office under North West regional cluster), including 
Greater Manchester and Eastern Cheshire Strategic Clinical Networks (SCN), were 
transferred to the Partnership as substantive posts as part of the organisational change. 
These employees are all hosted separately by local NHS organisations.  
To sum it up, the posts created for the Partnership were non-traditional, where all the 
staff members came together from different employers in different roles. However, they 
also follow a traditional route of organisational structure where there are reporting and 
accountability lines, and some level of hierarchy in the governance (G03). 
6.3 Positions 
The participants each take a position in the action situation where each has diverse 
options for a combination of resources, opportunities, preferences, and skills. In this 
section, we examine the roles that the different key groups in the Partnership have 
acquired in order to position themselves in the decision-making arena. Overall, 
participants can occupy the following positions: (1) Provider of service (mostly occupied 
by the 4 key groups); (2) Internal and external regulators (NHS England, and 
Partnership’s assurance groups and senior management team i.e. Executives); (3) 
Taskforce groups (Partnership programme delivery group); (4) Decision-making bodies 
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(Health and Care Board and Executive board); and (5) Advisory groups. These positions 
were collectively agreed by all participants during the initial stages of the formation of the 
Partnership and was revised later on to reflect the system-wide changes in the GM 
Health and Care economy and delivery phase of the GM Strategic Plan. 
6.2.3 Updated governance structure 
In order to ensure that the GMHSC stakeholders, partners, and core team have 
opportunities to be equally represented in the Partnership, a governance structure was 
initially established as outlined in the previous chapter. However, the Partnership 
recognises that they needed to adapt and address new and changing needs as a natural 
consequence of being the first locality in England having a devolved arrangement for 
HSC (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018:3). As a result, a revised governance structure was 
presented in January 2018 to reflect the progress that the Partnership has made in terms 
of transitioning from the initial strategy-setting phase to supporting the delivery and 
implementation of the GM vision set out in Taking Charge. More importantly, the Mayor 
of GM took office in May 2017 and the Partnership needed to recognise his ambition for 
public service reforms by coordinating with each other to realise the outcomes of the 
health and social care strategic plan.  
The initial governance established by the shadow group has significantly progressed 
between April 2016 to December 2017. Recognising that more support is needed to 
develop and establish initial links in delivering Taking Charge, a series of boards were 
formed (outlined in the previous chapter) to secure programme oversight, financial 
sustainability, and monitoring and assurance checks are in place. These arrangements 
still form the core of the GMHSC governance. 
The governance has continuously changed several times over the course of 2 years 
(2016-2018), where one participant described this iterative process as “evolutionary” and 
“a living governance structure” (G08). It was obvious that the arrangements set up in 
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2015/2016 were geared towards setting-up the different decision-making routes to 
create, coordinate, and socialise the overall GM strategy to the wider community. As the 
Partnership enters the delivery phase of the programmes, they had to employ more staff 
and re-shuffle the governance structure to have clearer lines of responsibilities and 
accountabilities at all levels, to secure clarity on how decisions are made, to reduce the 
amount of bureaucracy and duplication, and to ensure all key  stakeholders have equal 
opportunities to provide input into the governance groups (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018).  
“That's not because we ever got it wrong. It's because you take one step and 
then you get the confidence to take another step and so on and so, it's an 
iterative process...And I think that's a bit of strength actually, it's not been a 
weakness... It's saying you know what, every time we learn, we can refine, and 
finesse and we can move on to the next bit. So, I think there's an efficiency in 
there which is helpful.” (G08) 
 
For instance, a Primary Care Engagement Network was set-up in November 2015 to 
reflect the inclusion of the Primary Care representative voice in the governance 
framework. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Primary Care groups were not 
initially consulted during the signing of the MoU, highlighting the imbalance on the parity 
of esteem between hospital providers (i.e. Trusts and FTs) and primary care providers 
(G15). In order to address this, a Primary Care Advisory Group (PCAG) was formed to 
draw membership from the four aspects of primary care (i.e. GP, dentistry, optometry, 
and pharmacy) and ensure that they represent a collective voice in the wider GMHSC 
governance discussions and programmes of activity (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015). 
An LCO Network was also set-up in December 2016 to support the localities in working 
across the transformation programmes, aligned with the overall GM public service reform 




Despite the several additions, a newer and more updated governance was needed 
to reflect the challenges and barriers to engaging in the wider GMHSC system. Wider 
system changes were also a factor, including the merger of Manchester CCGs and 
Trusts, and the establishment of a new GM Mental Health. The development of 
integrated commissioning across localities and the impact of the GM Mayor and GMCA 
portfolio holders also have implications for the existing governance arrangements. 
Lastly, there is a need for the Partnership to strengthen its relationship to localities, by 
making them more accountable to the Transformation Fund and by creating links with 
Health and Wellbeing Boards to support joint commissioning decisions (GMCA and NHS 
in GM, 2018:9). 
Perhaps what is also not visible in the governance structure but is worth mentioning 
is the individual governance of each locality. All of these structures feed into the 
Partnership through their representatives attending the HCB and Executive meetings. 
By revising the streams for the stakeholders to participate in the decision-making 
process, it aims to reduce the amount of duplication in the system and to provide a 
clearer role for the core GMHSC Partnership team as a facilitator of the governance.  
A few of the newer additions to the revised governance were: 
 The Strategic Partnership Board (SPB) becomes GM Health and Care Board 
(GM HCB) 
 The Strategic Partnership Board Executive (SPBE) becomes GM HSC 
Partnership Executive to reflect more functions in the operationalisation of Taking 
Charge 
 The establishment of the Joint Commissioning Board (JCB) serviced by the GM 
Commissioning Hub 
 The enhancement of the Provider Federation Board (PFB) 
 A simplified version of the Executive sub-governance 
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 The Workforce and Digital Collaboratives, the integrated Estates team, and 
Health Innovation Manchester are to become core enablers of the governance 
 
Figure 22: Governance January 2018 to present 
 
Source: (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018) 
This updated structure (Figure 22) reflects a more integrated and collaborative way 
of working together with a dispersed style of leadership (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018). 
It is also still based on several key principles from the MoU and its previous iteration, 
which were retained as fundamental building blocks for the new structure. This evidence 
illustrates that the Partnership’s level of collaboration and interdependency, and the 
maturity of relationships and their willingness to achieve their collective ambition have 
evolved from the time it was established.  
6.2.4 Providers of service 
The providers of service are mainly occupied by the LAs, CCGs, Trusts and FTs 
providers, and the Primary Care groups. As key stakeholders of the Partnership, they 
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are responsible to delivering the GM Strategic Plan to their own respective localities and 
retain their respective accountability lines. Each group is represented in the decision-
making arena via different routes where they get to participate in the various roles in the 
cross-cutting programmes across the Partnership. For example, the city of Stockport has 
the following: Stockport local council (accountable to the voting public and Public Health 
England), Stockport NHS Foundation Trust (accountable to its board members and NHS 
Improvement), Stockport CCG (accountable to NHS England), and GP, dental, 
optometry and pharmacy practices (accountable to patients and Care Quality 
Commission).  
6.2.5 Advisory groups 
The advisory groups are made up of the sectoral networks that has informally 
developed and met as a GM collective over a period of time prior to the devolution deals. 
They are composed of the key stakeholders (i.e. CCGs, LAs, Trusts and FTs, and 
Primary Care groups) under collective formal arrangements, which are incorporated in 
the GMHSC Partnership governance for representation and decision-making gateways. 
The advisory groups are: 
 GM Association of CCGs. A formal arrangement between the 12 GM CCGs 
Senior leaders 
 Provider Federation Board. A formal arrangement between the 15 NHS Trusts 
and FTs Senior leaders 
 Primary Care Advisory Board. A board representing the PCAG composed of 
representatives from GPs, dentistry, ophthalmology, and pharmacy 
 LCO Network. A GM-level group representing the standalone LCO organisations 
of the 10 localities 
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 Joint Commissioning Board. The forum for collective commissioning undertaken 
on a GM footprint, made up of representatives from the 10 localities (CCGs and 
LAs) 
 
Each advisory group has a board set-up, who is then in charge of strategic oversight 
of their respective sectors and in some instances, leadership and reporting duties on the 
delivery of some work programmes. They have representation in the Health and Care 
Board and Partnership Executive respectively. They do not have definitive legal 
responsibilities or voting rights; however, they do possess an advisory capacity to 
provide non-binding strategic advice to the HCB and Partnership Executive. 
6.2.6 The regulators 
The devolution agreement between NHS England and GM meant that the 
performance of GMHSC Partnership is subjected to monitoring and regulation. The 
respective key stakeholders retain their lines of accountability to their individual 
organisations and regulators (external), whilst the performance delivery of any 
Partnership programmes and assurance and accountability to the Transformation Fund 
are subject to monitoring by the Quality board and Partnership Executive (internal). 
6.2.6.1 External regulators 
Because of the devolution arrangements, the Partnership is still subject to NHS 
Constitution and mandate. This meant that the Partnership has no statutory functions to 
regulate its member organisations. Instead, these are still discharged through NHS 
Improvement and Care Quality Commission.  
 NHS England via Chief Officer. Some of NHS England’s functions are delegated 
through the Chief Officer. The Chief Officer is responsible for the assurance of 
the 10 GM CCGs in line with the requirements of the SPB and NHS England. 
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Moreover, the Chief Officer is directly accountable to NHS England, ensuring that 
the key stakeholders deliver the NHS Constitution. 
 Care Quality Commission (CQC). CQC is an independent organisation that 
monitors, inspects, and rates the quality of health and social care services 
delivered and the organisations who deliver it. These include community health 
services, GP services, dental services, mental health, care home services, and 
social care provided at home (Care Quality Commission, 2018) within the city-
region of GM. 
 NHS Improvement (NHSI). NHSI is statutory responsible for monitoring the 
quality, safety, and financial sustainability of the NHS trusts and foundation trusts, 
and independent providers of NHS-funded patient care. It is their remit to assess 
and make recommendations about recovery plans for GM NHS Trusts and FTs, 
if needed (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016b). 
 
6.2.6.2 Internal regulators 
The GMHSC governance also incorporated an assurance and delivery framework to 
monitor and assess progress of the range of the responsibilities taken on by the 
Partnership and to connect core decision-making components with the wider 
infrastructure on delivery of the transformation programmes (GMCA and NHS in GM, 
2016h). These positions are usually occupied by the core staff of the Partnership team 
but can also be taken on by representatives from the key stakeholders. 
Ensuring assurance and monitoring 
 Quality Surveillance Group (QSG). One of the statutory functions delegated to 
the Partnership is driving quality improvement across GM. In order to fulfil this, a 
QSG was set up as a requirement of the National Quality Board and to represent 
GM footprint. The role of QSG is to engage in the surveillance of quality at a local 
 
200 
level, including patient safety, contract breaches, and failure to meet CQC 
standards. This position is chaired by the Executive Lead for Quality of the 
Partnership, with membership including Chief Operating Officers of CCGs, and 
representatives from CQC, NHSI, HEE, PHE, and Healthwatch (see GMCA and 
NHS in GM, 2016a, p. 7). 
 Performance and Delivery Board. This group is in charge of maintaining the 
constitutional and mandated requirements of the Partnership to NHS England 
and initiating taskforces to support improvement and recovery when appropriate. 
It is the single point for reviewing performance across the GMHSC system. It 
particularly deals with evaluating performance and delivery at a system-level, 
ensuring that all constitutional mandate standards are reviewed with the 
outcomes. Membership includes nominated representatives from within each 
sector where they act in an advisory capacity (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016a, 
p. 11). 
 
Ensuring financial sustainability and resource allocation 
 Transformation Fund Oversight Group (TFOG). TFOG was initially established to 
review the applications and make recommendations on the allocation of the 
Transformation Fund. It was a taskforce group formed from a pool of 
representatives from the 4 key stakeholder groups (CCGs, LAs, Trusts and FTs, 
Primary Care groups), led by the Executive leads, the Head of Transformation 
Fund, and the TF Lead. Their primary task was to lead the assessment process 
of the proposals for the access to TF (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2017). The 
group can only make recommendations, and final allocation of the funding is 
down to the Partnership Executive and Finance Executive Group (FEG). TFOG’s 
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operation ceased in early 2018 and monitoring and evaluation on the delivery of 
the TF terms and conditions were transferred to FEG. 
 Finance Executive Group (FEG). FEG is a forum responsible for system-wide 
financial advisory and assurance function. It deals with the identification and 
assessment of any strategic financial issues, risks, and opportunities, including 
the budget and funding of the core Partnership team. Its membership is led by 
the Executive lead for Finance and Investment, with representatives from the 
financial officers or treasurers of the CCGs, Trusts and FTs, and LAs (see GMCA 
and NHS in GM, 2016c). 
 
6.2.7 Taskforce groups 
There are a multitude of transformation programmes that needed additional staff 
support from the Partnership. Such task and finish groups were set up to provide 
oversight and strategic delivery of the projects, whilst working hand-in-hand with the 10 
localities and NHS organisations. These positions are occupied by both internal 
Partnership staff and representatives from the key stakeholders. 
Ensuring oversight on delivery  
 Transformation Portfolio board. The Transformation Portfolio board was initially 
in charge of the oversight, implementation, and delivery of the GM Strategic Plan. 
It brought together the locality leadership within the GM transformation 
programmes, ensuring that the risks and issues were proactively assessed and 
managed (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016c), particularly the management of 
the 10 locality plans, 5 GM transformation themes, and the 5 cross-cutting 
programmes. Its membership included the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for 
Themes 1 to 5 (internal staff) and SRO from each of the 10 localities (key 
stakeholder representatives) (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016b). 
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 Programme Management Office (PMO). In addition to the SPB and SPBE, the 
GMHSC governance structure created a PMO, to support the Transformation 
Portfolio board and to serve as the delivery arm of the Partnership. It is a small 
core team functioning as a strategic delivery vehicle overseeing the delivery of 
the transformation projects and cross-cutting programmes. It also works closely 
with localities and other statutory and delegated functional groups and 
stakeholder groups in GM, establishing opportunities for integrated working (see 
GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016c, p. 15).  
 Transformation Theme programme board. Beneath the PMO sits a sub-
governance structure for each Transformation Theme. Each Transformation 
programme board is in charge of their own projects related to the thematic 
strategies identified in Taking Charge, and their key responsibilities are to support 
its delivery and to provide effective leadership critical to the success of the 
Theme. The programme boards are usually comprised of an SRO, senior project 
leaders for each constituent project, NHS Provider trusts or FTs representative/s, 
CCG representative/s, LA representative/s, and Director/s of strategy, Director/s 
of operations, and representatives from appropriate reference groups (see 
GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016f, 2017b). 
 Programme Coordination board. The Transformation Portfolio board was later on 
revised to as the Programme Coordination board in order to recognise and align 
the changing roles that the Partnership had in terms of strategic to delivery role. 
It works hand-in-hand with the Performance and Delivery board, in terms of taking 
the recommendations from the performance review and ensuring that the require 






6.2.8 Decision-making bodies 
The decision-making bodies are they key forums where representatives across the 
system congregate to make collective discussions and decisions together. These 
positions are mainly occupied by senior leaders of the Partnership team and the core 
stakeholder groups.  
6.2.8.1 The GM Health and Care Board 
The new GM HCB is more or less similar to its predecessor (the SPB) in terms of its 
role in providing oversight for the strategic vision and direction for the health and social 
care in GM. As the Partnership moved from the strategic phase to the implementation of 
the programmes, and to start thinking about the future operating model post 
transformation phase, the HCB focuses on ensuring that the feedback from the key 
stakeholders and the residents of GM influence the actions from the Partnership. It also 
revised its membership in order to replicate and align itself with the ambition of the local 
Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWB), which were initially established during the 2012 
Lansley reforms. These changes resulted into the HCB becoming a non-statutory body 
that brings together the partners in one table to create a more holistic approach (GMCA 
and NHS in GM, 2018). Currently, its membership includes: 
 Chair and Chief Officer of each of the GM CCGs 
 Chair and Chief Executives of GM Provider Trusts and Foundation Trusts 
 Leader and Chief Executives of GM local authorities 
 NHS England, delegated through the GMHSC Chief Officer 
 NHS Improvement representative/s 
 Public Health England representative/s 
 Primary care representative/s through PCAG 
 GMCA through GM Mayor and Chief Executive 
 GM Fire and Rescue services representative/s 
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 GM Police representative/s 
 Voluntary, community, and social enterprise (VCSE) sector representative/s 
 GM Healthwatch representative/s 
 
HCB sits atop the hierarchical chart and works in parallel with the GM Reform Board 
regarding coordination of agendas for the public service reform in GM. The Enablers (i.e. 
Health Innovation Manchester, Digital Collaborative, Estates, Workforce Collaborative 
and Children’s HWB) all directly report to the HCB, whilst HCB is still accountable to GM. 
Representatives of HCB are also still accountable to their respective organisational and 
stakeholder grouping.  
The HCB is the highest level and ultimate decision-making body in the governance 
structure. To further distinguish it from the Executive and to avoid duplication of 
functions, HCB offloads some of its responsibilities to the Executive including 
performance check, delivery of strategy, Transformation Fund allocation and assurance, 
and risk management (all of which were initially under the remit of the SPB). Its agendas 
now focus more on the impacts of the transformation programmes in the localities rather 
than the operationalisation and delivery of the strategy.  
6.2.8.2 The GMHSC Partnership Executive 
The Strategic Partnership Board Executive (SPBE) was renamed the Partnership 
Executive, carrying over previous duties in operational and transactional issues. It was 
mainly responsible for enabling the development of GM Strategic Plan Taking Charge 
and engaging localities to prepare them for the delivery of the programmes. In order to 
adopt to the transition to the implementation phase, the Executive team is now focusing 
on assurance and monitoring role, particularly in the performance of localities across the 
system and holding them into account for the delivery of the cross-cutting and GM-level 
transformation programmes. Moreover, the Partnership Executive also monitors the 
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Transformation Fund, making sure that the recipients of the funding are on-track in terms 
of delivering what they promised to do.  
The newer version of the Partnership Executive recommended to revise the 
membership structures. Particularly, it wants to represent the GM HSC system but will 
not have all organisations as members as previously identified in the previous chapter. 
All localities must be represented across the 12 nominated members from the 4 key 
stakeholder groups. The revised membership rules now include: 
 3 representatives from GM CCGs, as identified and agreed by the Association of 
CCGs 
 3 representatives from GM Trusts and Foundation trusts, as identified and agreed 
by the Provider Federation Board 
 3 representatives from the GM LAs, as identified and agreed by the wider 
leadership team 
 3 representatives from Primary Care, as identified and agreed by the PCAG 
 NHS England through the Chief Officer of the GMHSC Partnership 
 2 representatives from the third sector, as identified and agreed by the GM VCSE 
 
The Partnership Exec reports to the HCB. In addition, the following governance 
groups report directly to the Executive team: Finance Executive Group, Performance and 
Delivery Board, Programme Coordination Group, and the Quality Board (as previously 
outlined). These groups are mainly responsible for the effective assurance and delivery 






6.4 Allowable actions 
Actions refer to the set of allowable actions that each participant can select from at 
any particular stage in the decision-making process (Ostrom, 2005). These prescribed 
actions could be attributed to what the participants are allowed to do or not to do, and 
under what circumstances these actions might be allowed in the decision process (Cole, 
2014; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2018).  
Partnership activities are mainly divided into three phases: (1) Strategic building; (2) 
Delivery and implementation; and (3) Monitoring and assurance. In each phase, 
participants occupy positions and refer to different set of prescribed actions. In this 
section, we want to understand how each position chooses from a set of strategies and 
eventually frames themselves in the action arena based on a prescribed Partnership 
activity.  
6.4.1 Representation 
We start by going to the bottom tier of the governance – the key stakeholders. Whilst 
they are in the lower end of the hierarchy, they have important roles to play during 
decision-making. Each core key stakeholder group (i.e. LAs, CCGs, Trusts and FTs, and 
Primary Care groups) has to have representatives in various boards across the 
governance. This was initially agreed when the MoU was signed and when the shadow 
governance was being formed. 
To illustrate (Figure 23), each of the 10 LAs Authorities of GM has a local council, an 
NHS Trust or FT, a CCG, a group of Primary Care Providers, Healthwatch, and a VCSE 
group. Each organisation has representatives in GM-level sectoral groups that were 
previously set-up some time predating devolution (e.g. GM Association of CCG) to 
informally coordinate with one another, or as a result of devolution (e.g. PCAG). They 
also have representatives sitting across various decision-making boards and programme 
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governance within the GMHSC Partnership, such as the programme governance boards, 
advisory groups, HCB, and Partnership Executive when appropriate. Representatives 
play an active role in various Partnership activities like the formulation of and approval 
strategy, engagement in meetings, networks, or steering groups, implementation and 
delivery of a programme, etc. 
Figure 23: Representation 
 
 
In any collaborative arrangement, representation is important in order to address 
power relations and extent of involvement. This was normally used as a countermeasure 
when stakeholders do not have the time or energy to engage in the collaboration, or as 
a means of contributing when they  do have the skills and expertise to participate in 
discussions (Huxham et al., 2000; Wanna, 2008). In the case of the Partnership, this 
was a way for the stakeholders to provide human capital and contribute to the pool of 
shared resources as part of the agreement to collaborate. More importantly, it is a way 
of getting involved in the decisions and having opportunities to provide a voice for the 
sectoral groups that they represent. 
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Each organisation within a locality has committed and signed up to the GMHSC 
Partnership through the MoU, which means they have taken on a responsibility to deliver 
the collective vision that they agreed in. For instance, a Trust Senior officer (F03) said 
that “within the executive, you get representation from each of these sectoral groups. So, 
the Federation board, we have 3 reps on the executive. The commissioners have reps. 
The primary care have reps and local authorities (sic).” 
“Each individual organisation is doing all of its usual business, but then some 
organisations have taken on a leadership role across the whole system. Either 
a leadership or a supporting role across the whole system. So, it could be that 
with respect to a range of services, their focus is completely inward, and they're 
just looking after their own population. But it could be, for one subject, they've 
got a responsibility to try and look after the whole system.” (C01) 
 
The default allowable action, therefore, of the key stakeholders it to represent their 
organisations within the Partnership governance. What happens in theory is that having 
representatives in the governance allows them to make significant decisions taken at the 
Partnership or GM level. It is essential that the key stakeholders are also not isolated in 
any of the core Partnership activities, such planning, delivery, and evaluation of the 
programmes (G01). At the end of the day, what the Partnership does and what it stands 
for particularly involves these stakeholders. A Partnership project management lead 
described, "the program we're delivering involves all of them" (G14) thus it is only right 
they have a say on the choices of programmes that suits them as a collective group. 
Representation, therefore, becomes the primary means of participation by the key 
stakeholders and without it, they are unable to partake in any decision-making process 




6.4.2 Oversight on strategy and delivery 
We now examine the core internal Partnership team and the set of actions they 
choose from within their roles. In this particular section, we focus our attention to the 
non-senior membership staff (i.e. non-Executive roles), who are typically situated in the 
programme governance or in the internal monitoring team. They are in charge of either 
leadership, delivery, and assurance roles, or administration and operational 
responsibilities.  
Evidence from the interviews suggests that the internal Partnership staff mainly have 
the following sets of action when it comes to programme governance: (1) to facilitate or 
(2) to enable. Because the Partnership has no legal mandate to enforce any agreed 
decisions, interventions, or programmes to its members, they had to play a proactive role 
in encouraging the implementation of the various work pieces highlighted in the GM 
Strategic Plan.  
Before we explore the given sets of action that they take, it is important to recall that 
the programme governance is established to provide oversight on strategy and delivery 
of the Transformation programmes outlined in Taking Charge. They are comprised of a 
combination of internal Partnership staff and representatives from key stakeholders and 
partner organisations. Their key function is to provide an overall direction and 
management of the projects assigned to their respective Transformation theme. During 
the interviews, I asked them to recall a project they recently participated in and reflect 
the role they played, how they participated in it, and what steps did they take to make 
decisions. This has allowed me to analyse their choices and establish a set of strategies 
that they make when they’re facing an action. 
6.4.2.1 Facilitator 
One of the key functions of the programme boards is to manage the delivery of the 
projects assigned to their respective Transformation theme. Interviewees suggest that 
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facilitating is an important strategy in order to achieve this. Facilitating could refer to two 
things. First, it could be about facilitating the project itself. It ranges from duties such as 
planning, designing and developing the strategy, mobilisation of resources, finding 
solutions to issues, launching and executing, and providing support all throughout the 
duration of the project.  
To illustrate, a prime example of a project in action is the delivery of 7-day access to 
general practice where the team developed “a suite of GM medical standards to look at 
how these shape the primary care at a scale, whilst also looking at the neighbourhood 
model and in terms of the new models of care and how to build that as a foundation of 
the LCOs.” (G01) A Partnership project management lead described their involvement 
in facilitating the design and development of a thematic strategy at a GM level, which 
can be adopted and implemented in each of the 10 localities (G01). A Senior project lead 
from a partner organisation also said that the extent of their participation involved 
facilitating health and social care improvement and making sure that the work is aligned 
with the Partnership's vision and that they work together collectively (P06). This level of 
facilitation is visible across the programme governance, particularly on the task and finish 
groups where they are focused in making sure that “the different threads are coordinated, 
and then specific teams will deliver on key aspects of work” (G08). Project management 
responsibilities, however, are stated in documents such as the Terms of Reference for 
each programme board, so it gives the impression that these are expected of staff 
members or partners to perform anyway.  
Interviewees expressed that managing the delivery of a project is not the challenge 
in terms of facilitating, but rather, getting everyone to converse with one another. This is 
when we come to the second action of facilitating relationships. During the initial stages 
of strategy building, Partnership staff gathered various members of the HSC system to 
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get their representative opinions on how to approach issues, what they think the 
Partnership should address, and how can they contribute to this.  
One of the mechanisms that is commonly used to facilitate conversations amongst 
different groups of actors is the steering groups.  The steering groups were mostly made 
up of experts from different localities and organisations, who are interested in the 
particular Transformation project theme. Although its role is similar to programme boards 
(i.e. providing strategic direction), they are also different in a way that steering groups 
are informal and do not have nominal authority to make decisions in terms of what 
happens in the project, what gets prioritised, or what gets funded. Most steering groups 
were initiated during the formative stages of the project. They were established “because 
it had genuine influence, it shaped our thinking. It was a sounding board. In challenge, 
does it give us suggestions and ideas, but it wasn't a decision-making body. We were 
quite clear about that… you can't have two bodies that might have eight different 
decisions responsible for the same program.” (G07). 
Whilst steering groups were introduced as a way for the Partnership project teams 
to have a representative oversight on the direction of the project (G03, G11), it was also 
useful in engaging with the different pockets of the system. It was a way for Partnership 
staff to ensure that they have the right people inputting into the workstreams and it’s not 
just internal members making decisions on behalf of the GM level. “It's an opportunity for 
them to feed in ideas into work as it emerges,” (G11) which made the conversations 
more inclusive and representative. For example, a Partnership project management lead 
said that the steering group has set-up an externally facilitated workshop to bring 
together representatives from CCGs, Trusts and FTs, LAs, and primary care groups 
(G01). This involved conversations like, “What do you think? What would you do think 
are the possible? What could we do for ambition? What would you want? What are we 
prioritising?” (G01, G03) as a starting point for discussion. For some where steering 
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groups facilitated events that include active patients, it became a powerful avenue to 
draw lessons from their real-life experiences. A Senior project lead from a partner 
organisation said, “when I'm engaging with the system, I'm also engaging with service 
users, so they come along to events.” (P02) 
6.4.2.2 Enabler 
Another key theme that emerged from the interviews is that the Partnership is an 
enabler in the system, in terms of implementing and delivering the GM Strategic Plan. 
This resonated from the interviews partly because of the power that the Transformation 
Fund has created to allow partner organisations and key stakeholders to get that extra 
funding to develop transformative projects within their localities. For instance, a local 
authority councillor who was in charge of public health portfolio believed that the TF has 
enabled them to address local challenges, focus on their neighbourhoods, and have the 
opportunity to work differently (L03). Similarly, CCG leads believed the extra money gave 
them the opportunity deliver better outcomes and close the financial gap. It also enabled 
them to take responsibility and use the money far more sensibly tailored to address their 
own local problems (C01, C02).  
The TF has indeed created an opportunity for local health organisations, particularly 
for local councils that were under financial pressures and did not have the kind of 
resource to drive key changes in the long run. But apart from all that, with or without the 
funding, the Partnership staff believed that it is their role to enable the system to achieve 
the outcomes outlined in ‘Taking Charge’ in as many was as possible. “Being able to do 
that and flex and enable the system to do that, I think that's part of my role (sic),” a 
Partnership project management lead stated (G03). A project management director also 
said, “as it says on the tin, it's a partnership. It is not about us doing to the system, it is 




Actions take place in the localities and it is very important for the Partnership to 
enable them to achieve the outcomes they promised to deliver. So, in reality, it is not 
only about enabling the system via extra funding, but also about having that capability to 
work through multiple lenses on how they can make people work together collectively at 
a GM level. It could be some form of “hand holding” (G11) where they take the local 
health organisations from point A to point B. A lot of the conversations involved 
motivating the localities to take the path which suits their circumstances and encouraging 
them to get where they needed to be as part of the collective agreement that they signed 
up for. As much as possible, the Partnership wanted to play a proactive role in 
empowering the localities and making sure that they get all the support that they needed 
in order to achieve not only their desired outcomes, but also the collective vision of GM. 
“Here's as much as we can possibly do to assist you and you need to kind of get 
it over the line almost. I know it sounds a little bit patronising almost but it's that, 
it's more than just kind of enabling something to happen. We're trying to support 
them as much as possible to deliver like some changes in the system.” (G11) 
 
6.4.3 Monitoring and assurance 
After the initial phases of strategy building and as soon as the implementation stage 
commences, the Partnership activities transition to monitoring and assurance. This 
particular action is prominent within the internal groups, who are in charge of ensuring 
that the localities and key partners deliver the project as streamlined by the programme 
governance. It is also important for their progress to be monitored and make sure that 
they adhere to national standards and the NHS constitution. 
Because of the nature of the devolution arrangements, the Partnership has no 
statutory powers to enforce their partners to adopt to the programmes outlined in the GM 
Strategic Plan or to bind them in the decisions made by the HCB. Instead, they had to 
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use different formal and informal mechanisms to encourage the partners to take the 
strategic recommendations and implement the programmes in accordance to their own 
organisational circumstances. One formal mechanism they use comes in the form of the 
Delivery and Assurance Framework (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016a), which sets out 
amongst other things, the responsibility to manage and improve system performance 
through assessments, metrics, and the like. When appropriate, the Performance and 
Delivery board and the Programme Coordination board conduct the necessary checks 
to make sure that system wide and programme specific performance requirements are 
achieved.  
Another mechanism for monitoring and assurance is the agreed Terms of Reference 
(ToR) that different collaborating committees created within the Partnership. This guides 
the agreeing parties to a structure according to the scope and limitations of the project 
identified, its goals and objectives, membership and voting rights, frequency of meeting, 
reporting lines, etc. As mentioned earlier in the previous section, Partnership staff refer 
to the ToR to identify their project management responsibilities. Specific roles within 
transformational programme boards are tasked with the realisation of the project's 
objectives, track key progress, and ensure achievement of predetermined programme 
milestones.   
If and when the Partnership fails to deliver the NHS Constitution, mandate, and 
financial controls at an aggregate level, high-level escalation measures are to be put in 
place as outlined in the Assurance and Delivery framework (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 
2016a, p. 14). Because monitoring functions were delegated to the Chief Officer of the 
Partnership, NHSE does not have direct power to intervene in this monitoring process 
(C04). These controls are: 
 an improvement or recovery plan 
 monitoring of the standard at prescribed frequency 
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 a requirement for GM to seek further prescribed support to secure recover 
 NHSE exercising powers of intervention with an individual CCG 
 
When a locality, on the other hand, fails to deliver a programme area and perform in 
accordance with the outcomes framework or performance metrics, proper intervention 
and rescue plans are also to be put in place. In extreme cases (i.e. CCG or place 
performance is below the threshold described in the Accountability Agreement or 
financial control), the Partnership may use its step-in rights on behalf of NHS England to 
take the necessary escalation measures to demand the organisation to present an 
Improvement plan on how performance can be improved and return to the required 
standard (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016b:14). The step-in rights are based on NHS 
England working through the GMHSC Partnership where both parties agree how to work 
to address the issues that have been identified. Because of the nature of the devolution 
agreement, NHSE's powers previously exercised at the national level are now delegated 
to the Partnership via the Chief Officer, and he has the power to monitor NHS 
organisations without direct interference from NHS England (C04). 
To illustrate how the Partnership puts this in action, we drew from the specific 
examples that the interviewees used to describe the reality of the monitoring and 
assurance process. After the devolution arrangements were put in place, CCGs became 
accountable to the Partnership via the delegated responsibilities of NHSE to the Chief 
Officer. However, others believe it is like “smoke and mirrors” (C04) because the 
Partnership Executive team still have links to NHS England and CCGs are still governed 
by the structural powers surrounding NHS bodies.  
Interviewees described the complexity and intensity of having to keep up with the 
protocols in place and the parallel process of the Partnership’s monitoring of the running 
programmes and the assurance for CCG performance (C01, C03, C04). “There will be 
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performance reviews, accountability reviews, duct tapes in terms of where we're up to 
and whether we're doing enough. Have we been managing the risks appropriately or are 
we progressing things at enough pace? There's quite a real complex structure,” 
according to a CCG board member (C03).  
Whilst there are formal protocols to follow for recovery, Partnership staff employ other 
ways to assess the severity the situation before making recommendations to the upper 
tier boards for formal intervention. As much as possible, the Partnership wanted to 
encourage local health organisations or partners to perform at par with the agreed 
outcomes framework, whilst also offering opportunities to discuss any difficulties (G05). 
This could be in a form of “brokering” (G03, L05) where they act as mediators or 
negotiators between different groups to resolve issues prior to any escalation or 
intervention from the Partnership board. “The fact that these things aren't mandated from 
NHS England and NHSI, means that it's about negotiation within the system and 
discussion within the system, (sic)” (P02) a Senior project lead from partner organisation 
said.  
The Partnership plays an important role in enabling those conversations happen and 
making sure that the right people are included in any form of deliberation or negotiation. 
Because of the way the governance was structured in terms of monitoring, assurance, 
and accountability, the Partnership has constructed enough barriers for key stakeholders 
or partner organisations to get through, such as deliberations and problem-solving 
mechanisms, the performance management boards, etc., before reaching the highest 
tier of the governance. If it does reach the Partnership Executive or even the HCB, it 
would have to be a fundamental change that needed to be addressed in a collective level 
(G08).  
A Partnership project management director said, “depending on the situation, it may 
be that it will be more of a conversation about how can we help you. (sic)” (G05). There 
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are roles in the project management teams that are specifically geared towards 
performance measurement, and it is under their remit where they go in and have 
conversations with localities that are performing poorly and ask the difficult questions 
about why their performance in some areas not where it needed it to be. This allows 
them the opportunity to address and rectify the issues before a recovery plan is put into 
action.  
There are day-to-day and/or monthly conversations on assurance as well, which 
involves a diverse range of discussions on performance against different provision in 
different localities all the time. This could be a conversation between commissioners on 
sub-contract management, or sometimes issues in a GM-level (G07, G08). Any issues 
are usually picked up on the mid-tier levels (i.e. Performance and Delivery board, Quality 
board, etc.) where they are examined in different orientations. LA councillors, for 
instance, have expressed that they comply with the extensive structures in place by 
attending assurance meetings and engaging in conversations (L02, L03, L05). It involves 
sending representatives to the performance management monitoring framework for 
formal reports. 
From the perspective of the partner organisations or key stakeholders, they believed 
that they have effectively agreed to the terms and agreements that may have come with 
it when they signed up to work in partnership (C01, C04). This included agreeing to 
commit to the collectively agreed deliverables, especially if their locality or programme 
area has been awarded with some Transformation Funding. “What we've then done is 
we've actually said, we'll voluntarily do this,” (C04) a CCG board member explained. 
Because of GM’s history of working together, there has already been an established 
mutual respect between all parties, thus, agreeing to be part of the Devolution agreement 
meant that they have to honour this collaboration by default. There is a collective element 
where organisations are taking ownership of what they agreed to be part of (C01, L04). 
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In some cases where transformation money has been awarded to a particular 
programme or place in order to fund the project, it was more about the performance 
management staff putting pressure to the organisations to adhere to the agreed 
performance metrics. In effect, the Partnership has enabled these programmes to 
happen, so when they signed the contract or investment agreement, the involved parties 
should be able to deliver this vision and make the most out of the funding that was 
awarded to them (G02, G06). A Partnership project management director explained, 
“we’ve given you this money, we now want to see what you've done, and if you've not 
done it, why have you not done it and we might take it back.” (G06) 
“There is reporting by exception, which is you know across all of the things that 
we've allocated money to, are they delivering what they need to deliver? Yes or 
no. Which ones are not delivering? And there may be decisions, because some 
of the process in GM and it's the same with the rest of the country, where the 
national team is giving them money. If you're not demonstrating that you're 
utilising the money effectively, it will stop.” (C01) 
 
6.5 Control 
Each participant has a level of control on how the sets of actions can be translated 
into intermediate or final outcomes (McGinnis, 2011a). In this research, control is 
determined by two main decision-making bodies: the HCB and the Partnership 
Executive. The interviews suggest that the two bodies transform actions into outcomes 
by consensus decision-making in (1) challenging discussions and pre-approval; and/or 
by (2) ratification and final endorsements. These mechanisms distinguish the level of 
power between the two. In this section, we examine how the HCB and the Partnership 
Executive utilise the sets of choices presented to them, come to an agreement, and 




6.5.1 Consensus decision-making 
The Partnership has a dominant approach of decision-making via consensus-
building arrangement. “We have to work by consensus. There is no other way forward,” 
(L05) an LA Senior Leader states. Without general agreement, the participating decision-
makers with opposing views will end up discussing for a long period of time (G01, L05). 
This feature was considered as one of the strengths of the governance structure, 
particularly at the senior level (G07, G08, G13, C04, L05).  
Figure 24: Voting rights 
 
Source: (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018) 
In order to keep a collective and united voice, voting arrangements were put in place 
in order to reach a decision on a majority process (Figure 24). The HCB, for instance, 
has set-up an agreement on voting rights to determine how a final decision is to be 
convened by the board members. As previously agreed, the principal core stakeholders 
and original signatories of the Health Devo MoU (i.e. LAs, CCGs, NHS Trusts and FTs, 
and NHSE) are the voting members of the HCB with a vote of 75% in favour in order for 
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any proposal to be endorsed or carried forward. When the primary care vote through 
PCAG was added later on, the level of support needed was increased to 80% (GMCA 
and NHS in GM, 2018). The decisions made by the HCB are not binding, but rather 
recommendations made are to be formally adopted by the members following their own 
governance procedures. Similar arrangements apply to the Partnership Executive. The 
VCSE sector, however, does not have voting rights in the Partnership Executive, but 
rather, they are granted a seat on the table to shape the discussions and represent the 
collective views of their respective group.  
6.5.2 Challenging discussions and pre-approval 
To illustrate how the Partnership puts this in action, we examine the flow of decisions 
and the dynamics of power between the Partnership Executive board to the HCB. We 
asked interviewees to draw from their experiences on any Partnership activities they 
have been recently involved in (e.g. project proposal, strategic document, assurance 
framework, etc.) and to describe how it was translated into an outcome via the 2 decision-
making entities. 
Primarily, the Partnership Executive board is a closed-door forum where all the 
dialogue and discussions happen between the representatives from various sectoral 
groups. It is considered as the “engine room” (G08, G17) of the Partnership, where all 
the discussions occur prior to the final endorsement of any proposal, amendment, 
recommendation, or update in the HCB. It primarily focused on “identifying the 
challenges, asking for the work to be done… having debates between different kinds of 
stakeholder… and where all the most difficult conversations happen.” (G08)  
When the Partnership was at its strategy building phase, the Partnership Executive 
was focused on ensuring that a strategic proposal was engaged across different parts of 
the GMHSC governance, particularly to the Advisory Groups (F03), and discussing about 
how to further refine the items in the document (G08). For instance, a Partnership project 
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management lead said they had taken the Primary Care strategy to the Advisory Groups 
for sign-off, and to ultimately, what was then the Strategic Partnership Board Executive 
(SPBE) and then finally to HCB (G01). This works similarly for other strategical 
documents that needed to be taken around the governance structure before it reaches 
the Partnership Executive. The Partnership Executive is the penultimate lap of the 
“socialisation” (G01, G07, G12, F03) loop of the strategic document, and by the time it 
comes to that point, “Partnership exec will then say well actually we got some concerns 
around this issue, so we might have to go around the cycle again.” (G06).   
Furthermore, the allocation of the Transformation Fund was also an important point 
of discussion within the Partnership Executive board. Discussions were particularly 
intensive on agreeing to a final decision on whether money should be awarded or not to 
various localities and programmes after extensive reviews by other sub-committees. For 
illustrative purposes, a Partnership finance lead described the scenario like, “They would 
say, let's keep with Stockport for simplicity, Stockport have applied for Transportation 
fund. This is what Stockport are promising to do, Stockport wants 20 million. TFOG 
recommend the approval subject to these material conditions. Do you Partnership 
Executive Board, support the decision to give Stockport 20 million?” (G02) In this case, 
the TFOG sub-committee has already performed the leg work and they are presenting a 
summarised version of the presentations to the Partnership Executive board.  
A Partnership project management lead described a meeting with the Executive 
board as “provocative and challenging” (G12), where board members asked questions 
about the how the programme will go forward and why is it important. Similarly, an FT 
Senior project director compared the bidding process similar to “dragon’s den” (F01), 
where the Executive directors were very intense when it comes to probing why they 




“We had to pitch for the money. And I can remember, at that point by then 
*Executive director*14 was very involved, and said "Okay how many are you 
going to roll out to? By when?" And I kept saying "Well it depends it depends." 
And they kept pushing me.” (F01) 
 
During the delivery, monitoring, and assurance phases, the Partnership Executive 
board acts as an even tougher critic. They have oversight on all operational and 
transactional issues; therefore, they have established a rigorous process on ensuring 
that all members of the Partnership are performing up to a standard that is expected of 
them. It is up to sub-governance teams to perform weekly to monthly checks on different 
levels of quality and assurance. Any areas of performance, whether it’s problematic or 
not, goes into the Partnership Executive Board for further discussion or intervention and 
recovery plans if appropriate. As much as possible, any issues will be filtered through by 
the Executive unless an ultimate decision is needed to be escalated to the HCB. A 
Partnership senior director said, “We monitor it in different ways, and we wouldn't take it 
back to HCB unless there was a fundamental change in what we need to.” (G08)  
Executive directors also play a dual role in terms of monitoring and assurance, where 
they carry responsibilities as Partnership executives for operational purposes, and as 
NHS local directors for NHS England functions. For instance, the Executive Lead for 
Finance and Investment is in charge of managing and monitoring the overall financial 
position for both Trust and FT providers, and the commissioners as part of his NHSE 
role; whilst the same position is also in charge of overseeing the management and 
financial aspects of the Transformation Fund and the financial operationalisation of the 
Partnership itself. These dual functions allow Executive directors to carry a bigger role 
                                                          
14 Name omitted for ethical purposes 
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in terms of monitoring its member organisations against not only to national standards 
but also against the commitment to the Devolution agreement (G13). 
Overall, the Partnership Executive has a greater scope on decision-making. It has 
the responsibility to pre-approve everything before presenting it to the HCB, which 
explains why their process is more intense when it comes to probing for discussions and 
asking more difficult questions to the participants. The environment is more of like a 
“debating chamber” (G08, G13), unlike the HCB where it's more of the leaders of partner 
organisations or stakeholders sitting on the table. Because the Partnership Executive 
board members are constituencies (i.e. nominated by their organisations) of the key 
sectors, there is enough representation to make significant decisions taken at this level 
on behalf of the GMHSC system. They have a larger decision-making power in terms of 
addressing problems at a collective level and have discretion to control and prevent any 
escalation of any types of decisions or issues to the HCB. 
6.5.3 Ratification and final endorsements 
The HCB is the highest level and ultimate decision-making body in the governance 
structure. Interviewees described HCB as the last point of call in terms of giving its seal 
of approval and ratifying or endorsing a recommendation or decision. The HCB is a public 
meeting, thus, ideally, it is more of a “rubber-stamping” (G13, P01) presentation of pre-
approved proposals and pre-determined reports that was already sifted and debated 
through the governance structures.  
The HCB and Partnership Executive work hand-in-hand. When a decision reaches 
the top of the hierarchy (i.e. the HCB), the Partnership Executive must be able to say 
that they already had an extensive debate about the risks and implications, and whether 
it should be presented in the HCB agenda or not for ratification. There's nothing to stop, 
however, the HCB from having the discussion. But the point is that by the time it gets to 
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them, all the legwork should have been done and the decisions have already been made 
(C01, P01).  
“We'd expect that to have been done in advance, so that's the final place where 
we've got everybody on board, we bring it there. We then say to them, ‘Do you 
now endorse, support and buy into this?’” (G08) 
 
Since the HCB meetings are open to the public and televised via a webcast, some 
described it as “theatrical” (G08). The meetings are done in a council chambers and are 
attended by the senior leaders of every partner organisation.  Because of this public 
facing nature, there really is a limited opportunity for discussion and comment. The 
agenda is published beforehand, where all attending members receive summarised 
versions of the agenda items and the Chair of the meeting asks, “Are we all backing this? 
Is this the way forward?” (G08)  
In fact, when something lands on the HCB table, it meant that the agenda has already 
been through the governance structures and everyone attending the HCB meeting (i.e. 
the senior representatives) are already aware or familiar with it. The discussions 
involving the HCB are more of just a re-confirmation if everyone agrees with it, then they 
publicly declare their consensus agreement. “If it was significant enough… or it was 
relevant to the success or failure of the implementation ‘Taking Charge’ and it landed on 
that table, what you'd get is a sense of What does this mean for hospital providers? What 
does it mean for primary care providers? What does it mean for local government and 
politicians? What does it mean for clinical commissioning groups? What it does mean for 
the voluntary and community sector? And then we come up with a settled consensual 




The impact of an HCB decision is important to any Partnership activity. It gives a 
stamp of approval and a final endorsement to carry on with the next steps. Because of 
the Devolution arrangements, the HCB does not carry any legal binding powers to 
enforce any decisions to its partner organisations. It does, however, have the authority 
to make recommendations for its members to follow any formal decisions made within 
their own organisational governance structures. It is up to the localities to implement 
these decisions and the Partnership then plays a supporting role to it. A Partnership 
project management lead says, “we've set our ambition, we've got an agreement, but 
how they commission and deliver and fund it, it is up to them.” (G01) Senior leaders, to 
say the least, follow these decisions out of respect on the MoU they signed. There is a 
sense of collective ownership and buy-in amongst the key stakeholders, thus, they 
implement any decisions even without the legal enforcement (C01, L04).  
Moreover, having something signed off by the HCB meant that all the effort by the 
Partnership programme staff members and participating representatives from the key 
stakeholders are finally put into test. A Partnership project management lead says, “it 
puts us in a very strong position to make a difference and be a bit bold. Because if you 
get signed off at that HCB, then that means it's serious and you've got to do it.” (G12) 
For example, when a programme strategy was approved, the HCB has written a letter to 
all GM chief executives to say, this has been approved. “We don't want this just to be a 
strategy that sits on the shelf and doesn't have any impact. And we've suggested a 100-
day challenge for people to, for organisations and localities to commit to some action to 
help deliver the strategy over a 100-day period.” (G04) a Partnership project 
management lead explained. 
Although the Partnership Executive has a wider scope when it comes to decision-
making, the HCB has the final say on whether it is going to be endorsed to its members 
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or not. Therefore, it has greater weight on its decision-making powers in terms of making 
recommendations for enforcement to the entire GMHSC system. 
6.6 Information 
Each participant has a set of information available to them prior to making any action 
within the action situation. In the Partnership, information is disseminated across the 
structures through a variety of channels. A Communications Strategy was initially 
released in September 2016 to support the sharing of information across the sectors 
participating in the Partnership, supplemented by other forms of formal meetings and/or 
informal networking.  
6.6.1 Communications Strategy 
To formally support the engagement of the Partnership and increase its presence 
across the GMHSC system, a Communications Strategy was signed in September 2016. 
The document mapped out mechanisms on how to build significant awareness on the 
GMHSC devolution and communications between the participating organisations 
through the following (see GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016b): 
 Stakeholder engagement. The document emphasised the importance of 
maintaining effective, reciprocal relationships with stakeholders by establishing 
monthly checkpoints and bulletins. Reporting to the HCB is also recommended 
to maintain formal ties with the Partnership. 
 Content strategy and brand development. Content strategy aims to raise 
awareness on the strategic plans of GM and its tangible benefits to the localities. 
Reinforcement controls are in place to highlight the financial impact that 
Devolution can bring, with regular reports on Performance and Statutory duties. 
 Media relations. Media training and briefing arrangements are to be provided 
especially to senior Executive leaders in order to maintain an online presence or 
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media profile. They are to proactively engage with different media coverages 
through a variety of materials, such as case studies, opinions, and comments. 
The Partnership is to monitor media coverage about Devolution and round them 
up in summary reports or monthly bulletins. 
 Digital engagement. The Partnership wants to build an effective presence in 
online conversations about Devolution and in engaging with the public and other 
stakeholder groups. Websites and social media accounts are to be monitored. 
 Campaigns. Agreed national campaigns are to be incorporated in a GM-level 
context, in coordination with the partner organisations such as Sport England, 
Public Health England, and Department of Health. 
 Internal staff engagement. To build a cohesive GMHSC community amongst the 
internal staff members through staff bulletins, face-to-face briefing, Executive 
board briefings, access to training and leadership, and incorporating brand 
management (i.e. ID/lanyard and core templates for staff members). 
 Partnership working and public engagement. A simple operating model for 
communications and engagement is agreed by the Partnership members to be 
embedded across GM. This include sign off and consultation requirements in 
order to build knowledge, skills, and capacity at a GM and place level. 
 
It also laid out the four different levels of engagement and communicating operations 
of the Partnership, namely: 
 National level. Engagement at the national level over the delivery of the NHS Five 
Year Forward View and the accountability with NHS England. 
 GM level led by GM core Partnership team. Overall responsibility of the Chief 
Officer on the delivery of the GM Strategic Plan and ensuring the resources, 
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skills, and capacity are in place to deliver programmes within the Strategic Plan. 
Assurance and support at place-based level on behalf of NHS England. 
 Place-based level. Delivery of locality plans and assurance to Partnership at GM 
level. 
 Organisational level. Responsibility and accountability to its organisational 
leaders. Delivery of engagement and consultation activities in related to 
transformation programmes. 
 
Overall, the Communications Strategy identified the ideal way of sharing information 
across the different groups within the Partnership. It provided a sound framework on how 
the Partnership formally plays an active role in ensuring that all participating stakeholders 
and partner organisations are engaged collectively within the system through various 
channels of information. 
6.6.2 Meetings and reports 
Meetings and reports are other ways of sharing information between the members 
of the Partnership. Majority of the interviewees attend meetings convened by the 
Partnership, where HCB, Executive, and programme board meetings as the most 
frequently cited. 
The HCB meetings were initially conducted monthly between 2016 to 2018 (initial 
establishment and strategy building phase). During the delivery and implementation 
phase on 2018, meetings were revised to every two months but still retained its public-
facing nature (i.e. televised via webcast). The venue was also rotated between the 10 
LAs to ensure a locality dimension and to increase public accessibility across GM. 
Members of the HCB represent both their respective organisation and locality when 
attending the meetings (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018). The meeting is chaired by GM 
Combined Authority portfolio holder for Health and Social Care, and co-chaired by the 
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Chief Officer. The Chief Officer’s report is one of the staple items and is usually the first 
point on the agenda of HCB meetings. It summarises key items of interest both within 
the GMHSC Partnership and its partner organisations. It also provides updates on 
Partnership activities, key discussions and decisions of the Partnership Executive board, 
including reports highlighting performance, transformation, quality, finance and risk. The 
HCB usually notes and comments on the Chief Officer's report afterwards. Documents 
and recorded webcasts of the meetings are released to the public through the 
Partnership website for transparency and accountability.  
The Executive, on the other hand, still meets every month with a forward plan of 
agenda items to be distributed in advanced to ensure clarity on which items are to be 
discussed and agreed. The following groups also submit regular reports to the 
Partnership Executive, wherein summarised versions are included in the agendas: 
Finance Executive Group; Performance and Delivery Board; Programme Coordination 
Group; and Quality Board (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2018). Since this meeting is closed 
to the public, documents are not released to the Partnership website. Decision logs are 
completed following every meeting in line with the GM Accountability agreement. These 
are reported back on a quarterly basis to the HCB. Short summary reports of Partnership 
Executive meetings could be included in the Chief Officer’s report, to which the board 
members can comment on during the HCB meeting. 
As part of the assurance process, CCGs hold quarterly meetings with the Executive 
directors of the GMHSC Partnership along with the leaders of the localities (C02). Each 
CCG Executive team must send representatives to this meeting to satisfy the statutory 
requirements. A CCG board member illustrated, “…as a group we provide, every quarter 
I think it is, a highlights report about how we're spending the money, what we're spending 
on or what the risks are associated to that project” (C04) Assurance meetings provide a 
forum for the Partnership and the localities to connect and communicate with each other 
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about their progress and how they are getting on with the implementation of their 
respective programmes across different sectors. Project management leads (G10, G14, 
G16) explained that locality performance and assurance meetings are held on a regular 
basis, where localities are asked to update on progress in this context against the agreed 
outcomes frameworks or national standards. Finally, the Partnership also releases an 
Annual Report and Business Plan report every year to update its stakeholders about the 
financial and sustainability performance of the GMHSC system, and progress on the 
implementation of the GM Strategic Plan. This was their way of updating their members 
and the public about the status of the Partnership in terms of financial and operational 
performance. 
6.6.3 Informal networks 
In the previous chapter, we have seen how the various sectoral groups coped with 
the tensions in the system by retaining informal arrangements to collectively remain as 
a GM-level unit. Because of the built-in networks that existed in GM long before 
Devolution was introduced, it was easier for them to communicate and work with one 
another when the Partnership emerged (G01, G09, C03, F02). There is a high level of 
interdependency amongst the members of the Partnership, which makes it easier to build 
and maintain relationships and create collaborative conversations.  
“I think that is from a history of having meetings together and people regularly 
seeing each other, so even before we (the Partnership) existed, there were kind 
of meetings and people got to know each before that so if you had those 
personal relationships, it makes it a lot easier to move ahead with work (sic).” 
(G09) 
 
Whilst the Partnership laid out the building blocks for bridging communications 
between the partners across the system, interviewees used other mechanisms to share 
information and interact with one another without having to go through the formal 
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channels. For instance, a Partnership project management lead described socialising 
ideas and pieces of documents around the governance structure in order to familiarise 
them about the piece of work they are doing (G01). Another Partnership project 
management lead said it was an effective way of getting people onside and raise their 
understanding about what the Partnership is trying to do (G07). “Socialisation” is a 
common practice of sharing knowledge or progress across the system, or a way of 
getting everyone to buy into an idea and getting them on board (C01, P06) prior to its 
discussion in the formal forums of the decision-making entities (i.e. Executive board 
meeting or HCB meeting). This is also a cheaper and more cost-effective way of raising 
the profile of the GMHSC Partnership and the various internal teams working around a 
multitude of programmes across the 10 localities (G07). 
The more people they involve during the socialisation period, the more feedback they 
receive (G04). It gives the Partnership more time to refine the idea and add more input 
from the various people they consulted with. A CCG Senior Lead, for instance, described, 
“We involved lots of people, patients and different organisations, different professional 
groups, as we were developing it. We had various versions, went to various groups. They 
gave feedback. We changed it. It was very, very well received.” (C01) This process 
created a more interactive relationship between various sectors because they get to 
discuss the more important things that are closer to their own local problems and tailor 
it to how they can address it as GM collective unit.  
“So, you know we got broad agreement around the what, some people were 
saying yes these are the things that are important to us. This is what we ought 
to be doing. Some of this, some of this is being prescribed nationally, but you 
needed to get local ownership and buy in to it. So that people don't say, well 
"That doesn't work for us, you know we're different. Our population is different. 





Another mechanism used for information sharing is through influencing. This practice 
is commonly used by partner organisations and core stakeholder groups, who do not sit 
or hold any position within the Partnership team. A Foundation Trust Senior project 
director, for example, described how she found networks within the Partnership team 
and maintained in-contact with them to help her understand and be updated with what’s 
happening next on a particular transformational programme (F01). Because she has no 
direct participation or no direct way of attending the meetings, she used this opportunity 
to establish a two-way relationship in order to influence various Partnership teams on 
the work piece she is involved in. 
“I help feed her information of what's going on. But that gives me an ability to 
influence, but it also gives me the ability to hear what's going on. Rather than 
waiting for it to trickle down through other routes. So, in many ways having this 
establishment has made a whole lot more things to happen but actually, 
potentially it gives us opportunities to work differently… it's another layer in the 
cake, which some people would say is more difficult. But actually, it's a layer that 
has potential to influence more directly.” (F01) 
 
Consequently, a Foundation Trust Senior officer also said that influencing their own 
organisation was useful in bridging relationships at different levels within the Partnership 
(F02), especially in areas within the system where there are existing tensions between 
the key stakeholders. Coming from a perspective of an FT where they are organically 
rooted to their board of directors for accountability, having the ability to influence and 
bring people aboard from their own organisation made it easier for them to have honest 
conversations when they meet formally in meetings within the Partnership. Having the 
ability to influence gives them a step advantage when it comes to getting people signed 
up for an idea and resolving existing tensions amongst themselves before, they step 
forward in a collective forum.  
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More so, influencing can also be a counter mechanism to persuade people, most 
especially decision-makers, about an idea you are selling (F01, P02). If you want them 
to change their existing opinions or if you want to lobby for ideas, having the ability to 
influence the right people within the Partnership could pay off.  
“It just means you need to influence more. So, if you walk into a meeting and 
everybody's got a different agenda, you have to think, right how can I influence 
them and actually you know what, or are they right? That is more important than 
what I'm asking right now? And so how do I influence given this new landscape?” 
(F01) 
 
This leads us to another common way of sharing information, which is through 
principled engagement. When participants interacting in a decision-making arena have 
the opportunity to engage with one another, they are more likely to establish trust and 
respect with each other’s interests (Emerson et al., 2012). This means getting the right 
people to negotiate and resolve their conflict with one another outside formal forums. For 
example, a Senior project lead from a partner organisation explained how identifying the 
right people to engage in prior to the “dropping a piece of paper” (P02) moment was 
crucial to the principled engagement process. This include asking the right questions 
such as, “Who do you speak to? Who are the movers and shakers? And who's going to 
be actually able to influence the decision makers?” (P02)  
Getting the right people in the room can be a challenging task, especially with the 
complex governance structures in place (G07, G14, P03, P04, P05, L05). Since there 
are multiple projects running at the same time with cross-sectoral organisations working 
together, interviewees suggest that resolving differences or conflicts can be best 
addressed by informal conversations outside meetings (G01, G09, L05). For example, a 
Partnership project management lead sometimes attend what they refer to as a “kitchen 
cabinet” meeting (G12), where several other project managers meet together on a 
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monthly basis to play catch up on what they are up to. An LA Senior leader also illustrated 
that when something is getting out of hand and participants cannot come up with a 
consensus, they had to sort out the issues separately and privately (L05). This ultimately 
helped in dealing with difficult conversations and resolving conflicts that tend to build up 
during formal meetings.  
“Try and cope with those offline. It is worth trying to do it. So, if you wait until the 
meeting and have a bigger row… you then got to pull people back together. So, 
if you try and get them together beforehand, get them to identify what their issues 
are to see if we can work with you going forwards.” (L05) 
 
Another Partnership project management lead said that different organisations within 
a locality may struggle to converse with one another if they are in the same room, so it 
is up to the Partnership staff to “join the dots” (G07) and manage their relationships to 
resolve their issues. These important debates all needed to occur before gathering in 
any decision-making forum (L05). “What you can't really have is a major fall out amongst 
all of the people in a large public board meeting because they've never seen something 
before,” a CCG Senior lead explained (C01). This statement reinforces the impact of 
reconciling issues prior to raising an item in any agenda, most especially in the HCB 
meeting (G08, G13). 
It was important for the Partnership to keep having these difficult debates and 
conversations with the various pockets of the system, otherwise, they lose traction (F02, 
L03, P05). “You have to choose you battles. You work on when the time is appropriate 
to raise those issues,” a LA councillor said (L03). Whether they engage, influence, or 
socialise the ideas, the organisations and the Partnership needed to find innovative ways 
on consolidating views or reconciling issues outside the formal decision-making forums. 
More importantly, the more they engage with each other in informal venues, the more 
chances they have on making the conversation relevant or significant enough to be 
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brought to the formal table (G17, L05). Because of the fragmented structures existing 
before Devolution was introduced, everyone needed to navigate their way through the 
new system in place.  
“So, what tends to happen with that is that you'd have a whether an 
implementation plan or an implementation problem. If it was significant enough, 
that it spoke across the, it was relevant to the success or failure of the 
implementation taking charge, and it landed on that table.” (G17) 
 
Overall, evidence suggests that navigating through the Partnership system is all 
about relationship management and informal networking. Whilst there are governance 
routes and engagement framework set-up to guide the relationships, the interviewees 
believed that the complexity of the governance structure made it more difficult to navigate 
through. They had to find different ways of working in order to share information across 
the table and make sure that the right people are engaged in the conversations. 
6.7 Costs and benefits 
For every action that a participant takes, there are attributed rewards or sanctions 
that either incentivise or disincentivise the production of the desired outcomes of the 
Partnership (Heikkila and Andersson, 2018). In the case of the GM Health Devo, we 
examine what motivates the stakeholder groups, partner organisations, and the core 
Partnership team from collaborating with each other and what are the trade-offs if they 
decide to do so. Our research suggests that the participants’ incentive to collaborate are 
be shaped by: (1) the imposed binding rules of the devolution agreement; (2) their own 
organisational agendas that yield maximum benefits, and more importantly, (3) the 
Transformation Fund money available for their financial gains. These were all reflected 
in the previous sections above, but we attempt to lay it out in terms of identifying how 
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these shape the Partnership members’ incentives to collaborate and participate in 
Partnership activities within the action situation. 
6.7.1 Imposed rules by the Devolution agreement 
It was a common theme from the interviews that participants agreed to engage in the 
Partnership itself because of the Devolution agreement that they all signed up for. The 
MoU, in particular, cemented the “gentleman’s agreement” (F02) where everybody was 
pretty much working with each other via a “social contract” (P05). Whilst none of the 
agreements have any legal mandates, the organisations who signed up for Devolution 
were all working based on their existing social attributes (i.e. trust, reputation, reciprocity) 
and working relationships (i.e. built-in informal networks, tensions within the system), 
which they have known from their previous experiences. Whilst some believe they 
collectively have to participate in Partnership activities because they signed up for it, 
others believed they had to do it because it is the right thing to do. The interest for joint 
collective actions has always been there for some organisations.  
6.7.2 Organisational agenda 
If it doesn’t benefit their own organisation, chances are they try to find other ways on 
how to influence the system. This partisan behaviour was one of the effects resulting 
from the purchaser-provider split that emerged during the 1990s. This posed some level 
of difficulty in terms of making joint decisions for the greater good because if the 
decisions are to negatively impact one's organisation, for instance, then the participants 
are more likely to make a choice that will benefit their own organisation. We 
demonstrated in the previous chapter that CCGs and Trusts struggle to overcome their 
vested interests due to the blurred lines of accountability (C01, F02).  
“If you put in pressure on individual organisations that might make them behave 
in a way, that only looks after their own interests rather than the greater good of 
the whole... We still see behaviours that are about either protecting something, 
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or you know, sort of vested interests and it's really difficult to try and get people 
to step out of their own organisation.” (C01) 
 
6.7.3 Financial gains 
With the TF coming into GM, there has been a full devolution effect felt across local 
NHS organisations. Since this pot of money was protected and there was more certainty 
on how much money GM is going to collectively get over a three-year period, CCGs and 
Trusts were able to plan accordingly. Moreover, it allowed more freedom to spend the 
money based on the priorities outlined on the GM Strategic Plan. “We get to decide at 
Greater Manchester-level what it gets spent on. So instead of us bidding or for being part 
of these formula changes over a period of time, we have certainty about how much 
money we were going to get.” (C04)  
“We don't have to bid for money against other parts of the country and potentially 
not to get our fair share because our bid wasn't good enough. We do get our fair 
share. And the reality is over time some of the national pot that we're getting a 
fair share of, hasn't been spent on transformation. So, in the end we will have 
spent more money on transformation in GM than anywhere else because we've 
protected all of that £450 million for transformation, we'd not used it to proper 
minor organisations.” (G13) 
 
The TF was separate from the conventional funding allocations to CCGs and was 
focused on the delivery of the five transformation themes outlined in the GM Strategic 
Plan. Although TF allowed more flexibility on how GM wants to spend the money on, a 
separate funding application process within the Partnership was put in place for the 
localities and other programmes of work to adhere to, which will then be assessed by an 
independent team internal to the Partnership and approved several external boards 
(GMCA and NHS in GM, 2016a). This is to ensure that there are equal opportunities for 
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everyone to bid and that the distribution of the funding is spread out across various 
places. The TF, therefore, provided a financial incentive for stakeholders and partner 
organisations to participate in the collective action. It enabled them to conduct various 
work programmes of which the Partnership has strategically managed. 
A monitoring and performance framework was also put in place to make sure that 
those receiving the money will produce the outcomes they promised to deliver. With this 
process put in place, it brought a sense of ownership for local leaders from LAs and NHS 
organisations to have responsibility to the money they're applying to or been given 
access to. A Senior CCG Lead said, “…rather than the Treasury every year having to 
put more and more money in to close the gap, it will say have the money now, and then 
you use it locally and you'll use it far more sensibly... and you will sort out some of the 
big problems in your system because you're taking responsibility for it.” (C01)  
6.8 Potential outcomes 
In this research, we are not concerned about evaluating the impact or the tangible 
outputs of the Partnership, but rather on the immediate process outcomes arising from 
the collaborative relationships and (in)formal mechanisms in place to govern the health 
commons. Therefore, outcomes in this research, therefore, refer to the desired process 
outcomes of every action taken by every position in the Partnership (see Table 13). 
Earlier in this chapter, we have identified major positions occupied by the various 
participants within the GMHSC Partnership, namely: the providers of service (occupied 
by the key stakeholders); the internal and external regulators (occupied by both the 
Partnership staff and NHS England); the taskforce groups occupied by the Partnership 
staff and partner organisations, and the decision-making bodies occupied by participant 
groups who are all equally represented. Each of these positions have a specified set of 
actions to which they choose from prior to participating in any Partnership activity. Using 
the set of information available to them and other external factors, such as the attributes 
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of the participants they interact with, they select an action and transform them into 
outcomes. Each outcome as a result of the combination of information, costs and 
benefits, and external factors, is therefore highlighted as follows.  
Table 13: Link between Actions and Outcomes 
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The purpose of this chapter was to draw together the exogenous variables from 
Chapter 5 and examine how they informed the participants within the action situation 
utilised them to modify and regulate their behaviour. We particularly explored the seven 
elements which make up the internal structure of the action situation, namely: 
participants, positions, potential outcomes, set of allowable actions, control in function, 
information available to participants, and perceived costs and benefits. Each of these 
elements corresponds with a set of rules, which emerges as an outcome of the 
interactions from the action situation. This is the rules configuration stage of the process, 
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where they craft, monitor, and enforce formal and informal institutions to facilitate their 
relationships. 
As illustrated above, our evidence suggests that the Partnership was able to 
successfully devise their own formal and informal institutional arrangements in order to 
shape the behaviour of their participants. They relied on soft structures, such as 
frameworks, strategic plans, governance structures, assurance and monitoring 
guidelines, and the MoU, to substitute to the absence of statutory legislation. This was 
used to create order and mobilise the relationships amongst its participants. More 
importantly, the Partnership resorted to informal institutions like shared norms, trust, and 
reciprocity, in order to overcome the limitations of the absence of formal institutions. They 
took advantage of the strong history of collaboration by the embedded networks and 
used this to facilitate debates and enable conversations that are difficult to conduct in a 
formal forum. 
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7 Interactions and Outcomes 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we outlined the formal and informal mechanisms that the 
Partnership and its member organisations have employed in order to establish the 
governance structure and how the participants should behave and make choices within 
the decision-making arena. Given a set of allowable actions, information, and the 
constraints provided by the exogenous variables (i.e. physical and material 
characteristics of the health commons, community attributes, and the rules-in-use), 
participants who occupy different positions then use different collaborative mechanisms 
in order to navigate their way through the action situation and produce their desired 
outcomes.  
In this chapter, we aim to round up the empirical findings and address each of the 
research questions of this study.  
1. Under what circumstances can collaborative governance mechanisms create a 
system of stewardship in governing the health commons? 
2. What are the formal and informal institutions that emerged as a response to 
collective action dilemmas? 
3. How are institutional arrangements influencing the different levels of collaborative 
processes in the governance of the health commons? 
 
First, we examine the emerging patterns of interaction according to Ostrom’s multiple 
levels of analysis, as a result of the different institutions set up within the constitutional, 
collective-choice, and operational levels. More importantly, we want to understand how 
the participants coordinated, competed, or engaged with one another in order to address 
collective issues, and the difficulties and various tensions arising from their interactions. 
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Second, we outline the formal and informal institutions resulting from our examination of 
the GMHSC Partnership as stewards of the health commons. Lastly, we summarise the 
findings according to Ostrom’s 7-rules typology and draw lessons on how we can apply 
the results of this study to the future consideration of using the health commons as a 
theoretical lens to sustain the NHS. 
7.2 Three levels of partnership activities 
The Partnership activities are mainly divided into three phases: (1) Strategic building; 
(2) Delivery and implementation; and (3) Monitoring and assurance. During the initial 
years (2015-2017) of the Partnership, majority of the activities involved writing strategic 
documents and establishing agreements between organisations on how to coordinate 
with each other within the system after signing the Devolution agreement. This meant 
that the Partnership was focused on engaging with the key stakeholders and making 
sure they are on board with what the Partnership is committed to achieve. Then from 
2018 onwards, as the Transformation fund was slowly allocated to various parts of the 
system, the Partnership’s activities shifted to the implementation and delivery phase. 
This included assurance and regulation of the activities, and the maintenance of 
relationships between the participants.  
In order for us to situate the institutional rules that emerged and how participants 
interact in each phase, we return to the assumptions of Ostrom’s IAD framework and 
how it recognises that institutional choices in the action situation can occur in multiple 
levels. Ostrom’s multiple levels of analysis illustrate how all rules are nested in another 
set of rules (Ostrom, 2005:58), where one level of actions and outcomes obtained from 
the previous level affect the proceeding level. For example, constitutional rules refer to 
who, when, and how can participants engage. These then affect the collective-choice 
activities, where choices about which institutions or strategies should be used in 
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resolving collective decisions. These collective-choice rules then influence how day-to-
day transactions and decisions are made by the participants in operational situations. 
This approach is a particularly useful way of examining how various rules and 
interactions emerged from the GMHSC Partnership and the organisations involved in it, 
and how the decision-making processes at different levels of Partnership activities 
occurred. In the operational situation, we focus on how the key stakeholders and partner 
organisations interacted with one another to deliver and implement the GM Strategic 
Plan. In the collective-choice situation, we look at how the Partnership acted as the 
steward to GM’s health economy and how it fulfilled its oversight role in strategy building, 
delivery, and monitoring and assurance. We also want to explore how various 
participants come together in the collective-choice action arena to make decisions 
collaboratively and collectively. Lastly, the constitutional situation refers to the role of 
NHS England as a key player to the GMHSC Devolution agreement and how it controlled 
the collective-choice activities by implying national mandates and regulatory roles. 
This section particularly addresses our third research question: 
 How are institutional arrangements influencing the different levels of collaborative 
processes in the governance of the health commons? 
a. How is the interaction of formal and informal institutions affecting the 
different levels of relationships between the participants?  
b. How are the rules-in-use (informal) utilised to facilitate the relationships 
within the collaborative governance? 
c. What are the collaborative mechanisms used by the decision-makers to 





7.2.1 Constitutional situations 
In this section, we look at the constitutional activities, which are primarily the events 
leading to Devolution and how emerging institutions (i.e. constitutional rules-in-use) 
potentially impacted the facilitation of the GMHSC Partnership in the collective-choice 
level. We focus on the role that NHS England played in the constitution level and how 
this affected the interactions in the collective-choice and operational situations.  
7.2.1.1 Formal institutions 
In order for Health Devo to materialise, formal institutions (e.g. rule of law or binding 
legal documents) were put in place. As we recall, formal institutions play an important 
role in fostering local and regional economic development and legitimising collaborative 
governance (Feiock, 2008; Rodríguez-pose, 2013; Pike et al., 2015). The Devolution 
agreement is an example of a formal institution examined in the local economic 
development setting, where powers are shared or decentralised across specific multi-
agent geographical levels. Pike et al. (2015) described that the extent and nature of 
decentralisation within governance systems play an important role in explaining the types 
of institutions that shape and regulate the behaviour and relations.  
As illustrated in the previous sections, the Health Devo in GM emerged with no 
statutory basis. Unlike the 2012 Lansley reforms, the overarching legislative framework 
supporting Health Devo was through the ‘Warner amendments’ (The King’s Fund, 2015) 
to the National Health Service Act 2006 via the Cities and Local Government Devolution 
Act 2016. This only outlines the range of devolved NHS functions to combined authorities 
or local NHS organisations acting together through a joint committee, but in itself does 
not transfer the ‘N’ out of the NHS to ensure that the national standards and assurance 




7.2.1.1.1 De facto meta-governance 
Formal institutions also act as an incentive for collaboration, particularly in agency-
based collaborations where participation is oftentimes mandated by legislature, which in 
turn creates legitimacy (Moore and Koontz, 2003; Diaz-Kope et al., 2015). In the case of 
the Partnership, the absence of the statutory basis to drive “true” devolution of NHS 
functions to GM fails to mirror the full effect of the city-region Devolution agreement. This 
reflects the weakened local autonomy characterised by centrally-controlled policies, 
described as “contractual localism” by Deas (2014) and “centrally orchestrated localism” 
by Shaw and Tewdwr-jones (2017).  
The outcomes of the negotiation for the Devolution agreement illustrate that NHS 
England is still playing the role of a “meta-governor” (Jessop, 2014) orchestrating control 
mechanisms to assert political authority whilst also indirectly influencing the practices 
and preferences of distal networks and hierarchies to promote their agenda. This was 
visible throughout the institutionalisation of the GHMSC Partnership. An MoU was used 
as a formal institution to define the joint-working relationships between the local 
organisations involved in the GMHSC Partnership. The absence of legislation meant that 
NHS England was able to preserve the national characteristic of the NHS by ensuring 
that not all statutory responsibilities were fully discharged to the GM. It was a hands-off 
mechanism that allowed them to exercise influence whilst giving the Partnership some 
level of autonomy in defining their own paths and setting their own strategic agenda. This 
was demonstrated by some studies on the English devolution deals (Bailey and Wood, 
2017; Ayres et al., 2018) as a way of the central government regaining control and 
exerting an arms-length influence over the devolved regions.  
The established institutional arrangements were met by a mixture of reactions 
amongst the different stakeholders. NHS England remained very much involved during 
the negotiation stages and the delegation of functions was the prescribed route instead 
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of full devolution. The reason behind this is that NHS England wanted to preserve the 
national characteristic of the NHS by ensuring that not all statutory responsibilities are 
fully discharged to the GMHSC Partnership (The King’s Fund, 2015).  
A few were rather critical about the central government’s lack of enthusiasm or 
general interest to create primary statute to fuel devolution, mainly because of the fact 
that the Parliament has other things to worry about (i.e. Brexit) or that the NHS is 
reluctant for another restructuring of the system (G05, L05, P03, P04). It was also 
running the same time the parliamentary process around Cities and Devolution Bill was 
happening, so it was important for GM leaders to continue negotiating for Devo Health 
without breaking the momentum of securing the agreement (G17).  
Given that the government did not really have the best track record when it comes to 
restructuring the HSC system as demonstrated in previous chapters, it was almost 
understandable that GM had to settle for the delegation route rather than plead for further 
devolved powers. They practically took whatever was offered in the table (G05, G12, 
G17, L05). An interviewee depicted the NHS as an “oil tanker” (L05), where once you 
set it in course towards a particular destination, it is very difficult to steer it or change its 
direction. This meant that it takes a lot of time and effort to advocate for a statutory 
change within the NHS, especially after the current system is not fit for purpose as a 
result of the HSCA 2012. Time is, therefore, of the essence, and with the current 
complexities presented in changing legislation, GM leaders accepted the deal instead of 
spending resources to convince the NHS to take the legal devolution route. They had to 
take the route of forming a non-statutory body through partnership or joint working 
agreements forged by the signing of an MoU (G05). 
“The restrictions on what we could do was first of all there was no change in the 
structure of the NHS for Manchester. So, we had to take in all of the 
arrangements that existed… We didn't really have a legal vehicle for devolution 
at that point… We didn't want to lose the momentum. So, we went for the next 
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available option… which means that… we're not a statutory body, you know, 
we're a partnership of all the organisations.” (G17) 
 
That being said, some participants felt like GM Devo Health deal it was being 
enforced or mandated rather than encouraged (P03, P04). Since without written statues, 
NHS responsibilities cannot be devolved legally, thus, the MoUs were put in place “to 
push collaborative work despite the statutes separating it” (P03, P04). This only caused 
misunderstanding as to what the true meaning of Devolution is about especially when 
on a hindsight, devolution does not really entail what it’s meant to be.  
“So practically it's devolved but they can't say legally there, because legally we 
require primary statutes to change, unpick all the Lansley reforms and to do all 
of that, parliament have got something else on their plate, appears to be bit busy 
doing something else at the moment. So, we're pushing integration as far as we 
can despite statute, actually not promoting it. So legally nothing.” (P03, P04) 
 
The power awarded to GM was therefore, in some respects, an illusion (G03). Whilst 
it alleviates the GMHSC Partnership from the bureaucratic processes and enables them 
some level of freedom to do things differently, the irony is that GM is still subjected to 
NHS constitution and mandate. This was illustrated in the GM Strategic Plan, where 
transformation programmes such as decreasing A&E waiting times and the 
implementation of the locality plans were patterned against the NHS Five-Year Plan. A 
Partnership project management director said, “The central national governments said 
yes it's something that we're prepared to consider, but we want to see a coherent Five-
Year Plan for Greater Manchester.” (G05). This was a way of NHS England practicing 
its meta-governor role by “steering, not rowing” (Hammond et al., 2019) and making sure 
that GM still complies to national policy.  
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A senior local authority leader, however, highlighted that the intention of the NHS to 
preserve the ‘N’ is problematic in a way that not everything has to be implemented on a 
national level across the rest of the country (L05). The NHS needed to acknowledge that 
different regions have different needs in terms of addressing their population’s own 
health outcomes, thus making it quite difficult to achieve improvement if devolved regions 
are still subjected to national assurance and control.  
“One of the weaknesses of the NHS is that N, the national. We're trying to have 
everything done the same across the country. But we're the only part of that 
England that has this devolved part. It's not full devolution. We're still subject to 
all the controls that other parts of the country are from NHS England, but we do 
have more powers to do things differently in Greater Manchester.” (L05) 
 
As part of the Devolution agreements, lines of accountabilities and statutory 
responsibilities were retained. We have illustrated in the previous chapters how this has 
affected the formal institutions that the Partnership has created in order to facilitate the 
working relationships and lines of reporting between its member organisations or key 
stakeholders. Governance arrangements were established, and in effect, the core 
Partnership team became a regional office of the NHS England. Some statutory 
functions were delegated through the Chief Officer, and the Chief Officer reports back to 
NHS England, ensuring that the GMHSC Partnership delivers what was agreed in the 
MoU and GM Strategic Plan.  
These formal institutions were created to add another layer of complexity to the 
health and social care system, only for NHS England to play a domineering role and 
create constraints on how the local NHS organisations interact. Although GM was able 
to draft their own devolution proposals and set boundaries on how they want to take 
control of the system, NHS England was still able to set the ‘rules of the game’ on how 
much power is to be situated at the collective-choice level. The language of “devolution” 
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and “partnership” also caused an atmosphere of confusion and fragility to the local 
stakeholders (Lorne et al., 2018), masking it as a way to cultivate a collaborative and 
integrated atmosphere (P03, P04) when in reality, GM was only given limited power and 
autonomy. 
7.2.1.2 The presence of key leadership roles 
The conversation on devolution of health responsibilities started as part of the initial 
Devo Manc package. At that time, the debates were focused on other areas like skills 
and transport, and the potential of health devolution was recognised. It was referenced 
on the 2014 Devo Manc deal and within two months, Devo Health was quickly secured 
(G17).  
Political leadership played an important role in driving the devolution deals forward 
for GM (C04). Gray (1989) and Wood and Gray (1991) identified the presence of 
leadership roles in collaborative settings could bring and assemble the necessary 
stakeholders to the table. Moreover, the presence of powerful and influential may also 
encourage trust amongst the participants, thus ensuring a more successful collective 
action (Ostrom, 2000). Since health was not initially offered when Devo Manc landed on 
the table, key local political and NHS figures worked relentlessly to push for delegation 
of health functions to be included in the NHS agenda. “There were a couple of key people 
that kind of came together and started discussing, lobbying George Osborne, help him 
seeing some of the local NHS players,” a Partnership senior director narrated (G13). Ian 
Williamson, who was then the Chief Officer of Central Manchester CCG, was brought in 
to lead the NHS side of the work to set-up and to begin driving conversations on what 
Devo Manc might mean for health, (G13) along with Sir Howard Bernstein, Chief 
Executive of Manchester City Council, who represented the local authorities (LAs) and 
played an influential role in securing Devo Manc (L05, G17). Other local leaders and key 
figures from the GM Combined Authority also emerged for the negotiations. Simon 
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Stevens, Chief Executive of NHS England, was also invited to attend a number of those 
meetings to work on what became the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which 
was eventually signed off by the 37 GM NHS organisations and local councils.  
Because of the way GM has evolved over the past decades after the abolition of the 
GM City Council (GMCC) and the formation of the Association of GM Authorities 
(AGMA), it was only natural for a leader to emerge and lead the city-region to 
transformational success. This figure was Sir Howard Bernstein, and for most, he was 
regarded as a “star of British local government” (Halliday, 2016) and “the lead chief 
executive for the whole of Greater Manchester” (L05). Sir Howard Bernstein’s presence 
and influence over the years helped him build a local reputation, which eventually led for 
GM leaders to trust his skills and decisions. A CCG board member says, “locally in 
Manchester, when he said I'd like something to happen, people usually went that's a 
good idea.” He played an influential role in not only securing the devolution deals for GM, 
but also the additional £450 million Transformation fund to boost the GMHSC economy 
and change the direction of the NHS (G13, L05). “It was his skill really that helped to get 
the devolution deal across the line, he's very clever to do that,” says an LA Senior leader 
(L05). 
Almost without any consultation from the public and with the health deal being 
secured in a matter of months (G13, G17), the decisions were agreed upon by a small 
number of key officials from the government, NHS England, and the GM Combined 
Authority. This was a common theme in the English devolution deals, which illustrated 
the presence of court politics (Ayres et al., 2018) where policy is driven by a single 
person, in this case, Sir Howard Bernstein, with a small following of key individuals to 




Whilst Devo Health was being negotiated, Devo Manc was also running in parallel. 
With the introduction of the newly elected Mayor of GM Andy Burnham in 2017, it was 
questioned as to how he will situate himself in the devolution of health and social care in 
GM. When the Devolution deal was being struck, the government insisted for GM to have 
an elected Mayor and not everyone was keen on this idea. However, in order for Health 
Devo to push through, GM had to accept the package deal being offered (G17, L05). 
The Mayor has formally no influence nor any statutory responsibility for health, which 
means he has no decision-making power over the decisions that is being made by the 
Partnership (see Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016; GMCA, 2016). The 
absence of this, however, does not discount that it is a mechanism for depoliticisation by 
NHS England (Lorne et al., 2018; Hammond et al., 2019). The Mayor still sits in the 
Health and Care board meetings, although his presence is merely to show a united front 
and agreed representation between GMCA and the Partnership regarding public service 
reform (G16). 
In short, the Mayor has soft powers and has no statutory control as to what happens 
in the GMHSC system (G14). They do, however, have joint working relationships with 
the GMHSC Partnership to make sure that the transformation programmes, such as 
Population Health and Workforce Development, are aligned with GM’s public service 
reform plans.  
“What makes Manchester unique is the two of them existing. Because there are 
other levels of devolved health out there, we are not as unique as we like to 
think. There are other health structures out there and there are other devolved 
sort of combined authorities. What there isn't is the two of them mirrors and 





Andy Burnham’s entrance to the GMHSC Partnership created a unique and almost 
synchronic link with the GMCA (G03, P05), which in effect, impacted the way participants 
interact in the activities in the collective-choice level.  The newly established governance 
structures ensured that the Partnership has a link with the GMCA through the Reform 
board, which is the committee in charge of providing strategic leadership in developing 
integrated public services in GM (GMCA, 2016c). Whilst gluing the two pieces together 
may be ideal, it did not really reflect in practice. The GM Health and Care board and 
Reform board have very similar membership, although their functions and governance 
styles are different making it more difficult to link up together. HCB merely reports a 
summary of their meetings into the Reform board, which is then reported into the GMCA 
and the office of the Mayor. Some of the Partnership staff report to both Partnership and 
Reform boards, but they are not accountable to the GMCA nor the office of the Mayor. 
A Partnership project management lead reflected, “what we know is if somebody is not 
accountable then generally, stuff doesn't end up going their way,” (G14) leading to 
difficulties in discussion with separate parts of the system working in parallel governance 
and resulting into further fragmentation. The Partnership is not adequately influencing 
the Reform board at this stage, and this eventually became an inherent weakness in GM 
since there is little integration for public service and health reform. 
At the same time, another key figure emerged to take command in steering the 
direction of the GM health and social care economy. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, governance studies suggest that strong and flexible leadership is crucial in 
ensuring the success of the collaborative process (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Heikkila and 
Gerlak, 2018). When the shadow governance transitioned to the operationalisation of 
the GMHSC Partnership in April 2016, Jon Rouse was appointed by NHS England to 
take on the role of Chief Officer. He is ultimately accountable to NHS England ensuring 
that the key stakeholders deliver the NHS Constitution, and has received delegated NHS 
functions, such as strategic leadership, direct management, and CCG assurance to 
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name a few. More importantly, he plays a key role in terms of providing a solid leadership 
status within the Partnership, which created a huge impact as to how participants behave 
and make decisions in the collective-choice level. 
Jon Rouse’s appointment was mostly met with praise by the interviewees. He was 
regarded as a key driver of the team and an inspirational figure, who motivates the key 
stakeholders and partner organisations to work harder and collaborate together (G04, 
L04, L06). He has the vision to drive things forward and has the ability to facilitate 
conversations, making his addition to the GMHSC Partnership all the more prolific. Some 
believe his influential presence bred a positive mindset of “working differently” within and 
between organisations (G04, F01, P05), making it easier for the Partnership to navigate 
through the governance structures. For instance, a Partnership program management 
lead suggested that “if we sometimes say Jon Rouse is really keen on this, and Jon 
Rouse wants this to happen, that makes a difference,” in terms of implementing 
programmes of work (G04). Another also shared that Jon Rouse’s impact to collaborative 
working across NHS organisations led to opportunities and conversations that they never 
had before Devolution. An FT Senior project director was asked to draft a letter 
addressing Jon Rouse to promote their programme of work to the NHS GM institutions 
and described, “…I have an opportunity. I'd never get that opportunity in London to do 
that.” (F02) 
Interviewees think that the presence of both Jon Rouse and Andy Burnham were key 
to breeding successful relationships within the GMHSC Partnership (L04, P05). They 
were the two pillars of Devo Manc, holding the entire city-region together and putting it 
on a pedestal for the rest of the country to see. Both of their outstanding reputation as 
leaders have created a magnet effect across different areas by attracting a high calibre 
of professionals who would want to work with the various localities and NHS 
organisations in GM (L04). These coincide with what literature suggests about the 
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presence of influential leaders that could help sustain the collaborative governance as 
they continued to evolve (Gray, 1989). 
“And that also is very interesting dichotomy, that relationship between GMHSC 
and the work that John Rouse is doing, Jon Rouse's vision, and then alongside 
Andy Burnham. The vision where that's going and how the two of them interlink, 
that is the uniqueness of Greater Manchester. The fact that both of them are 
existing in synchronicity with each other. That's what's unique about it.” (P05) 
 
7.2.2 Collective-choice situations 
GM already has an inherent culture of collaborative working where local NHS 
organisations and local councils have already forged collective informal networks; but 
Devo Health became an institutional vehicle to formalise these existing relationships and 
facilitate new ways of joint working. From the constitutional level, we learned how NHS 
England played a domineering role in setting the rules on how the GMHSC Partnership 
governs the health and social care economy of Greater Manchester. Whilst the 
Partnership was given some level of autonomy to create internal frameworks to guide 
their collaborative working, NHS England still exercised a high degree of control through 
the transfer of some NHS functions to the Chief Officer. The Chief Officer is an NHS 
England employee, who inherited the responsibilities of a delegated accountable officer 
of the GMHSC system to the NHS.  At the same time, the entrance of the elected Mayor 
of GM also moulded new working relationships between the Partnership and GMCA. 
In this section, we look at how all of these impacted the activities in the collective-
choice level. We review how the GMHSC Partnership crafted, enforced, changed, and 
monitored more rules in order to take responsibility for the stewardship of the health and 
care economy of GM and to facilitate the collective action behaviour and decision-making 
process of its participating members.  
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7.2.2.1 Formal powers 
In the previous chapters, we illustrated that the GMHSC Partnership was formed as 
a governing body responsible for the collective management of the GM health and care 
economy. However, it was not established as a statutory body and only received limited 
delegated powers from NHS England through legislative amendments to the National 
Health Service Act 2006 via the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 
Schedule 4. This meant that a significant degree of national oversight and control 
remained with NHS England and the Secretary of the State, and existing organisational 
statutory responsibilities and lines of accountability remained. The lack of legislative 
vehicle to create a ‘hard structure’ for Devo Health meant that other forms of mechanisms 
were used to formalise the newly formed GMHSC Partnership. The Memorandum of 
Understanding was the only formal institution representing the agreement between the 
partner organisations, outlining the common intent of Devo Health and identifying the 
roles and responsibilities of those involved. This set-up meant that GM still remains part 
of the NHS social care system subject to the NHS constitution and mandate.   
Table 15: Partnership crafted and enforced rules in collective-choice level 
Activity Crafted and enforced rules 
Membership 
Signing of MoU to signify commitment to the collective 
vision of GM 
Employment 
arrangements 
Secondment; fixed-term contract; appointment on a 
permanent basis 
Shared resources 
Transformation fund; delegated responsibilities from 
NHS; pooled budgets and shared workforce 
Strategic direction GM Strategic Plan 'Taking Charge' and 10 locality plans 
Operation 




Health and Care board and Partnership Executive 
Access to 
resources 




Key stakeholders and partner organisations occupying 
positions within the governance structures 
Monitoring and 
enforcement 
Assurance and monitoring framework; formal reporting 
lines 
 
These constitutional level rules restricted the way participants in the collective-choice 
situation interact. The key stakeholders of the devolution agreement were all statutory 
bodies (i.e. ‘hard structures’) with existing responsibilities and reporting lines, hence, the 
Partnership had to resort to collaborative mechanisms or informal institutions in order to 
overcome the absence of legal power to exercise mandate or enforcement over  the 
partner organisations (i.e. CCGs, Trusts and FTs, etc.). This was supported by 
overarching governance structures to order the relationships and organise powers and 
collective behaviour of the participating organisations. Strategic oversight, decision-
making, and monitoring and assurance frameworks were also set to suit their local 
needs. To complement these, the Partnership strengthened collaborative working by 
utilising the existing informal networks (i.e. ‘soft structures’) as channels of information 
and exchange of knowledge. Primarily built on trust, reputation, and reciprocity, the 
Partnership core team used unwritten shared understandings (i.e. norms or social 
arrangements) to structure patterns of interaction with the key stakeholders and partner 
organisations.  
7.2.2.2 Soft powers 
The Partnership has no legal mandate or mandatory requirement to enforce the GM 
Strategic Plan to the key stakeholders and partner organisations; thus, to create order 
and mobilisation of relationships, governance structures and guiding frameworks were 
established (Thomson and Perry, 2006; Imperial and Koontz, 2007). Each stakeholder 
occupied a position in the decision-making arenas (i.e. Health and Care Board, and 
Partnership Executive) to create equal representation, and internal staff team members 
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from various NHS organisations were brought in to provide leadership and project 
management roles.  
Our evidence suggests that there was a predominantly top-down approach on two of 
the Partnership activities, particularly during the (1) strategy building; and (2) monitoring 
and assurance. Whilst in theory, the Partnership wanted to empower the key 
stakeholders (i.e. the providers of service) and allow them to take ownership on the 
implementation of the strategy, they instead played a dominant leadership role in 
directing the member organisations to agree and sign-up to the strategy or proposals 
and in monitoring the progress of the programmes. The Partnership relied heavily on 
face-to-face dialogue to build up the relationships and as the collaborative process 
matures from the direction-setting to the implementation stage (Ansell and Gash, 2008).   
During the planning phases, the activities were focused on building and developing 
a strategy that will guide the driving purpose of the Partnership. During its formal 
operation in April 2016, a lot of the governance structures were already in place; 
however, majority of the strategic documents and protocols for quality assurance, 
regulation, etc. were still being developed. Project proposals were being distributed 
across the governance as part of the engagement process and the Partnership’s role 
was concentrated on ensuring that all affected or involved stakeholders will sign up for 
it. The activity occurred at the lower levels of the governance and climbs up the middle 
tier (e.g. advisory boards) for recommendation, then onto the upper tier (e.g. decision-
making bodies) for deliberation and final approval. 
To illustrate, let’s say a project management group is assigned to develop and design 
a programme strategy. It is comprised of multiple Partnership staff whose roles are 
focused in creating a single document that summarises the case for change for a certain 
policy area and ensuring that all the group stakeholders are aware and are signed up for 
it. A programme strategy is usually informed by the GM Strategic Plan ‘Taking Charge’, 
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which already outlined programmes focused on national targets, a previous GM agenda 
pre-dating devolution, or an issue that has recently became apparent. It goes through a 
series of iterations, making sure that everyone that needed to be involved were aware 
of what’s going in the strategy, what role they play in, and how is it going to impact their 
respective organisations if the strategy is implemented. 
Although majority of the proposals, at that time, were co-designed with the 
participating partners, it was mostly influenced by an overarching national strategy (i.e. 
The Five-Year Forward View) or a national must-do or ‘ask’. The strategies were driven 
by project managers and programme leads employed by the Partnership. They created, 
coordinated, and socialised the overall GM strategy to the wider community in order to 
raise awareness and engage the operational levels (i.e. the providers of service) into 
committing to the overall collective vision towards the GMHSC economy. The 
interviewees emphasised this aspect of strategic building as co-production and co-
designing (C01, G01), where it particularly focuses on the level of involvement of the 
different stakeholders in the creation and development of the strategies and 
programmes. The Partnership made sure that all levels of the governance structure have 
seen, read, engaged, and discussed all project proposals, strategic documents, and 
frameworks prior to approval by the decision-making bodies. This allows not only an 
opportunity for the participating organisations to identify best practice, share their 
expertise, and provide collaborative input, but also a way for them to incorporate their 
local needs to the overall collective direction of the GMHSC economy (G01, G04, C02). 
A CCG integration lead shared, “if it's co-designed and they reach out to localities in the 
development of it, you help with the strategy and it has a strong flavour from each area.” 
(C02)  
Once everything is set and approved for by the HCB, it trickles back down to the 
operational level for implementation. The co-designing of the strategy and frameworks, 
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in addition to the signing of the MoU, provided a leverage for the Partnership to have 
some teeth in terms of implementation, monitoring, and assurance. Because they have 
no hard mandatory powers to enforce the strategy, they used it as a buy-in mechanism 
for all participating organisations to take ownership and collective responsibility of what 
they originally signed up for (C01, L04). However, a Foundation Trust officer explained 
that they don’t necessarily sign in agreement with a project proposal to fund it or 
guarantee implementation; but rather it’s more of an “…agreement to actually do the 
changes because it's for quality and service and it's for patient outcomes” (F02). 
Whilst the Partnership tried to play a passive role by allowing the key stakeholders 
to co-produce majority of the frameworks (i.e. crafting their own rules), majority of the 
initiatives and key decisions were made by the HCB and Partnership Executive. They 
still applied a top-down approach in terms of enforcing and monitoring who follows the 
rules of the game. NHS England delegated some monitoring and assurance functions to 
the Partnership, including driving the improvement of quality and maintaining the 
constitutional and mandated requirements. Documents clarifying accountability and 
monitoring principles were drafted in order to arrange how positions and actions will be 
scrutinised. Moreover, when the Partnership took responsibility of collectively governing 
their own health and social care economy, it also included looking after some of its 
shared resources (i.e. the Transformation Fund). The Transformation Fund was an 
important source of financial flow across all localities and arrangements had to be put in 
place in order for the Partnership to decide who can acquire from this resource, how do 
they become eligible to receive it, and how do they monitor if the receiving party is 
utilising it as initially agreed. 
Although NHS England limited the level of autonomy that the Partnership can 
exercise towards the health and social care economy of the city-region, the Partnership 
team has crafted formal structures (e.g. governance, operating frameworks, monitoring 
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principles, etc.) to guide how participants position themselves in the decision-making 
arenas, which actions or information to take based on their motivation or incentives, how 
to order their relationships and interact with one another, and how to monitor each other’s 
progress and compliance with national and local mandates. 
7.2.2.3 Trust, reputation, and reciprocity 
Collective action theory posited that institutions, including rules, norms, and 
strategies, structure the behaviour of the participants in a collaborative and collective 
agreement (Ostrom, 2005, 2011). As participants continue to interact, they adopt rules 
and norms that govern their collaborative activities. Whilst formal rules were used to 
structure the relationships, informal institutions like shared norms were also found useful 
in facilitating the collaborative processes (Rodríguez-pose, 2013; Heikkila and Gerlak, 
2018). 
Our evidence suggests that although the Partnership operated in a hierarchical 
manner supported by formal structures such as governance and operational frameworks, 
they also relied on informal institutions to order their relationships and overcome the 
limitations brought by the formal structures. For instance, the Partnership exhibited a 
strong foundation of organic cooperation built from decades of trust and reputation 
building. They displayed high levels of interdependence by coming together in order to 
accomplish something as a collective, which they are unable to do so on their own.  
The Partnership took advantage of the informal networks formed pre-dating 
Devolution and used it as a channel to bridge the gaps in the system. Because these 
relationships were already built in decades of mutual trust and reciprocity, it was easier 
for the Partnership to bring sectoral groups together and provide a forum for them to 
generate a collective voice. For example, the formation of the Advisory Groups 
incorporated the GM Association of CCGs, Provider Federation Board, Primary Care 
Advisory Board, LCO Network, and Joint Commissioning Board, and gave them a role 
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in terms of providing non-binding advice to the main decision-making bodies of the 
Partnership. They share an advisory capacity to facilitate discussions and provide 
recommendations based on their knowledge and expertise on their particular sector or 
field of work. This was particularly evident during the strategy building phase, where the 
Advisory Groups were engaged in refining the documents presented to them. Since 
these groups have already existed long before Devolution was formed, incorporating 
them in the Partnership governance helped facilitate relationships between existing 
groups and newly formed streams of programmes. 
More importantly, informal networking became a useful tool for the Partnership to 
facilitate conversations, engage in discussions, resolve conflict, and monitor compliance 
between the members. We illustrated in the previous chapters how the Partnership used 
principled engagement and face-to-face dialogue outside the formal forums (i.e. 
meetings, etc.) as collaborative mechanisms to getting the right people to come to the 
table and sort out their issues or differences before any decision reaches the Partnership 
Executive board or Health and Care board. This was the Partnership’s way of playing 
the role of a mediator, but also establishing trust amongst each other and earning the 
key stakeholders’ respect at the same time. By creating new rules on how to exercise 
joint working in a different manner, the Partnership was able to overcome the limitations 
and organisational barriers that was brought about by the existing fragmentation in the 
GM NHS system. 
Whilst there were some pockets of resistance and tensions during the establishment 
of the Partnership from different key stakeholder groups, there was still a strong 
presence of collective ambition. Although GM already displayed exemplary collective 
behaviour in the past as illustrated by their decades of organic cooperation and formation 
of soft networks, Devo Health provided a new vehicle for the Partnership to make a 
difference. Having this strong collective interest and shared understanding of what they 
 
263 
can achieve collectively created positive incentives for them to engage in collaborative 
working. A lot of the driving force comes from the leadership groups, particularly Jon 
Rouse and his executive team, who encourage its members to work collaboratively in 
order to share best practice and create better outcomes for GM. “I think it's brought a 
spotlight on a new and innovative way of working that we're really lucky to be part of,” an 
LA councillor illustrated (L03). There is a great desire to lift the standards up and improve 
health outcomes for the population of the city-region and put GM on the map as a pioneer 
model for Health Devolution across England.  
There was also a level of “we signed up for this” attitude or co-ownership of problems 
and decisions became a useful mechanism for the Partnership to enforce rules in 
monitoring and assurance, whilst also fostering strong community roots. Interviewees 
suggest that the Partnership has given them an opportunity to work differently. For some, 
it was quite empowering just to have ownership and to take charge of their own health 
and social care economy (C01, F01, G08, L04, P08). For localities that are so tired of 
getting dictated by NHS England on what to do and how to handle their resources, it was 
a breath of fresh air for them to be given the responsibility and encouragement to come 
together and do what they think is best for their area (C01). Because the Partnership and 
its participating members have ownership on its plans and the rules that they crafted to 
facilitate their decisions and interactions, it fostered a new atmosphere of collaboration 
that has not been done before in GM or anywhere else in the country.  
“More subtly, I think it's given us permission to behave differently, to think at 
scale, to be innovative, to use a different language in a way that we couldn't 
before. And I think it also allow us to do is take action at a different scale than 
we ever could have previously. You hope that by taking action at scale, you have 




This built up reciprocity between the members, wherein there is almost an immediate 
sense of pride that supported the way they interact in the collective-choice level. “When 
I speak to my colleagues in Merseyside or in London, they say ‘You're so lucky to have 
GM devolution,’” an LA councillor said (L03). It enabled for stronger links between one 
organisation to another, which provides opportunities for mutual exchanges to occur. It 
also helped build a collective reputation for GM and brought other similar city-region’s 
attention to GM’s innovative way of working. 
Some people were not too keen in signing up for Devo Health and were a bit sceptical 
on what it can achieve collectively. Because the NHS is exercising an arms-length 
influence over the devolved combine authority by retaining the same accountability lines 
and without statutory basis, clinicians and general practitioners alike have expressed 
their pessimism regarding the change it will actually bring (P02, P03, P04). The 
Partnership, therefore, had to find ways to overcome this barrier by portraying different 
roles in order to earn trust and reciprocity, and gain a positive reputation amongst its 
members.  
One of the roles that they played was an influencer. This is one of the rules-in-use 
that evolved as a response to the constrained interactions within and outside the 
collective-choice level. Partnership members used this as a mechanism to bridge 
relationships at different levels within the Partnership, especially in areas where there 
are existing tensions between local NHS organisations and local authorities. Influencing 
was used in various Partnership activities to persuade people to change their opinions, 
lobby for ideas, or get their foot in the door to bring together and speak with the right 
people. Some believe that the Partnership also brought in members with influential 
status, like Jon Rouse and his executive team, who have the ability and power to get 
things done and breed a new organisational culture of collaborative working. This further 
solidified the existing relationships that have already been cultivated in GM for decades.  
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Another role that the Partnership played was a broker. The Partnership acted as 
negotiators across the different sectors in order to facilitate conversations and resolve 
issues before it reaches any formal decision-making venues. They were the middlemen 
during discussions, where they practically diffuse or rectify any source of conflict or 
consolidate opposing views in order to avoid friction in relationships and further 
escalation. This ultimately helped in making difficult conversations happen through 
informal conversations outside meetings. Since the system was used to a competitive 
way of working, the Partnership had to proactively manage the fragmented relationships 
and join the dots by bringing all the right people in the same room and facilitate debates 
or discussions.  
Being a broker was mostly helpful during the monitoring and assurance phase, when 
the Partnership find it difficult to sanction any partner organisations or localities who were 
not complying with the agreed proposals or programmes that they were expected to 
deliver. They used this as a hand-holding mechanism to walk the member organisations 
through on how they can get from point A to point B and achieve the necessary outcomes 
that they collectively signed up for. Formal mechanisms were also put in place, such as 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks established, to formally evaluate the performance 
and quality of its participating organisations, the work programmes being implemented, 
and compliance to the NHS constitution. Although for as much as possible, the 
Partnership wanted to avoid any form of formal escalation and preferred to resolve any 
difficulties before a recovery plan is put in place. They step in and assess the severity of 
the situation and enter a negotiation process with the parties involved to address the 
issue before it reaches the decision-making bodies.  
McGinnis (2013) suggested that relying on formal mechanisms is costly, which is 
why smaller communities with elite leaders usually rely on informal ways (such as social 
shaming) to exercise monitoring power. Although the Partnership’s conditions were not 
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really ideal to promote social shaming as a mechanism for monitoring compliance, it 
relied on its partnership organisations’ commitment or “social contract” (P05) to agree 
with the working principles outlined in the MoU. Because none of the Devolution 
agreement has any legal mandates, the organisations who signed up for Devo Health 
were all working based on their existing social attributes (i.e. trust, reputation, reciprocity) 
and working relationships (i.e. built-in informal networks, tensions within the system), 
which they have formed from their previous experiences 
Perhaps the most important role that the Partnership played is being an enabler. 
They, first and foremost, brought closer a new funding stream (i.e. the Transformation 
Fund) to enable transformative projects to take place within localities and give the 
opportunity to deliver better outcomes and close the financial gap. Second, the evidence 
suggests that it is the Partnership’s role to enable the system to achieve the outcomes 
outlined in ‘Taking Charge’ in as many was as possible. Whether they engage, influence, 
socialise, or facilitate conversations, they needed to craft their own rules and enforce it 
in innovative ways in order to maintain collaboration and foster trust amongst its 
members.  
Whilst the importance of having a legal route would have been ideal, this does not 
mean that polycentric systems like the GM health and social care system would fail or 
not be sustainable. Drawing comparisons with the existing devolved nations (i.e. 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), a Partnership senior director (G08) said that, 
“statutory devolution doesn’t make people work together” despite the appetite to pursue 
the legislative route. Our research shows that the GMHSC Partnership was able to 
overcome the existing fragmented and/or competitive relationships by devising 
institutions that rely mostly on social attributes and complemented by hard structures. 
The Partnership’s lack of hard powers was complemented by utilising the existing levels 
of hierarchies, markets, and networks as a foundation to building bridges and forging 
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better relationships. Whilst they did not have the mandatory legal power to enforce any 
of their strategic proposals or programmes of work or exercise any formal sanctions to 
rectify their members’ non-compliance behaviour, they used collaborative mechanisms 
primary relying on trust, reciprocity, and reputation to facilitate relationships and promote 
collective behaviour.  
“I think at the moment what we're really struggling with at the moment is the 
various different power dynamics that exist in the system. The hard and soft 
power that exists. So ironically enough the only hard power in the system exists 
within GMCA and the DPHs, but those driving the agenda are the partnership 
who only have soft power around health and wellbeing and population health. 
And the mayoral office which only has a soft power here has no statutory powers 
around health and wellbeing. So, there's a lot of power dynamics playing out at 
the moment and lots of kind of storming, norming and forming around the way 
that different parts of the system work collectively together. Who has primacy? 
Who has leadership? Who has the ability to set an agenda or veto agenda 
items? All that's playing out at the moment and it's really a major challenge but 
something that was always going to be a challenge. But we will come out to the 
other side of it. It's an interesting one.” (G14) 
 
7.2.3 Operational situations 
In the previous section, we examined the collective-choice level and how the 
Partnership reacted to the constraints set by the constitutional level. We learned that 
although the Partnership relied on its soft powers and top-down approach to impose the 
rules that they set to govern themselves and the GM health and social care economy, 
they still had to resort to informal institutions to facilitate the collective behaviour and 
interaction of the participants in order to attain their intended outcomes. This was 
characterised by establishing high levels of trust through various collaborative 
mechanisms, utilising existing networks to bridge relationships, and creating new ways 
of integration and joint working. 
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In this section, we explore how the organisational level (i.e. the providers of service, 
the key stakeholders, etc.) reacted to the emergence of the Partnership and how it 
constrained or improved their interaction both in the operational and collective-choice 
levels. Whilst we focused on the strategy-building and monitoring and enforcement in 
the previous sections, the operational level primarily focuses on the Partnership’s activity 
of implementing the work programmes. We dive into the existing tensions between 
stakeholders and if the Partnership has addressed them, and how organisational culture 
played a big role in preventing them from fully experiencing the new ways of working that 
the Partnership is advocating for.  
7.2.3.1 Localities 
Localities are the core of the delivery process (GMCA and NHS in GM, 2015g). They 
drive the outcomes for change in GM’s collective ambition and their participation is 
crucial to the success of Devo Health. Evidence suggests that the Partnership did not 
want to impose a single, centrally led strategic plan without having to consult each of the 
10 localities and asking them how they will contribute to shape the delivery of services 
within their own geographical footprints (G05). In order to orchestrate this, each of the 
10 localities in GM drafted their own locality plans focusing on delivering integrated care 
in the community-based rather than hospital settings. These eventually became the 
foundation to the overall GM Strategic Plan ‘Taking Charge’, driven mostly by the 
transformation themes. Injected by the Transformation Fund, the 10 localities of GM had 
the task of delivering local needs through integrated provision of services to eventually 
improve the overall population health outcomes of the 2.8 million residents of the city-
region. 
The locality plans acted as strategic support to realising the overall GM vision. Theme 
2 of ‘Taking Charge’ focused on transforming community-based care and support, which 
was led by the 10 localities to support the integration of community health and social 
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care services into place-based approach. In order to operationalise and govern these 
proposed changes, Local Care Organisations (LCOs) were established as a form a multi-
agency partnership between the LAs, local NHS organisations, third sector providers, 
and other public services within their respective areas. Whilst these arrangements were 
already existing nationally prior to devolution through Accountable Care Organisations 
(ACO) and Integrated Care Partnerships (ICP), LCOs were standalone organisations 
which acted as a local adaptation to these existing policy initiatives. They were intended 
to provide an alternative to the hospital culture and reduce existing service fragmentation 
in GM inherited from previous health and social care reforms as part of the Devolution 
reform (G05, Walshe et al., 2018).  
One of the positive contributions of this initiative was that it gave the communities to 
work at scale and coordinate local services in order to reduce costs and hospital 
admissions and create a sustainable health and social care system. To illustrate, person 
and community-centred approaches were developed to transfer acute care closer to the 
homes and neighbourhoods. “You'll be treated at home closer to your family, in your own 
environment, there will be specialist staff within your neighbourhood who will come and 
look after, you don't need to go to a hospital,” a Partnership project management director 
described (G06). In some places where there is a lack of NHS organisations to support 
this to happen, third sector organisations (i.e. voluntary, community and social enterprise 
or VCSEs) come into play. They act as providers of non-clinical care and support 
services and become crucial part of the LCO architecture. They usually exist outside the 
formal health and social care structures, but deliver a range of community-based 
services and support to localities that are oftentimes far cheaper than hospital services 
can do (G07).  
Another positive impact was the Transformation Fund bringing in an extra bootstrap 
of cash that allowed localities to bid for and capitalise their locality plans. Rather than 
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having to bid for a national fund and compete with other localities for a single pot of 
money, Health Devo allowed GM to receive a pot of cash fully devolved to them (i.e. the 
Transformation Fund) and give the 10 localities access to it through a secure process 
that the Partnership devised. Incentivisation has become a common theme to encourage 
competition between neighbouring areas, where poorer areas lose out on more affluent 
areas over funding allocation (Ayres and Pearce, 2013; Deas, 2014; Bailey and Wood, 
2017). The TF therefore acted as an incentive for localities to put forward a strong locality 
plan that aligns with the GM Strategic Plan ‘Taking Charge’. Collaborative governance 
literature suggests that incentives influence an individual’s level participation and 
motivation to contribute towards the collective action (Ostrom, 1999; Ansell and Gash, 
2008). When there is a reasonable expectation for participants to enjoy the benefits from 
it, then the more likely they are to be motivated to contribute to the collaboration. In the 
case of the Transformation Fund, localities receiving the money are incentivised to take 
part and contribute to the collective vision of GM and use the extra cash to boost their 
local services at the same time. “The devolution deal has actually provided us a source 
of funding to help us drive transformation,” a CCG board member shared (C03). Given 
austerity and budgetary pressures, it was a “drop in the ocean” (G04) that allowed 
localities to “shift things around” (L01) and enable them to implement their plans, make 
transformations, and improve health outcomes to their local population. 
In the collective-choice level, the Partnership wanted to emphasise the importance 
of the bottom-up approach, where the localities proclaim ownership of solutions to their 
problems with no solutions overlaid on a top-down GM basis (G03, G05, L04). The 
problem, however, was that localities face different adversaries brought by the existing 
tensions already within the system, making it more challenging to implement the locality 
plans and operationalise the LCOs. This brings us to whether Devo Health actually 
addresed the fragmentation of services in GM by pushing for integrative, bottom-up 
initiatives or whether it added an extra layer to an already complex system.  
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On a hindsight, despite the various incentives that the Partnership have set-up to 
drive transformational changes at the operational level, the truth is that the localities have 
different needs with a variation of health outcomes (C01, C02) making it more 
challenging to drive collective action and generate collective outcomes. As a CCG board 
member describes, “…so one of the challenges is translating something that might be 
developed as GM level into a local context, because each locality is different.” (C02). 
Whilst the intention and vision of the LCOs were well-received in the operational level 
(L04), there were varying degrees in terms of their development. Some emerged quicker 
than the others, whilst others took longer than expected to establish formal structures. 
Since LCOs follow a wider footprint beyond their what the local authority would normally 
cover (L04), others had to deal with the complexity of organising the governance and 
configuring an integrated way of working together. For example, Bury LCO was only 
established on 1 April 2019 including a formal alliance with the Northern Care Alliance 
NHS Group, which made up of Salford Royal and Pennine Acute Hospital NHS Trusts. 
Both secondary care providers are located outside Bury and offers wider services to 
Manchester, Oldham, and Salford respectively (The Pennine Acutes Hospital NHS Trust, 
2019). 
The Transformation Fund also generated an atmosphere of local competition 
between the localities. Because the funding is limited, the Partnership devised a tedious 
process on how various workstreams can have access to the funding. This again 
illustrates that collective-choice crafted rules can affect how participants interact within 
the operational levels. Localities were made aware of the kind of conditions in which they 
could apply to the funding, which included application, assessment, awarding, and 
monitoring stages (G02). Whilst some were fortunate to be able to bid during the initial 
stages, others weren’t as lucky. One described how they were only awarded a fraction 
of what they originally bid for, which makes it more problematic to implement the 
proposals for their transformational themes (C01, F02). Another said that the bidding 
 
272 
process was difficult enough to go through, where they had to justify their costings and 
proposed outcomes in front a panel (F01). Currently, all of the Transformation money 
has been distributed and localities are under pressure to deliver the outcomes they have 
promised in their locality plans. They have to keep up with monthly monitoring and 
assurance checkpoints with the Partnership team to make sure that they are performing 
as expected of them. 
On top of this, local authorities are still under budgetary pressure and austerity 
measures, creating an unsustainable gap in council funding and causing a significant 
impact in the delivery of adult social care services and support (see latest figures in Local 
Government Association, 2019). LCO leaders believe that whilst the Partnership has 
brought in new monies to incentivise the system to collaborate, outcomes still show that 
GM has still not kept enough people out of hospital (L02). “There's a bit of tension at the 
minute because hospital activity levels are still haven't improved from before that 
happened (sic),” a Trust Senior officer said (F03).  
Pearce and Ayres (2012) explain that the devolution deals were being pursued 
alongside a government target to eliminate the public sector budget deficit, which means 
that local authorities relying on central government grants face substantial cuts. This 
pressured local councils to absorb public service cuts in exchange of the promise of 
additional powers and future funds from the Devolution deals (Shaw and Tewdwr-jones, 
2017). This was described by Bailey and Wood (2017) as network framing, where fiscal 
conditions were used by the central government to exert influence over local authorities. 
This also represented the arms-length influence of the state in terms of the proportion of 
local government spending, “taking one hand and giving with the other with strings 
attached” (Bailey and Wood, 2017:978).  
Evidence suggests that the operational level was less receptive to the changes 
brought by the Devolution movement, despite the efforts made on the collective-choice 
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level to bridge the relationship gaps and fragmented system. Local councils, for example, 
are more pessimistic that the Partnership is bringing something new to the table. They 
believe nothing is truly devolved because the £6 billion delegated to the Partnership has 
always existed in the system and nothing new is being brought in. One referred to it as 
“creative accountancy” (L01) where money is just being reshuffled and redistributed 
within the system and all the Partnership does is re-managing what has already been 
there in the first place. Moreover, because the NHS is still exercising an arms-length 
influence over the devolved combine authority by retaining the same accountability lines 
and without statutory basis, clinicians and general practitioners alike have expressed 
their pessimism regarding the change it will actually bring (P02, P03, P04).  
7.2.3.2 The NHS organisational culture 
Because of the added layer brought about by the establishment of the GMHSC 
Partnership, some were initially concerned that these institutional arrangements will only 
bring further fragmentation to the already complex system. “We've got lots of individual 
organisations that when you've added them together, it's the NHS, but they don't 
necessarily work in that way,” a CCG Senior leader states (C01). Given that the former 
HSC reforms bred a culture of competition and disjointed services, the system became 
disjointed that organisations were operating in a separate fashion.  
“There is really an important point in that if you think of, let's think of four types 
of organisations and you've got and think of the way in which their attention and 
their focus draw in particular directions that are not necessarily aligned. You've 
got clinical commissioning groups, who feel responsible to their GP membership 
but feel accountable to NHS England as their regulator. You've got NHS trusts 
and foundation trusts, who feel deeply internally organisationally accountable 
but recognise an accountability to NHS improvement as their regulator. You've 
got local government that feels locally democratically accountable but has a kind 
of political leadership that it needs to be able to satisfy. And if we took something 
like the Voluntary and community organisations you've got to set there that feels 
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like its accountability is entirely atomise but recognise it needs to co-ordinate 
itself in order to get to the table.” (G17) 
 
One of the biggest challenges that Health Devo needed to overcome was the culture 
of fragmented working within the NHS system. We illustrated in the previous chapters 
that each organisation is used to working differently, where the existing structures 
created by the Health and Social Care reforms in 2012 brought difficulties in terms of 
coordinating decisions and being on the same page with LAs, CCGs, Trusts, Primary 
care providers, and the voluntary sector. Differences in organisational culture can indeed 
aggravate the difficulty in collaboration because everyone works in entirely different 
professional languages and procedures (Himmelman, 1996; Huxham, 1996). Each 
stakeholder group is used to working a certain way that some felt that Devolution is 
mandating them to collaborate (P03, P04).  
Different organisations occupy different positions within the Partnership governance, 
which perhaps makes collective participation more diverse and heterogeneous. In 
collective action theory, heterogeneity of participants shape the motivation and interests 
in achieving collaboration (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2000). Some individuals may have 
stronger self-interests in achieving more benefits than others, whilst some may exercise 
deterrent behaviour to cooperation. The retained lines of accountability and the lack of 
statutory changes within the NHS system resulted in organisations clinging onto their 
own procedures and representing their own organisational interests when they come to 
the collective Partnership decision-making arena. This was illustrated by Olson (1971) 
when he stated that rational individuals will act on their own self-interests and will not act 
to achieve group interests when participating in collective group decision-making, 
especially when there are multiple incentives to collaborate, competing interests, and 
blurred lines of accountability.  
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This was also supported by the evidence presented in previous chapters, where 
decisions are influenced by partisan motives demonstrated by their attachments from 
the organisations’ own discipline or the geographical area they represent (P03, P04, 
C01). There will always be an element of competition arising from the retention of market 
principles inherited from the Thatcher government. This led to a level of difficulty in trying 
to change the way organisations operate because they have always been used to 
working in a certain manner, i.e. competing with each other. For instance, Trusts are 
deeply accountable to their board of members, where they are used to competing with 
one another in order to be sustainable. They are subject to quality control and 
performance checks from NHS England, which are crucial to their survival if they are to 
risk making collective decisions with other Trusts in GM. If decisions are to negatively 
impact one's Trust or changes of service will have a disadvantage on another, then they 
are more likely to make a choice that benefits their own organisation thus making it less 
likely for a collective unit to reach a joint unbiased decision.  
The Lansley reforms resulted in intra-organisational conflict between the various 
NHS organisations, which affected the way they interact with one another when 
Devolution was introduced. Resistance to collaboration is inevitable, especially when 
organisations operating within bureaucracies needed to change their ways of working 
and challenge longstanding rules, regulations and attitudes (Himmelman, 1996). For 
instance, we illustrated in the previous chapters that there has always been a divide 
between hospital trusts and primary care providers (e.g. general practitioners, etc.) 
where each operate differently based on how they are structured. GPs are more 
collaborative by nature because they are small businesses working collaboratively and 
less competitively in the same neighbourhoods, whilst Trusts are statutory bodies that 
are organisationally profiled/structured (G15). Primary care providers have always felt 
that hospitals have always been favoured, although it wasn’t expected that when the 
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Health Devo MoU was originally signed, Primary Care providers were not included in the 
official list of signatories.  
“That's a really bad start point to have. 37 statutory organisations have signed 
an MoU to something new and probably the most, the largest provider in terms 
of activity has not even heard about it. So, it tells you something about how the 
system is dictated.” (G15) 
 
There is an obvious tug of war in terms of who has more power to make the decisions 
and which decisions to prioritise, heightening the split caused by the NHS internal market 
and Lansley reforms. “Where statutory bodies are set to gain, those decisions tend to 
make quite easy and things move quite fast,” GP senior officers described (P03, P04). 
Decisions were made in isolation and without public engagement, where some pockets 
of the lower tier of the system find out about it later on. Influential leaders have to step 
up and engage in the collective-choice level in order to negotiate representation of their 
stakeholder group within the Partnership, and this shows again, how the operational level 
have to bend the existing rules in order to gain advantage in the collective decision-
making arena.  
Such difficulties in the system created more friction between groups and make joint 
decision-making more challenging at a local level. The main challenge, perhaps, is the 
different organisational cultures, where you've got people from the NHS who are used to 
working in a certain way and then you've got people in local government working a 
different way (L01, L02). The commissioning culture has always been competitive where 
CCGs are being run by people with health backgrounds that tend to make decisions 
defaulting back to the “medical fixing” model; whilst LAs continue to battle budget cuts 
and prioritise to deliver public health and social care functions at a neighbourhood-level. 
Smaller organisations like the voluntary and community sector groups also have to 
compete in terms of receiving contracts from CCGs to deliver such community-centred 
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services. And then there are GPs who, on the other hand, are struggling to find a 
representative voice in the system and are competing against big hospitals, to the point 
where they are used to a system of incentivising or receiving a small reward for doing 
something beyond their contracts (P05, L02, G07, F01). 
There will always be tensions between priority-setting amongst the different types of 
organisations within the system – the local government who wants to promote place-
based community approaches and bring services closer to the  population; the provider 
trusts who want to decrease A&E waiting times and are pressured to reach nationally-
mandated NHS targets; and the CCGs who hold majority of the budget and control which 
services get commissioned. A CCG board member described, “there was too much silo 
working and people were not thinking across the whole system about the whole issue. 
So, they were only looking at their part.” (C03) We see bigger cracks in the health and 
social care system that make it more challenging to forge a culture of collaboration, 
especially when the organisations are used to competing against each other for the sake 
of accountability, performance management, and vested interests. There is also the 
divide between health and social care as a separate aspect of the public services, where 
the Mayor of Greater Manchester has no power on what happens in the health and social 
care and this remit still lies within the Partnership led by the Chief Officer who is an NHS 
England employee.  
Not all, however, were as critical with the entrance of the Partnership and Devolution 
in the system. Despite the scepticism to the delegated arrangements dictated in the 
constitutional level which in turn limited the levels of action and interaction in the 
collective-choice and operational levels, the participants recognise the added value or 
immediate outcomes that Devolution has brought to the GMHSC system. Many 
acknowledged how Health Devo has enabled the system in so many ways, particularly 
in creating new formal avenues to meet and work together. Some also believed that 
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although there has been no increase in shared resources, particularly the alleged £6 
billion budget for health and social care, Devolution allowed the localities some level of 
collective control to managing their own existing resources. “It's not new money, no. But 
it is having control of the resources and having the opportunity to bend it and use it,” an 
LA councillor explained (L04).   
7.2.4 Summary  
In the previous sections, we demonstrated how formal and informal rules interacted 
at each level and how one affected the other. At the constitutional level, NHS England 
orchestrated centrally controlled rules on how the Partnership will be formed and how 
they will be monitored. Amendments to the statutory legislation were made to make way 
for a limited Devo Health and formal leaderships roles were created to draw links of 
accountability back to the top tier. At the collective-choice level, the Partnership crafted 
another set of rules based on the guidelines set by NHS England at the constitutional 
level. Because of these constraints, the Partnership had to resort to other forms of 
informal institutional arrangements (i.e. gentleman’s agreement, cooperation, etc.) to 
overcome the barriers to collaboration. The Partnership drew links of accountability down 
to the lower tier (e.g. CCGs, LAs, Trusts) to strengthen the network connections and use 
it to their advantage when they are exercising their regulatory role. Lastly, at the 
operational level, the key stakeholders were bounded by the agreement that they signed 
with the Partnership, making them to compulsory comply with the rules imposed by the 
Partnership. However, since they retained their statutory roles and lines of accountability 
as outlined in the constitutional level, they exercised a higher degree of local autonomy. 
This meant that they are tied to their own organisational rules, which prevented them to 
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7.3 Formal and informal institutions to address the collective 
action problem 
In the previous section, we illustrated how all rules are nested in another set of rules 
(Ostrom, 2005:58), where one level of actions and outcomes obtained from the previous 
level affect the proceeding level. The Partnership became a collective action arena that 
brings together both constitutional and operational actors. Constrained by the rules on 
each level, the Partnership used both formal and informal institutions to address the 
collective action dilemma of sustaining the GM health and social care economy.  
We contextualised the action situation in the collective choice level and explored the 
seven elements of the action situation and how they affected the individual behaviours 
and rules configurations over time. We also identified that one of the analytical powers 
of the IAD framework is being able to identify the types of rules-in-use utilised by the 
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participants to facilitate their behaviour and interaction in the action arena (Ostrom, 2005; 
Heikkila and Andersson, 2018). Ostrom (2005) developed a typology for rules-in-use, 
where each is interrelated with a specific function in the action situation. In this section, 
we summarise these institutional arrangements from Chapter 5 and link them with 
Ostrom’s rules typology in order to identify the rules-in-form (formal) and rules-in-use 
(informal) that were formulated, and the collaborative mechanisms used by the decision-
makers to enforce collective action.  
This section particularly addresses our second research question: 
 What are the formal and informal institutions that emerged as a response to 
collective action dilemmas? 
a. What are the rules-in-form (formal) and rules-in-use (informal) that were 
formulated?  
b. How are they crafted, monitored, and enforced? 
7.3.1 Boundary  
Boundary rules determine the entry, succession, and exit of actors (Ostrom, 2005). 
These identify who are the actors involved in the Partnership and how they enter and 
potentially exit the agreement. Since the Partnership was set-up as a collaborative 
governance, it involved two or more organisations who intend to create public value by 
working together rather than separately (Imperial and Koontz, 2007; Von Wald and 
Boyes, 2010). Our findings show that there are three groups of actors who entered in 
agreement to be members of the GMHSC Partnership. These are the following: (1) the 
key stakeholders, who comprise of the organisations who signed up to participate in 
Devo Health in GM, which are the CCGs, the Trusts and FTs, the Primary Care 
providers, and the LAs; (2) the partner organisations, who also signed the MoU to co-
deliver key programmes outlined in the GM strategic plan; and (3) the core staff of the 
GMHSC Partnership team, who are employed to manage, oversee, and deliver some of 
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the delegated responsibilities to the Partnership, including operational, monitoring, and 
implementation and delivery of the GM Strategic Plan.  
All actors entered a formal agreement through the signing of the MoU. The document 
outlined the framework for achieving the devolution of health and social care 
responsibilities to the participating organisations in GM. As mentioned previously, MoUs 
are oftentimes used in the NHS to record joint working agreements that are not legally 
binding (NHS Improvement, 2018). Whilst it is not a legal document, MoUs 
institutionalised the common intent and agreement between the parties in question and 
also identified the roles and responsibilities of those involved. Since the Partnership was 
also formed on a non-statutory basis, this meant that all member organisations retained 
their lines of accountability and responsibility (e.g. budgetary and funding for 
overspends) with their original function holder. However, since staff were recruited to 
form the core GMHSC Partnership team, these staff members were employed either on 
secondment, fixed contract, or appointed on a permanent basis.  
7.3.2 Position 
Position rules determine types and roles of decision-makers (Ostrom, 2005). Each 
participant takes a position in the action situation where each has diverse options for a 
combination of resources, opportunities, preferences, and skills. Our findings show that 
members of the Partnership occupy the following positions: (1) Provider of service 
(mostly occupied by the four key stakeholders); (2) Internal and external regulators (NHS 
England, and Partnership’s assurance groups and senior management team i.e. 
Executives); (3) Taskforce groups (Partnership programme delivery group); (4) Decision-
making bodies (Health and Care Board and Executive board); and (5) Advisory groups. 
Due to the complexity of the positions available and to ensure that all participants have 
opportunities to be equally represented in the decision-making arena, a formal 
governance structure was established.  
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Establishing governing arrangements is important especially in settings where 
multiple actors have overlapping roles and have competing statutory responsibilities 
(Ostrom et al., 1961). Moreover,  the heterogenous mix of the Partnership, which 
comprised of both public and non-public organisations, meant that hybrid arrangements 
were needed to fit the evolving needs of the collaborating participants (Donahue, 2004; 
O’Brien, 2012). This was demonstrated by the formal governance transitioning three 
times, which reflect the evolutionary phases of the Partnership activities: from a shadow 
group (emergence of the Partnership – April 2015 to April 2016); to an initial operational 
structure (strategic planning – April 2016 to December 2017); and a revised version 
(delivery and implementation – January 2018 to present). The arrangements set up by 
the shadow government were geared towards strategic planning of the work 
programmes to be delivered. As the Partnership entered the delivery phase of the 
programmes, they had to employ more staff and re-shuffle the governance structure to 
have clearer lines of responsibilities and accountabilities at all levels. 
7.3.3 Choice 
Choice rules define the set of actions assigned to each actor (Ostrom, 2005). These 
prescribed actions could be attributed to what the participants are allowed to do or not 
to do, and under what circumstances these actions might be allowed in the decision 
process (Cole, 2014; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2018). Our findings show that participants 
occupy positions and refer to different set of prescribed actions based on the three 
phases of Partnership activities, i.e. strategic building, delivery and implementation, and 
monitoring and assurance. Since not all stakeholders are able to participate in all 
positions in the Partnership at the same time, levels of participation had to be decided to 
indicate how responsibilities and benefits are to be distributed (Gray, 1989). 
First, the member organisations of the GMHSC Partnership have important roles to 
play during decision-making. The rationale behind this is that all significant decisions 
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taken at the Partnership level must include the input of the stakeholders, therefore, all 
stakeholders should be involved in all stages of the decision-making process (Ansell and 
Gash, 2008). Moreover, by identifying the critical and rightful participants who are 
affected by a shared problem, and ensuring that all collaborating organisations are 
equally represented, the legitimacy of and commitment to the process are preserved 
(Gray, 1989; Imperial and Koontz, 2007). The governance structures, therefore, ensured 
that all members of the Partnership are all well-represented through various boards and 
work programmes. By choosing to this action (i.e. represent their organisation in the 
Partnership), they choose to play an active role in various Partnership activities, such as 
the formulation of the strategy, engagement in meetings, networks, or steering groups, 
and implementation and delivery of a programme to name a few. This is also considered 
the default action because they signed an MoU, which represents their agreement to join 
the Partnership. 
Second, whilst all key stakeholders are represented in each group, the core 
Partnership team is tasked to a specific set of actions that are exclusive to them. Their 
role is to have oversight on strategy and delivery of the GM strategic plan, where they 
fulfil leadership, delivery, and assurance roles, or administration and operational 
responsibilities. Literature suggested that leaders sometimes facilitate rather than 
directing (O’Brien, 2012), which was evident when our interviewees expressed that they 
facilitate conversations and relationships rather than focusing on managing or directing 
the project itself. This also included monitoring and assurance roles, where the 
Partnership relied on both formal and informal institutions to fulfil these actions. Because 
the Partnership still has to adhere to national standards and the NHS constitution, the 
Partnership had to devise their own rules to make sure that all member organisations 
are complying with both constitutional and collective-choice level rules. Evidence from 
the interviews suggested that mechanisms like brokering and negotiating, and arranging 




Aggregation rules determine the collective agreement rules (Ostrom, 2005). 
Collaboration is inherently political, which involves a lot of negotiation, bargaining, and 
extensive discussion (Himmelman, 1996; Moore and Koontz, 2003). Our evidence 
suggested that all collective agreements were guided by the overarching fact that the 
members entered a gentleman’s agreement to enter the Partnership and work towards 
a collective goal; hence, they should honour that commitment by voluntarily complying 
to the rules that they agreed as a unit. This was usually conducted via a formal decision-
making arena where participants come together, meet on a regular basis, and set the 
level of control on how actions are to be translated into outcomes (McGinnis, 2011a; 
O’Brien, 2012).  
The Partnership has two distinct decision-making bodies (i.e. HCB and the 
Partnership Executive), who were in charge of making collective decisions, and 
achieving direction, control and coordination of the participating stakeholders (Imperial 
and Koontz, 2007; Ansell et al., 2017). The aggregation rule is that all decisions should 
be agreed as a consensus and based on majority via formal voting arrangements. 
Partnership decisions usually involved challenging discussions and pre-approval at the 
Partnership Executive level, and ratification and final endorsements at the HCB level. 
Interviewees identified that most difficult conversations happen at the Partnership 
Executive meetings through debates and engaging discussions. Emerson et al. (2012) 
highlighted that this deliberation process is important in every forum so that conflicts are 
resolved at the lowest level. All final decisions are approved at the HCB, where a stamp 
of approval and a final endorsement are given. 
7.3.5 Information 
Information rules define information access (Ostrom, 2005). Collective decisions rely 
upon the information that is handed to them, based on the perceived incentives of the 
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participants (Agrawal, 2001; Kopelman et al., 2002; Poteete et al., 2010). In the 
Partnership, information is disseminated across the structures through a variety of 
channels, such as formal assurance meetings and reports, and informal networks. 
Because GM has a history of cooperation, built-in networks have existed long before 
Devolution arrived; therefore, it was easier for the member organisations to communicate 
and take advantage of these networks rather than going through formal channels. 
Ostrom (1998) explained that as individuals engage in repeated interactions with one 
another for a period of time, they acquire good reputation that lead to developing levels 
of trusts and higher levels of cooperation. This also became a cheaper and more cost-
effective way of sharing information amongst various pockets of the GMHSC system, 
especially when it is difficult to get the right people in the same room. Our empirical 
findings, therefore, suggested that navigating through the Partnership system is all about 
relationship management and informal networking. Whilst there are formal governance 
routes and communications engagement framework set-up to guide these relationships, 
resorting to informal forms of information sharing became a more effective way of 
navigating around the system.  
7.3.6 Payoff 
Payoff rules identify the rewards and sanctions associated with outcomes of actions 
(Ostrom, 2005). In this research, we associate payoff rules with the incentives to 
collaborate, and the associated sanctions if they don’t participate in the various activities 
in the Partnership. Collaboration and collective action theory suggested that motivation 
can be influenced by factors such as shared problem or common purpose (Koontz, 2006; 
Emerson et al., 2012) and gain control financially and personally (Imperial and Koontz, 
2007).  
This was demonstrated by the empirical findings where we suggested that the 
member organisations agreed to engage in the Partnership because their senior leaders 
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signed the MoU on their behalf, and they were bound by a social contract that has no 
legal implications. The Partnership had also set-up both formal and informal mechanisms 
to make sure that there is some level of assurance between the member organisations 
at the operational level, the Partnership at the collective-choice level, and NHS England 
at the constitutional level. However, our evidence showed that participants were 
constrained by their own vested interests and lines of accountability to their respective 
organisations. They make decisions based on whether it will benefit themselves or not, 
and this acted as a barrier to achieving full collective action. This illustrated that 
individuals behave out of their self-interest where they do not realise the implications of 
collective actions (Olson, 1965). The Partnership, therefore, had to moderate this rational 
choice behaviour by creating Advisory boards that will incorporate the groupthink 
decisions of such factions into the governance. For instance, the PFB is a formal 
arrangement between the 15 NHS Trusts and FT Senior leaders, where they have 
strategic oversight amongst all the local Trusts and FTs in GM. This was demonstrated 
by Huxham (1996) and Huxham et al. (2000), where they suggested that 
countermeasures like this can be put in place to mitigate power struggles and avoid an 
unsuccessful collaboration process. 
7.4 Design principles to addressing the health commons 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to extend the theory of collective action and 
common property regimes and apply them in the health policy context. In Chapter 3, we 
posited that under conditions analogous to Ostrom (1990) and Cox, Arnold and Tomás' 
(2010) design principles to managing sustainable common pool resources, we can 
replicate this to a health commons setting. In this section, we summarise our findings 
and address how the GMHSC Partnership was able to successfully craft, enforce, and 




This section aims to address our first research question: 
 Under what circumstances can collaborative governance mechanisms create a 
system of stewardship in governing the health commons? 
a. What are the external factors that influence decision-making bodies to 
collaborate and act as a collective unit? 
 
Heikkila and Gerlak (2018) outlined that in large-scale regional collaborations 
selection, having a big group of actors creates a heterogenous group with diverse 
interests, and distinct backgrounds and experiences. However, others believed that 
larger groups may be more prone to free riding and struggle to employ collaborative 
mechanisms (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001). Our analysis showed that this is not always the 
case and we explain why. First, our evidence suggested that whilst it was challenging to 
orchestrate the formal structures due to the constraints that NHS England and the 
government have put to prevent full devolution, the Partnership was able to overcome 
this because of the strong history of collaboration amongst the various organisations and 
health sectors within GM. The initial MoU was agreed upon by more than 30 
organisations, and that in itself, is already a proof that large-scale regional collaborations 
can be established despite the heterogeneity of the participants as identified in the 
literature. 
Second, NHS England and a small group of local influential leaders came together 
to craft the initial governance arrangements of the Partnership. This included which 
resources are to be shared (e.g. budget, human capital, social capital, estates, etc.), how 
they are going to be shared upon, and who can access these resources. However, this 
did not occur without any challenges. The Devo Manc agreement came with a list of do’s 
and don’t’s, including rules on the limited level of autonomy that the new Partnership 
entity can exercise, the retained statutory functions and funding flows of its member 
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organisations, and the lines of accountability back to NHS England. On top of that, there 
are existing tensions within the local health and care system of GM, which resulted in a 
fragmented relationships and organisations working in isolation and competing with one 
another. These external factors contributed to the level of difficulty in establishing joint 
collective action. However, the role of key leaderships during the negotiation stages of 
the establishment of the Partnership helped in overcoming this barrier and was able to 
successfully transition a shadow governance into its full operation. 





Well-defined boundaries: 10 LAs of 
the GM city-region 
Level of autonomy: Limited by NHS 
England to delegation not full 
devolution 
Accountability arrangements: Lines 
of accountability remain to 
respective organisations 
Financial arrangements: £6 billion 




GM history of cooperation; strong 
interest for joint collective action; 
presence of influential leaders; 
existing tensions in the HSC 
system brought about by the 
culture of choice and competition 
during the Thatcher era 
Rules-in-use 
Initial governance arrangements 
during the transition period 
 
Lastly, the Partnership was able to successfully craft, enforce, and monitor their own 
set of formal and informal institutional arrangements in order to govern their shared 
health resources. These circumstances can be summarised through the following design 
principles. 
Well-defined user and resource boundaries. The GMHSC Partnership covers the 10 
local authorities of the city-region of GM. These physical geographical boundaries made 
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it easier to define who gets to participate in the collaborative decision-making and which 
resources are to be shared across the city-region. The boundaries also identify the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria on who and how are groups allowed to enter and/or exit 
the Partnership and which roles do they play in the collective forum, which we highlighted 
under the boundary and choice rules.  
Congruence with local conditions. Local conditions surrounding the resource 
involved oftentimes drive congruence to the rules being formed (Ostrom, 1997).  In the 
case of the Partnership, the common property in question is the overall health and social 
care economy of GM. This represents the overall stock of physical, financial, and human 
capital in the city-region that is being looked after by Partnership. This meant that the 
Partnership gets to strategically decide where and how to spend the £6 billion budget of 
the local NHS organisations and LAs within their boundaries. In addition to this, GM 
received a one-off access to £450 million TF, which can be used directly into to boost 
transformative changes on the delivery of health and social care services within the city-
region.  
In addition to these physical attributes, we must also acknowledge the community 
attributes of GM. The city-region has a long history of collaborative arrangements that 
existed long before Devolution was introduced. This made it easier for organic 
relationships to come together and create a joint collective action to form a collaborative 
governance. However, we should also acknowledge that there are prevailing local 
tensions within the HSC system of GM brought about by the culture of choice and 
competition from the Thatcher era. This has constrained the full potential of local NHS 
organisations to succeed in fully participating in collaborative efforts due to the multiple 
layers of governance already existing within the system.  
Collective choice agreements. The physical attributes of the resource and community 
attributes of the users of the resource influence the rules of the game. These rules-in-
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use shape the behaviour of the those who decided to participate in the collective action 
(Ostrom, 2005). As demonstrated in the previous sections, the Partnership was able to 
craft their own institutional arrangements to regulate the entry of actors, the use of the 
resources, the patterns of interaction, and the costs and benefits associated with the 
actions and outcomes (Imperial, 1999). In order to facilitate these arrangements, the 
Partnership relied on high levels of mutual trust and reciprocity amongst the participating 
members in terms of compliance to the collectively agreed rules. This was primarily the 
foundation of the collective choice rules and the source of joint collective action within 
the Partnership. Our evidence demonstrated this by using the “we signed up for this” 
attitude or co-ownership of problems and decisions as one of the informal mechanisms 
used to foster joint collective action. More importantly, governance structures were 
created at the collective choice level in order to facilitate both national and local 
accountability and organise the vertical and horizontal relationships within and across 
the different levels within the GMHSC system. 
Monitoring mechanisms, graduated sanctions and conflict resolution. The 
Partnership exercised caution when sanctioning its members. This was demonstrated 
by the choice, information, and aggregation rules. Our interviews demonstrated that 
formal protocols were in place to punish those who do not comply with whatever is 
expected of them as per the MoU, e.g. implementing of work programmes, reaching 
nationally or locally mandated targets, improving the quality of services and health 
outcomes, etc., through formal meetings with the Partnership Executive or the respective 
Project Management team. These also include recovery and intervention plans, 
outcomes framework, or performance metrics. NHS England does not have any direct 
power to intervene any of these monitoring processes because this function was 
delegated through the Chief Executive of the Partnership. 
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Since the Partnership is under a magnifying glass, they would want to avoid any form 
of bad attention towards them. Therefore, as much as possible, the Partnership would 
want to use formal protocols only as progress or milestones check and not to escalate 
to the final option for punishment. They utilised informal institutions to resolve any 
conflicts or any performance issues before reaching any high-level escalation 
procedures. Graduated sanctions were used instead, where they constructed enough 
barriers for key stakeholders or partner organisations to get through, such as 
deliberations and problem-solving mechanisms, the performance management boards, 
etc., before any conflict or performance issues reach the highest tier of the governance. 
Daily or monthly assurance meetings are also in place as monitoring mechanisms to 
make sure that members are up to date with their individual tasks.  
Informal avenues via face-to-face dialogues were also available to resolve conflicts 
and was highly favoured by most of the interviewees. This was facilitated mostly by the 
Partnership team, who proactively engaged in meaningful conversations with the 
stakeholders in order to address any issues prior to reaching the Partnership Executive 
table.  
7.5 Lessons from the GMHSC Partnership as stewards of the 
health commons 
In this section, we examine the outcomes and implications of the GMHSC 
Partnership as stewards of the commons as a result of the external factors, formal and 
informal institutional arrangements, interactions, incentives, and sharing of information 
that shaped their behaviour within the collective action arena. Whilst this research is not 
an evaluation on whether Devolution was an effective policy or not (instead, see 
Communities and Local Government, 2016; Walshe et al., 2018; Sandford, 2019), our 
aim in this section is to look at the process outcomes resulting from the formation of 
institutional structures of the Partnership to sustaining the health commons. 
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7.5.1 A polycentric and fragmented NHS 
Over the past few decades, the health and social care system has been subjected to 
ever increasing demand and dwindling supply of resources and unprecedented 
slowdown on funding growth due to pressures from austerity, leading to poorer health 
outcomes and raising questions on whether the NHS can sustain for the future 
generation (The King’s Fund, 2017). As we have illustrated in Chapter 3, the government 
resorted to multiple overhauls and reorganisation of the NHS, characterised by 
hierarchies, markets, and networks, and a constant pendulum swing between 
managerial, integrated, and collaborative approaches. This resulted into a highly 
fragmented and complex NHS system – almost like a labyrinth that leads to different 
nodes and levels of decision-making.  
When the GM Health Devo deals were being arranged, it was agreed that the 
delegation of health functions from NHS England to Greater Manchester only involves a 
limited degree of autonomy. Statutory functions, lines of accountabilities, and existing 
responsibilities within organisations were all retained as set out in the HSCA 2012. With 
the formation of the GMHSC Partnership adding another layer of complexity to the 
governance structures, it raised questions on whether this addresses any of the existing 
tensions in the system created by previous system reforms, and whether this set-up will 
be sustainable in the long run. 
7.5.1.1 Centrally orchestrated localism 
At the constitutional level, our evidence shows that despite the delegation of some 
NHS functions to the Partnership, NHS England retained a strong level of control in 
setting the limitations on how the Partnership governs its local health economy. 
However, NHS England also wanted to empower the city-region by awarding them some 
level of autonomy but not fully devolved NHS functions. The Devolution deal was like 
“smoke and mirrors” (C04) because in reality, there was not “true” devolution. Rather, 
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GM received a deal with limited autonomy and delegated functions that truly do not 
represent fully devolved functions, as in the case of the devolved NHS in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. Moreover, there was no statutory legislation to formalise 
the creation of the new Partnership entity, but rather an MoU was substituted as a means 
of formal agreement.  
This demonstrated the strong central influence with weak local nodes that has been 
existing within the political landscape in English governance (Pike et al., 2015; Bailey 
and Wood, 2017; Shaw and Tewdwr-jones, 2017). The Partnership Executive team, for 
instance, remained to have links to NHS England via the Chief Executive, who is an 
NHSE employee. Local NHS organisations such as CCGs and Trusts were still governed 
by the structural powers surrounding NHS bodies. This meant that member 
organisations were still subjected to national mandates and the NHS constitution, 
displaying a level of local paternalism with national accountability that was already 
present prior to Devolution (Greener and Powell, 2008). This is not surprising, given that 
the overarching City Devolution deals were driven by temporary political and territorial 
fixes with an overriding objective of devolved local responsibilities determined by the 
centre (Pike et al., 2015; Bailey and Wood, 2017; Shaw and Tewdwr-jones, 2017; Ayres 
et al., 2018). 
7.5.1.2 Stewards with a collective intention 
Despite the influencing role of NHS England in driving forward a Devolution deal, key 
influential roles and local GM leaders rose to negotiate a better deal. Within months, the 
Devo Health was secured by a small number of key officials from the government, NHS 
England, and the GM Combined Authority. This was an indication of local elite 
assimilation and centre court politics that has contributed to the weak citizen mobilisation 
and lack of legitimation of the Devolution process (Deas, 2014; Kenealy, 2016; Prosser 
et al., 2017; Ayres et al., 2018). This, however, can also be interpreted as a 
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demonstration of the strong political networks in GM that has long existed following the 
abolition of metropolitan councils during the late 1980s (The Economist, 2013; Deas, 
2014; Holden and Harding, 2015; Haughton et al., 2016). This resulted in decades of 
organic cooperation with high levels of mutual trust and respect, contributing to the 
successful securement of Devo Health.  
GM has, indeed, all the key ingredients to become stewards of its own health 
commons. Given the constraints posed by NHS England at the constitutional level, as 
identified in the previous sections, the Partnership was able to demonstrate that formal 
and informal institutional arrangements can be crafted and enforced to overcome 
adversaries and generate collective action. This has already been proven in studies on 
polycentric settings where multiple actors have overlapping roles and have competing 
statutory responsibilities to protect different constituencies, where collaborative 
mechanisms have been developed by state and non-state actors to work together and 
resolve conflict (Ostrom et al., 1961; Ostrom, 2008; Aligica and Tarko, 2012; Carlisle and 
Gruby, 2017).  
Our evidence also demonstrated that organisations who signed up for Devolution 
were all working based on their existing social attributes (i.e. trust, reputation, reciprocity) 
and working relationships (i.e. built-in informal networks, tensions within the system), 
which they have known from their previous experiences. They were holding each other 
accountable in a way that they are honouring the MoU that they all originally signed up 
for. Given that Devo Health did not have any legal mandates to force organisations to 
comply with the agreements, everybody was pretty much working with each other via a 
social contract and altruism.  
7.5.1.3 Local paternalism with national accountability 
Devo Health was part of the localism agenda of the Conservatives to bolster city-
regional ambitions and foster a more collaborative way working via the Devolution deals. 
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This was, however, not a new initiative; but rather a newer version of previously 
repackaged or rebranded policies, e.g. LEPs, City Deals, Combined Authorities, and now 
Devolution Deals to name a few. It did signal the entrance of departure from the 
traditional centralist approaches of top-down imposition of planning and strategic vision 
to empowered local regions with stronger local autonomy. Devo Health, however, failed 
to institutionalise this in some respects.  
The creation of the GMHSC Partnership meant that a new layer of decision-making 
has been added at a ‘meso-level’ (Quilter-Pinner, 2016) – which instead of bringing 
decisions closer to the local communities as envisioned by the Five Year Forward View 
(NHS England, 2014), it imposed a top-down approach on strategic planning at a central 
and collective level. This meant that rather than local NHS organisations and local 
councils making separate decisions to meet their local needs, some decisions have to 
be made at a GM-level in order to address the health and wellbeing of the entire GM 
population as a whole, i.e. making decisions at the most appropriate level (AGMA et al., 
2015). The Partnership constructed formal modes of governance to organise reporting 
structures, which also demonstrated that this new way of working still has elements of 
the hierarchical and centralist approaches that has existed within the NHS culture for 
decades.  
On the other hand, the Partnership was still able to fulfil its collective ambition of 
addressing GM problems by GM decision-makers. They promoted co-ownership of 
bottom-up solutions, where the localities were encouraged to contribute to the overall 
GM strategy. They were, however, to be held accountable to delivering what they signed 
up for and to commit to the collectively agreed deliverables, especially if their respective 
locality or programme area has been awarded with some Transformation Funding. It is, 
therefore, still under the remit of the localities to deliver these plans and be accountable 
to their respective constituents and individual organisations. This demonstrated a shift 
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back to national paternalism with local accountability, where strategic decisions are 
controlled centrally whilst relying on the local nodes to deliver them. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter aims to synthesise the empirical findings from Chapters 6 and 7 and 
examine the outcomes and implications of the GMHSC Partnership as stewards of the 
commons as a result of the external factors, formal and informal institutional 
arrangements, interactions, incentives, and sharing of information that shaped their 
behaviour within the collective action arena. 
Our findings suggested that the Partnership was able to successfully craft, enforce, 
and monitor their own institutional arrangements despite the constraints set by the formal 
rules at the constitutional level. By constructing informal institutions, the Partnership was 
able to overcome the limitations of the formal rules and to use them as countermeasures 
to free-riding and self-seeking behaviour. The Partnership was also able to devise their 
own rules to incentivise and motivate collective behaviour from the member 
organisations. This confirms the arguments presented in our theoretical framework 
(Chapter 2.7). 
The GMHSC Partnership illustrated that being stewards of your own health and 
social care economy can be advantageous in terms of having more control to your 
resources and being able to create and use various institutional mechanisms to facilitate 
collaboration across the system. Table 19 summarises our conceptualisation of what 
constitutes the GM health commons, based on our empirical findings. This 
conceptualisation is one of our key contributions to the theoretical discourse on the study 





Table 18: The GM health commons 
 Common pool 
resources 
Health commons 





Joint ownership of 
the fish in the lake 
Joint access to the 
commons via stewardship 
of health resources 
Devo Health; Delegated NHS 
functions; to make decisions 
on their own HSC economy 
Common 
pool resource 
Population of fish in a 
lake 
Overall stock of health 
resources in the region 
The overall health and social 
care economy of GM 
Resource 
unit 
A fish once it has 
been caught 
Access to health services 
£6 billion overall spending for 
health and social care in GM 
Appropriation 
Extraction of fish 
from the lake 
Access to health services 





Stewardship team acting 





harvest from the lake 
Providers: Health care 
professionals; Users: 
patients 
Users and providers: Key 
stakeholders (NHS 
organisations + LAs) + 2.8 














behaviour of the 
actors 
Rules that shape how 
decisions are made by the 
stewards and how to 
access the resources 
Devolution agreement (Cities 
and Local Government Bill 





maintenance of the 
resource 
Limitations on how parties 
can spend savings from 
programs or what 
initiatives they should 




monitoring and accountability 
frameworks, governance 
structures, and access to TF) 







Stewardship team sets 
priorities for programmes 





State intervening to 
local users  
Regulations from the state 





destruction of the 
resource 
Rising health care costs 
reducing overall economic 
productivity 
Increasing financial deficit 
with poorer health outcomes 
Sustainability 




outcomes, lower costs, 
productivity and equity 
Improved health outcomes 
for the population, reduced 
financial deficits, integration 







This chapter presents the overall contributions of this thesis into existing theoretical 
knowledge and policy context. As outlined in the objectives of this research (Figure 25), 
this research aims to contribute to the research gap in the study of commons applied in 
the health policy context. It particularly explores the notion that multi-sectoral 
organisations can take charge of their own health commons and function as a collective 
unit by crafting and enforcing their own institutions to order relationships and govern 
decision-making behaviours of its constituents. Using the IAD Framework as an 
analytical tool, this research highlights the formation of formal and informal institutions 
as a response of the Partnership to the devolution of health responsibilities to GM. 
Figure 25: Contributions of the thesis based on the research objectives 
 
First, we begin this chapter by outlining the key findings of the study and why this 
research is significant to the discourse of health devolution in the UK context. It reviews 
how the aims and objectives were achieved, with respect to addressing the research 
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gap. Second, we highlight the contribution of this thesis to the theoretical discourse in 
collective action and collaborative governance by exploring the concept of governing the 
commons applied outside the US context. We also outline how the GM setting 
contributed to the application of the health commons and how it advances knowledge 
and methodology through the examination of institutional arrangements in a multi-
sectoral partnership. Third, we identify the implications of this research to the policy 
context of sustaining the NHS. We look at the lessons drawn from our empirical findings 
and examine how the central government can learn from the GM model of setting up of 
the ‘rules of the game’. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations 
of the study and how scholars can apply the concept of the health commons in other 
policy contexts moving forward. 
8.2 Key findings of the thesis 
This thesis investigates how formal and informal institutions emerged as a response 
to collective action dilemmas in the health policy context. We posited that the health 
commons can be looked after by a group of stewards that represents both the 
appropriators and providers as a whole in order to preserve and sustain their shared 
resources for the use of future generations.  
Following this line of thought, we argued that the local decision-makers of GM 
through the GMHSC Partnership are the stewards of the health commons – a group that 
asserts responsibility for overseeing and making decisions of the health and care system 
on behalf of its population. They have established governance mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements in place in order to dictate who can participate in drawing 
resources from the health commons, and which, how, where, and when resources can 
be used. Aside from planning and providing strategic direction, the Partnership also 
monitored the outcomes and enforce graduated sanctions to any stakeholder who fails 
to follow the collectively agreed rules.  
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The Partnership was in-charge of their health commons, which represented the 
overall stock of physical, financial, human, and social capital resources within their 
defined boundary, i.e. the 10 LAs of GM (Chapter 5.2). This was oftentimes described in 
strategic documents as the overall health and social care economy of GM (Walshe et al., 
2018), encompassing the £6 billion overall spending allocated to the local NHS 
organisations and all the relevant physical, human, and financial structures that were 
likely to be shared between the city-region. Our research suggested that the Devolution 
of health functions paved way for GM to draw a well-defined user boundary to their local 
pool of health care resources. Having well-defined user and resource boundaries 
(Chapter 7.4) allowed the Partnership to define who gets to participate in the 
collaborative decision-making and which resources are shared. The Partnership crafted 
boundary and choice rules (Chapters 7.3.1, 7.3.3), which identified the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria on who and how are groups allowed to enter and/or exit the Partnership 
agreement and which roles do they play in the collective forum. 
Analogous to the theory of CPR, the GM health commons have a set of actors who 
were in charge of making decisions on behalf of the population, overseeing the strategic 
planning of transformation programmes, and monitoring collective participation of its 
members (Chapter 6.2, 6.4, 6.5). Although the role of the Partnership was not really to 
control who gets to withdraw or use the health commons, they are primarily there to act 
as stewards and generate collective action on how to make better decisions about 
improving their health outcomes, improve productivity, and provide better services for 
the HSC economy. Most of the members of the Partnership are also providers of service, 
who make contributions to the sustainability of their commons.  
Our conceptualisation of the health commons in the GM context gave us a new 
perspective in sustaining the NHS. We compared the doomsday scenario of the Tragedy 
of the Commons to the rising health care costs with poorer health outcomes and lower 
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economic productivity that was occurring in the NHS. Moreover, we described that the 
labyrinth of NHS reforms from centralist to marketisation to partnership working led to 
further fragmentation in the system (Chapter 3.3). Our research, therefore, offered an 
alternative perspective and suggested a new framework for managing the health 
commons. 
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Overall, this thesis showed that as stewards of the regional economy of GM, the  
GMHSC Partnership was able to craft, monitor, and enforce their own formal  and 
informal institutional arrangements in order to not only successfully govern their health 
commons, but also to foster and facilitate collaborative relationships across their 
multisectoral and fragmented system. They were able to fulfil their collective ambition to 
address their own local problems by promoting a collaborative governance that 
incorporated all parts of the health system and made decisions as a collective unit. 
This research drew together the rules that informed the participants to modify and 
regulate their behaviour. We particularly explored the seven elements which make up 
the internal structure of the action situation, namely: participants, positions, potential 
outcomes, set of allowable actions, control in function, information available to 
participants, and perceived costs and benefits. Each of these elements corresponds with 
a set of rules, which emerges as an outcome of the interactions from the action situation. 
This is the rules configuration stage of the process, where they craft, monitor, and 
enforce formal and informal institutions to facilitate their relationships. 
As illustrated in the previous chapters, our evidence suggested that the Partnership 
was able to successfully devise their own formal and informal institutional arrangements 
in order to shape the behaviour of their participants. In order to avoid free-riding or any 
form of abusive behaviour towards the appropriation from the commons, the Partnership 
was governed by formal and informal institutions to shape and incentivise behaviour 
(Chapter 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 7.3). These rule-making activities allowed the regulation of 
interaction amongst the participating members and also fostered/hindered collaboration 
and collective action (Chapter 7.2). They relied on soft structures, such as frameworks, 
strategic plans, governance structures, assurance and monitoring guidelines, and the 
MoU, to substitute to the absence of statutory legislation. This was used to create order 
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and mobilise the relationships amongst its participants. More importantly, the Partnership 
resorted to informal institutions like shared norms, trust, and reciprocity, in order to 
overcome the limitations of the absence of formal institutions. They took advantage of 
the strong history of collaboration by the embedded networks and used this to facilitate 
debates and enable conversations that are difficult to conduct in a formal forum. 
Our evidence suggested that the creation of the GMHSC Partnership resulted into 
three key significant outcomes. We demonstrated this by exploring how formal and 
informal rules interacted at each level, namely the constitutional, collective choice, and 
operational levels, and how each layer affected the other.  
First, there are still traces of centralist approach in the system. At the constitutional 
level, NHS England orchestrated centrally controlled rules on how the Partnership will 
be formed and how they will be monitored. Amendments to the statutory legislation were 
made to make way for a limited Devo Health and formal leaderships roles were created 
to draw links of accountability back to the top tier. NHS England and the government, 
therefore, played the role of meta-governors by masking the Devolution movement as a 
repackaged version of localism. In reality, they retained central control and continued to 
exert arms’ length influence over the devolved city-region.  
Second, the aim of Devolution was to bring decision-making closer to the citizens, 
and yet, the creation of this new layer of decision-making meant that some decisions 
have to be made at a city-region rather than local level. At the collective-choice level, the 
Partnership crafted another set of rules based on the guidelines set by NHS England at 
the constitutional level. Because of these constraints, the Partnership had to resort to 
other forms of informal institutional arrangements (i.e. gentleman’s agreement, 
cooperation, etc.) to overcome the barriers to collaboration. The Partnership drew links 
of accountability down to the lower tier (e.g. CCGs, LAs, Trusts) to strengthen the 
network connections and use it to their advantage when they are exercising their 
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regulatory role. This implied that the Partnership exercised a top-down approach where 
decisions are made centrally in and on behalf of GM. With the existing partisan 
behaviours, inherited organisational culture of competition, and lack of statutory basis 
and national mandate, the Partnership found it challenging to implement it. 
Third, the Partnership helped transitioned GM to shift from local paternalism with 
national accountability to national paternalism with local accountability. Prior to Devo 
Health, local NHS organisations had more control in terms of strategic planning as per 
their population needs and were accountable to the NHS for their decisions and 
outcomes. However, the entrance of the Partnership created a collective vision of making 
decisions that is best for GM as a whole but putting the local NHS organisations 
responsible and accountable to delivering it. At the operational level, the key 
stakeholders were bounded by the agreement that they signed with the Partnership, 
making them to compulsory comply with the rules imposed by the Partnership. However, 
since they retained their statutory roles and lines of accountability as outlined in the 
constitutional level, they exercised a higher degree of local autonomy. This meant that 
they are tied to their own organisational rules, which prevented them to fully collaborate 
and participate at the collective decision-making arena. Whilst the locality levels get to 
contribute on how the programmes will be delivered based on their local needs, i.e. 
creating bottom-up solutions, the Partnership was merely just an instrument to facilitate 
and enable these solutions to happen. At the end of the day, it is still under the remit of 
the localities to deliver the collectively agreed plans. All of these findings coincide with 
previously published evaluation reports of Communities and Local Government (2016), 
Walshe et al., (2018) and Sandford (2019). 
This is not to say, however, that Devo Health failed to resolve the problems it aimed 
to address. In fact, our evidence suggested that the formation of the GMHSC Partnership 
resulted in a successful effort to collectively manage their well-defined and bounded 
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health resources by overcoming the barriers set at the constitutional level by devising 
their own institutional arrangements at the collective-choice level. They took advantage 
of the strong social networks and history of collaboration already existing within GM and 
utilised various forms of collaborative mechanisms to continue to build a stronger 
foundation of relationships within the system. Despite the challenges, the Partnership 
demonstrated that with the right combination of leadership, trust, and collective intention 
to resolve joint problems, then it is possible to overcome the political barriers of 
Devolution. 
8.3 Theoretical contributions  
Building on the theoretical foundations of the common pool resources or the 
‘commons’, the theory of collective action, and collaborative governance, we identified 
that there is a research gap that needed to be explored. The key theoretical contribution 
of this thesis is the application of the health commons outside the US context, where we 
extended the by applying them in the UK health policy setting.  
In the literature review (Chapter 3.2), we examined the conceptualisation and 
working assumptions of the health commons. Although it has always been present in the 
literature, earlier studies were very limited to conceptualisation and not much on 
empirical examination. It wasn't until Michael McGinnis and his colleagues from ReThink 
Health Initiative offered an emerging perspective on how we can view health resources 
as a common property regime and how regional and local governances can act as 
stewards of the health commons by initiating and facilitating institutional arrangements 
in order to take charge of their own health resources. Upon their examination of small 
health community in Grand Junction, Colorado (McGinnis and Brink, 2012; McGinnis, 
2013a, 2018), we discovered that the formation of a leadership team and a health care 
collaborative consortium exercising informal institutions led to positive health outcomes 
and the long-term sustainability of their bounded health care resources. Because of the 
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existing strong social ties beyond the community's geographical boundary, the 
leadership team was able to successfully exercise some level of substantial control to 
monitoring the appropriation of their health commons. 
The application of this theoretical framework was, however, challenging due to the 
limited applicability of the health commons in the US health care context, particularly on 
a small community like Grand Junction where it is driven by a top-down collaboration on 
health care stewardship and largely operated by the private sector. Further studies 
showed failed attempts to foster collective action amongst local communities in the US 
as a result of poor regionalised health policy reforms at the state and national levels. 
Whilst we were aware that this set-up is widely incomparable to the way the UK health 
care system works, both US and the UK do share the problematic narrative in addressing 
their dwindling finite resources and financial sustainability.  
Our study, however, is not the first to explore this phenomenon. The application of 
the health commons drew attention to whether countries outside the US with universal 
health coverage will perform similarly to that of Grand Junction's. For instance, Wong et 
al.’s (2014) examined a small tight-knit indigenous groups in Malaysia and examined the 
success of their health commons through the effective management of their shared 
natural resources and strong knowledge base on how to preserve their health systems 
for future generations. Universal health coverages in indigenous populations pose 
unique challenges to supply, access, and infrastructure. The lack of state support and 
insufficient supply in medical facilities and personnel led to this small indigenous 
community to manage their own health commons. They took advantage of their strong 
social and knowledge base to empower their local citizens to take ownership and control 
of their health care resources. Similarly, Palumbo (2017) examined the conditions of 
European publicly-funded health care systems and how the health commons can be 
applied to managing opportunistic behaviours in accessing free health care. The author 
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sparked an interesting debate on how universal health care systems are comparable to 
the properties of common pool resources and highlighted the parallelism between the 
appropriation and sustainability issues between both concepts. Outcomes from such 
case studies have set-up future studies to provide empirical contributions to the 
discourse. This has proved the need for the exploration of the research gap, which 
strengthened our narrative to test whether we can draw lessons from the current 
conditions of the English health devolution agenda in managing a portion of their 
bounded health commons.  
The outcomes of our case study were significant in advancing the debate in 
sustaining the health commons through carefully crafted institutions, particularly outside 
the US context. Our research’s empirical contributions to the theoretical knowledge 
illustrate that the conceptualisation of the health commons is evolving and that we should 
continuously test it in various health systems. The uniqueness of the GM case shows 
that when given the chance (i.e if neither privatisation nor full state control is an option), 
local governments can replicate the conditions found in local communities that face 
social dilemmas on the commons. 
Akin to Ostrom's design principles and drawing from the limitations of the empirical 
findings of McGinnis and his team, our research was able to successfully replicate their 
findings and extend it in the UK health settings. First, our findings suggested that the 
heterogenous multi-sectoral nature of the Partnership contributed to a pool of actors that 
have diverse interests and distinct backgrounds. With more than 30 organisations from 
public, private, and third sector, the Partnership was able to incentivise its members and 
forge cooperation through soft powers. In contrary with previous studies in CPR that 
preferred smaller groups (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Heikkila and Andersson, 2018) as 
opposed to larger and more heterogenous groups, the Partnership took advantage of its 
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history of cooperation and trust to glue the fragmented relationships and cracks in the 
GM health and social care system.  
Second, our findings coincided with McGinnis' (2013b) and Wong et al.'s (2014) 
studies on the emergent use of informal institutions as a countermeasure to state 
involvement and potential political tensions. In Wong et al.'s (2014) study in particular, 
social protection and altruism played a key role in garnering collective interest amongst 
the members to pool their resources for the benefit of the indigenous community. Given 
that this study was in a context outside the US and in a small tight-knit community in a 
rural area in Southeast Asia, the role of informal institutions were important to informing 
the way local governments would respond to collective action dilemmas. Similarly, 
McGinnis' (2013b) found the value of exercising informal sanctions as a means of conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Rather than imposing an authoritative form of punishment to 
those who do not abide by the “rules”, the Grand Junction health leaders used gentler 
forms of communication to modify each other's behaviours.  
Summarised as the design principles to addressing the health commons (Chapter 
7.5) in Table 19, we found that GM was able to mimic the outcomes of previous studies 
through the use of informal institutions as countermeasures to the formal restrictions 
posed by NHS England. Although NHS England awarded delegated responsibilities to 
GM, they were still subjected to national mandates and regulations. With the limited level 
of autonomy, GM created formal structures (such as governance and frameworks) in 
order to operate in a hierarchical manner and create a chain of command across the 
conurbation. However, informal institutions were vital to bridge the fragmented cracks of 
the system. Informal modes of networking, which were built on trust and reputation, were 
utilised in order to facilitate conversations, engage in discussions, resolve conflict, and 
monitor compliance between the members. 
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Lastly, our findings corroborated the existing studies on the health commons. As it 
appears, communities with existing levels of cooperation and collective intention – 
regardless of their size and location – thrive in collaborative settings and can successfully 
craft, enforce, and monitor their own bounded resources. GM possessed the right key 
ingredients (i.e. history of cooperation; trust and reputation building; strong interest for 
joint collective action; and presence of influential leaders) to take charge of their health 
commons, which then guided the formation of their formal and informal institutional 
arrangements. The presence of influential leaders, more importantly, played a key role 
in steering the direction of the collaborative governance during its early stages. All of 
these guided and regulated their decision-making and relationship-building. Whilst there 
were still existing tensions in some pockets of the system, the Partnership banked on 
GM’s strong history of cooperation as a form of buy-in mechanism and encourage its 
members to participate in Partnership-level activities. 
8.4 Methodological contributions 
Another objective of this research is to examine the factors that hinder or enhance 
collaboration and interaction. By using the theoretical lens of the role of institutions in 
governing the commons, this research was able to offer a pragmatic and more practical 
way of using and analysing rules configuration in the health commons context. First, we 
offered a unique research design and methodological approach that combines the 
strengths and weaknesses of case study research using a critical realist approach. 
Second, we took advantage of the explanatory power of the IAD framework to 
contextualise complex policy situations and identify mechanisms that led to a given 
outcome. 
Studies on the commons and collective action utilised a diverse set of methodological 
approaches in order to prove that sustainability can be attained if self-organising 
communities establish their own institutional arrangements, as opposed with state-led or 
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private-owned approaches. We examined the methodological debates that dominated 
the field of social science and how the studies in the field of commons contributed to this 
discourse by using a variety of sophisticated analytical methods (Chapter 4.2). Ranging 
from case study methods, field-based research, meta-analysis, action research, 
experiments in the laboratory and field, and agent-based modelling, the study in the 
commons acknowledged that there is no single prescribed method that can fully address 
collective action problems.   
By applying an institutional approach to examining the health commons in the UK 
setting, we advanced the theoretical inquiry and empirical evidence on the effectiveness 
of institutions as a solution to addressing collective action dilemmas. This research 
contributes to the rich database of empirical studies on rules configuration by employing 
a critical realist approach using qualitative methods (Chapter 4.3, 4.4). Our unique 
approach to examining the health commons particularly also contributes to the growing 
field of understanding the governance of common property regimes across a 
multidisciplinary context.  
The IAD framework has been applied in numerous contexts in examining the 
commons including large-scale ecosystems (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005, 2018; Gerlak 
and Heikkila, 2006), watershed partnerships (Moore and Koontz, 2003; Imperial and 
Koontz, 2007; Hardy and Koontz, 2009), fisheries (Rudd, 2004; Imperial and Yandle, 
2005), forestry management (Koontz, 2003), and polycentric settings (Whaley and 
Weatherhead, 2014); however, it has yet been explored in the health commons context.  
This research was able to contribute to this methodological gap by successfully 
examining the role of institutions in governing the health commons through the utilisation 
of the IAD framework. We identified this framework as the best and most appropriate 
analytical tool to assist us in organising the complex situations that occurred to establish 
the institutional arrangements that emerged before (Chapter 5), during (Chapter 6), and 
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as a result (Chapter 7) of the collective action in governing the health commons. It had 
the explanatory advantage to investigate the collaborative and institutional mechanisms 
associated with collective action efforts, particularly with its focus on rules configuration 
(Chapter 6, 7.3). Moreover, we used the IAD’s multiple levels of analysis to be able to 
compare how the rules obtained from one level affect the rules configuration of the 
proceeding level (Chapter 7.2). This advantage enabled us to extend the application of 
the IAD framework in the health commons setting. 
The IAD framework helped us to (1) identify the exogenous variables that set up how 
participants interact within an action arena (Chapter 5); (2) configure the different types 
of rules that emerged as a response to their interactions and given the constraints on 
information and incentives (Chapter 6, 7.3) (3) explore the interaction of rules and how 
they are nested from one level to another through the multiple level of analysis (Chapter 
6.8, 7.2); and (4) identify the process outcomes arising from the interactions (Chapter 
7.5). Through these, we were able to configure the circumstances which can foster 
collective action and stewardship of the health commons, which we summarised as the 
design principles analogous to that of Ostrom's (1990) and McGinnis' (2013a) original 
contributions (Chapter 7.4). 
8.5 Policy contributions 
One of the rationales for conducting this research is the need to propose an 
alternative solution on how the NHS can sustain the system. Although we did not conduct 
a thorough outcomes evaluation regarding the effectiveness of Health Devo (as identified 
earlier, this can be found elsewhere, see Walshe et al., 2018), this thesis instead was 
able to offer an unconventional perspective in managing the health commons by crafting 
and monitoring institutional arrangements to address collective action problems. This 
section, therefore, explores the policy contributions of this research and how key players 
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(e.g. other Combined Authorities, etc.) can learn how to best set up the “rules of the 
game” for optimal outcomes.  
In terms of health outcomes, this thesis did not aim to evaluate the impact of the 
GMHSC Partnership on the GM population. However, we should still acknowledge their 
achievements and shortcomings in terms of the immediate outcomes of their 
transformational programmes. Devo Health in Greater Manchester is currently in its 4th 
year of operation and the Partnership still has so much to offer. Within these 4 years, 
GM has managed to fulfil one of their key visions of establishing a Joint Commissioning 
Board (JCB), which began its full operation in December 2018. They were meant to bring 
together all commissioning bodies in GM to carry out GM-wide binding decisions (NHS 
in GM and GMCA, 2018). Recent reports (NHS in GM and GMCA, 2019b, 2019c) also 
showed the following improvements in the system performance: general waiting time for 
referral to treatment in NHS Trusts and FTs has dramatically improved and is well above 
the England performance, and referrals in primary care has improved showing a more 
effective management in demand within the community. There are also notable 
improvements in the overall population health of the city-region; however, there are still 
performance variations across the system, particularly in A&E waiting times and delayed 
transfer of care.  The most recent business plan aims to focus on the acceleration on 
progress talks with GMCA regarding integration of health and social care with all other 
policy areas and the promotion of a single commissioning system with coordinated local 
care organisations that deliver coordinated care to the population (NHS in GM and 
GMCA, 2019a).  
We should not, however, isolate the situation in Greater Manchester as the only case. 
Devolution of NHS functions is happening elsewhere in various forms and in different 
parts of England. London, for instance, also received devolution agreements to also take 
some level of control to their health and social care economy. This was again driven by 
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the political agenda of localism as a means of decentralising powers and responsibilities 
back to the local authorities (Department of Health and HM Treasury, 2017; Mayor of 
London, 2017; Naylor, 2017). Moreover, far from the political side of devolution but 
similar in agenda is NHS England’s contentious advocation for place-based and person-
centred approach to delivering care. This was highlighted in their 2014 national strategic 
plan, the Five Year Forward View, which promoted new models of care to put more 
emphasis on preventative care at a community level, integration of health and social care 
services, and empowering patients to take control of their health (NHS England, 2014). 
The integrated care systems (ICS), for example, is one of the models for care 
currently being promoted. This aims to reduce costs and encourage collaboration across 
different parts of the HSC system through shared pooled budgets between local councils 
and CCGs, joint governance structures, and joint planning responsibilities (NHS 
England, 2014; Checkland et al., 2015). NHS organisations (i.e. CCGs, Trusts, and 
Foundation Trusts) and local authorities are to submit Sustainability and Transformation 
Plans (STPs) outlining how place-based approach can be applied within their geographic 
scope (also known as STP footprints). They have to bid nationally, put forward a quality 
application, and essentially compete with the rest of the country in order to receive extra 
cash from the £2.1 billion pot of Sustainability and Transformation Fund (STF) (see NHS 
England et al., 2015). This single application and central approval process system was 
intended to support collaboration and to reduce bureaucracy. 
GMHSC Partnership, in many ways, is essentially a repackaged version of the ICS 
– except the Devolution agreements enabled them to do more. Perhaps we could 
compare it as a double-edged sword; where in one hand, Devolution has granted GM 
some level of autonomy to make decisions at a city-region level through new ways of 
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collaborating, whilst on the other hand, this set-up has constrained them to adhere to the 
NHS constitution and comply to centralist policies set by NHS England15.  
Our research offers a new way of examining the continuing evolving policies to bridge 
the fragmented system of the NHS and eventually sustain it for the future generation. 
We offer a critical departure point for examining the impact of Devo Health and the NHS 
integration policies through rules configuration and perhaps, an alternative 
recommendation for future policies and managing ACOs and ICPs. 
In the literature review (Chapter 2.3), we identified that Ostrom offered an alternative 
individualistic conception to collective action. She established that communities can 
exercise self-governance of their commons through the aid of institutions, without the 
involvement of the state nor without the aid of privatisation. However, theory also 
suggested that whilst self-organised systems are more effective than government 
regulation and intervention, it is not necessarily a panacea to resource management. 
State intervention, in fact, can sometimes be a key set piece to the success of managing 
the commons as we have illustrated in this thesis. 
Our empirical findings demonstrated that whilst some responsibilities were delegated 
to GM, NHS England still played a key role in regulating and monitoring the activities 
occurring in the Partnership level. Moreover, Whitehall was key to passing the legislation 
that paved way to the devolution agreements between GM and NHS England. This 
resulting arrangement is rather common in CPR studies where the government plays an 
intervening role not only to mediate disputes, but also as ultimate guarantor of property 
rights arrangements (Agrawal, 2002; Mansbridge, 2014).  
                                                          
15 We should always exercise caution when interpreting this because of the controversial labelling 




Consequently, Sarker (2013) stated that where polycentric governance exists, ‘state-
reinforced self-governance’ is a recommended alternative. As we outlined in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis (Chapter 1.2.2), we identified how the multiple 
overhauls of the NHS over the last two decades resulted into a complex system. Ostrom 
et al. (1961) denoted this as polycentric governance, where there are many centres of 
decision-making that are formally independent of each other with overlapping domains 
of responsibilities. Sarker (2013:728) argued that a cooperative relationship between the 
state and non-state actors in polycentric settings is encouraged through institutional 
arrangements. In this case, the state offers substantial financial, technological, statutory, 
and political support, but without exercising coercive and authoritative involvement.   
In some ways, we could draw parallelisms from Sarker's (2013) study and argue that 
our findings illustrated that the GM health devolution model is a ‘state-reinforced self-
governance’. To avert the tragedy of the commons in the NHS, this thesis believes that 
should the government and NHS England award further delegated responsibilities to 
combined authorities or metropolitan regions, they should take into consideration the: (i) 
level of authority that they exercise with regards to monitoring and regulating the 
performance and activities at the collective tiers; and (ii) the amount of ownership of the 
health commons that are being awarded to the collective and operational levels. Perhaps 
this set-up will allow devolved English regions to flourish and craft their own institutional 
arrangements that will suit their local needs, but also maintain a collaborative relationship 
with the central government.  
8.6 Limitations and recommendations 
The key contributions of this thesis are summarised in Figure 26. The thesis is an 
examination of the emergence of formal and informal institutions as a response to 
collective action dilemmas. In particular, we used the theory of collective action to unravel 
the factors that could help sustain the health commons of a devolved region in the UK. 
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Our findings had theoretically contributed to the application of the health commons by 
using a case study outside the US setting. We advance the debate on whether publicly-
funded health systems are comparable to that of a small community in Grand Junction, 
Colorado. Our empirical results show that regardless of the size, location, or contextual 
setting, communities with existing levels of cooperation and collective intention thrive in 
collaborative settings and can successfully craft, enforce, and monitor their own bounded 
resources. In order for us to execute this, our study applied the multiple levels of analysis 
of the IAD framework in order to identify the collaborative mechanisms that led to such 
institutional outcomes. This methodological contribution allowed us to extend the 
application of the IAD framework in the health commons setting.  








Lastly, our research offered an alternative perspective in looking at the health 
devolution policy in England. We recommended that NHS England re-examine their 
position in the devolution process and allow devolved combined authorities to function 
as a 'state-reinforced self-governance'. The central government can still play an active 
role in providing political and financial support, but without authoritative involvement in 
Extended the application 
of the health commons 
outside the US setting 
Applied the multiple levels 
of the IAD framework in 
identifying the emergence 
of institutions in local NHS 
governance   
Contributed to the debate 
in English devolution and 
the use of institutions in 
managing public services  










monitoring and regulation process. This will allow devolved English regions the flexibility 
that they needed to craft their own institutional arrangements suited to their local needs, 
but also receive collaborative support from the government and NHS England when 
needed. 
This research has limitations, both in the theoretical and methodological aspects. 
First, our views on managing the commons were mainly driven by Ostrom’s 
advancement on the common pool resources and the role of institutions in addressing 
sustainability problems. We focused on neo-institutionalist theories of rational behaviour, 
collective action, and collaborative governance as the key drivers of our model. However, 
we failed to explore other theories that could also potentially explain individual behaviour 
and the need for collaborative mechanisms to organise relationships, such as principal-
agent theory, network theory, organisational theory, and new institutional economics. 
This could perhaps be explored and applied in future research when examining factors 
other than institutions. Second, our interpretation of the health commons was limited to 
McGinnis’ definition and his application of Ostrom’s design principles. Since our focus 
was to compare health systems similar to the commons, other concepts such as health 
governance were not compatible to our research focus. Moreover, our conceptualisation 
of the health commons was also constrained by the limited empirical evidence that 
explored other health systems outside the US. Because of this, we were not able to 
evaluate the full extent of the health commons in diverse settings. 
Third, we encountered several methodological issues when conducting this 
research. Our research design focused only in a single case, which we have already 
justified previously (Chapter 4.4.3). Whilst we have been successful in identifying how 
GM has managed to create institutional arrangements and use collaborative 
mechanisms to govern their local health systems, it remains that GM is an extreme case 
that exhibited strong models of cooperation and collaboration. We recommend future 
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studies to expand the cases being examined and conduct a comparative analysis to 
further diversify the results. Perhaps other methods could also be explored, such as 
action research or ethnography, where the researcher can immerse in the system and 
make observations. Field study would have been a perfect data collection technique for 
this research; however, due to the constraints resulting from the amount of time spent 
for the HRA application and the fact that the Partnership already commissioned 
University of Manchester to conduct a qualitative and quantitative evaluation, this was 
removed as an option. 
Given these limitations, we are hoping that more policy scholars in the UK and 
Europe will take interest in applying an institutional approach the health commons and 
advance the empirical evidence using more innovative methodological approaches. We 
are also hoping that this research was able to inspire an alternative solution to examining 
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